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Abstract 
Legal theory has failed to fully explore the rhetorical in the judicial decision 
and, in doing so, has misunderstood the key role played by reasons that seek 
to legitimate and justifY while expressing emotion and commitment. This 
thesis sets out to understand why legal theory has failed to do so and what 
role rhetoric plays in the judicial decision. 
Three legal theorists, Chaim Perelman, Bernard Jackson and Neil 
MacCormick are used to show that it is seeking to be philosophically 
acceptable that has led legal theorists to avoid the emotional and character-
based aspects of the judicial decision. Two historical studies, of the Talmud 
and Aristotle's Ars Rhetorica, demonstrate that rhetoric can be seen as closely 
related to the limits of authority in the system and the character and identity 
of the decision-maker. These insights are then applied to the common law, 
exemplified by six cases from the law of negligence. This highlights the 
importance of the commitment of judges to their own sense of role and the 
way limitations on reasoning help to create this sense. 
The thesis concludes by considering the relationship between philosophy and 
judgment and argues that they can be seen as different forms of understanding 
and that there are strong ethical reasons for rejecting attempts to see either as 
a paradigm for all understanding. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and methodology 
Persuasion is the power of the weak: 
Appeal to facts shared by all parties, the claim to speak in accord with 
the canons of reason universally compelling for every side - these serve 
in particular the polemical requirements of the weak. The strong decline 
logic for themselves and declare what is reasonable (Neusner 1983, 
123). 
Although the judiciary are usually associated with power it is the contention 
of this thesis that it is persuasion that is the key to understanding the process 
of judicial decision-making. 1 This is because it is in seeking to persuade that 
judges reveal where they feel that they need to provide reasons to legitimate 
and justify their own decision-making processes. This highlights aspects of 
the decision-making process that are linked to ethics, emotion and character 
which are often hidden and which legal theory has both ignored and helped to 
hide. 
This introduction chapter starts by setting out the main themes of the work 
before exploring in more detail the problems not simply of understanding but 
of describing that process 
1 Michelman (1986) points out that in using justifications judges are presupposing that they 
will be judged according to certain standards and that judgment is an activity which can 
be so judged. A similar point is made by Kraemer see chapter 5 below, p 246. 
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An overview 
1. Persuasion, legitimacy and legal meaning 
Derrida has said of law: 
law is always an authorised force, a force that justifies itself, even if this 
justification may be judged from elsewhere to be unjust or unjustifiable 
.... It is the force essentially implied in the very concept of 'justice as 
law (droit)', of justice as it becomes 'droit' (Derrida 1992,5) 
The stated goal of this thesis is to understand the process by which judges 
legitimate and justify their decisions and it concentrates on the limitations, 
the boundaries which define what is and is not persuasive. These are the areas 
where the judge reveals the limits of hislher own power within the system and 
the limits of the power of the system itself 
In concentrating on persuasion the thesis deals with an aspect of language 
which has often been discredited or ignored, dismissed as rhetoric:2 
... a speaker's or writer's self-conscious manipulation of his medium 
with a view to ensuring his message as favourable a reception as 
possible on the part of the particular audience being addressed. (Cole 
1991, ix) 
Yet it is these aspects of judicial decision-making which look outward and 
which seek to be acceptable which, it will be argued, are where the judicial 
role can be best seen and understood. In the way that they present their 
decisions judges are primarily seeking to persuade a legal and narrowly a 
judicial audience that the decision should live on and become part of the 
system either by becoming a precedent or simply by being protected from 
2 See Plato's Gorgias (1953) which is the foundation of much anti-rhetorical philosophy. See 
also Vickers' influential In Defence of Rhetoric (1988) for a historical overview and a 
contemporary reevaluation of rhetoric. 
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appeal. The way they structure and use language in these decisions reveals 
what they believe the system will find acceptable. 
For the legal system what is relevant about each judicial decision is the text 
that is recorded and can therefore be reused not the subjective reason why the 
judge made that specific decision. The judge does claim in the text of the 
decision that what is being presented are the reasons why slhe made that 
decision. This may be true or it may not but the reasons that are used publicly 
tell us about what the legal system regards as appropriate reasons, as reasons 
that can legitimately justify the judicial use of power and make the decision 
enforceable. In doing so they also reveal what is legally meaningful, what 
statements have meaning within a legal context and this is why the judicial 
decision, the structures within which it is contained, and the language used 
within it are the subjects of this thesis. 
These limitations should not be understood as negative as they allow the 
judges access to a space where they can gain power and authority, help to 
generate a strong sense of individual role and purpose and create a legal 
community within which the values and ethics of justice and the rule of law 
are worked out. These aspects of the process encourage the judge to absorb 
some of the character of the system into hislher own character and sense of 
identity. This provides a strong foundation of commitment to the system 
which permeates the way individual judges present their role to themselves 
and others in their decisions. 
Yet although these limitations are significant they have been generally 
ignored, Cyrus Tata (1997) in an article on representations of sentencing 
recognises they exist but limits their role: 
The giving of publicly declared reasons for a decision tend to be 
couched in legal analytical terms. Has this more to do with the necessity 
to fulfil a popularly held expectation of the principles of justice than a 
revelation of the stream of consciousness in the decision process? 
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... in fact these accounts tell us little about the actual sentencing 
decision process itself and more about the demands of legal rhetoric. 
However, this is not to say that legal rhetoric is unimportant or should 
be ignored, but that we should recognise that it has a symbolic role of 
legitimation rather than an instrumental role. (1997,415) 
Tata is correct in arguing that legal rhetoric has a symbolic role but in arguing 
that rhetoric has less to do with decision-making he is failing to understand 
the significance of this statement. Claims to legitimacy are used to authorise 
the use of power. The problem of legitimacy, therefore, is how to justify the 
use of power within society3 and is linked to a central aspect of the judicial 
role, the power to make decisions which will be followed, indeed this is could 
be seen as the defining aspect of what makes reasoning recognisably judicial. 
The rhetoric they use therefore, however symbolic, contains a wealth of 
information about the judicial role and the process of decision-making. It also 
allows an exploration of the place of character and ethics in law while taking 
the structures and languages of law seriously. 
The thesis then attempts to describe the architecture of the judicial/legal 
space that is created by these limitations and to understand in some detail 
how it generates authority and is therefore an attractive space which has 
benefits for those who choose to submit to its rules. It concentrations on 
persuasion rather than the more acceptable viewpoints of "legitimacy" and 
"justification" in order to uncover aspects of the context, specifically the 
ethical and emotional aspects, which are neither rational nor logical and 
3 Some thinkers, notably Habermas (1988), have identified a legitimation crisis. They argue 
that the move to a post-modern, pluralist society with its competing truth claims have 
made it harder for states to justify their use of power. See also Teubner (1989) and Unger 
(1976). Douzinas and Warrington (1994) argue that the crisis is occurring because the 
split between public and private law is becoming less clear. Their identification of the 
problem has not been uncritically accepted. Rottleuthner (1989) has argued that there is 
no evidence of a crisis of legitimacy caused by a change from modernity to post-
modernity. This is a specific criticism of the picture of social change portrayed by 
Habermas and others and does not mean that legitimacy is an issue that legal theorists 
should not consider. 
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which tend to be missed by legal theorists. 4 
2. The problems of legal theory 
Underlying the contention of this thesis that persuaSIOn is the key to the 
judicial decision-making process is a critique of the failure of legal theory to 
fully consider the rhetorical and symbolic elements of legal decision-making.5 
This is despite the fact that the focus of twentieth century philosophy on the 
production of meaning by rendering the rational and logical problematic 
encourages a consideration of these aspects of law. 
This movement within philosophy is of particular significance for a thesis 
which aims to understand legal meaning because the growing interest in the 
production of meaning within western philosophy is closely linked to the 
collapse of any philosophically objective worldview and has generated an 
entirely new field of analysis - cultural theory. Initially, under the influence of 
Marx, the aim of such theories was to discover the defining structures that 
underlay and determined societies but, in the latter half of the twentieth 
century, structuralism was widely rejected and, in the collapse of 
structuralism that is contemporary post-structuralism, meaning is found to be 
more fluid, more organic, hierarchical structures have been rejected in favour 
of webs of significance.6 This more complex view of the way in which 
4 Almost every legal theorist has at some time considered judicial decision-making. In recent 
years, Dworkin (1986) has been particularly influential but he is only the latest in a long 
line which could include Cardozo (1926), Wasserstrom (1961) and Fuller (1966) amongst 
many others. 
5 Fish is perhaps the most extreme example of this. He has gone so far as to state that theory 
has no consequences other than "rhetorical" ones in his attempts to explain its limited 
impact. (1989, 15) This thesis will attempt to answer this by showing the way in which 
rhetorical consequences can be significant and in chapters 2 and 5 will consider the 
relationship between theory and judgment. 
6 Milner (1994) has identified three dominant strands within the post-structuralist movement, 
Derridean which revels in the tensions of the collapse of structures and seeks to demystifY 
and deconstruct, Lacanian, which is Freudian and focused on the creation of the subject 
and Foucaultian which seeks to describe an interplay of relative cultural schemes of 
signification. This description of the movement of cultural theory is clearly not the only 
one see Chaney (1994) which is similar in some respects but concentrates on the roots in 
sociology rather than philosophy. There is though agreement that turning to cultural 
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meaning is created and sustained provide opportunities for a re-evaluation of 
the role of the symbolic and rhetorical in law. 
Chapter 2 contains an analysis of the work of three theorists, Cha'im 
Perelman, Bernard Jackson and Neil MacCormick which describes their 
attempts to create theories of legal reasoning within the shadow of these shifts 
in philosophy. It will be argued that although interesting these theories fail to 
understand why judicial decisions are grounded and compellable and that this 
is because they have concentrated not on understanding the decision within its 
own context but in translating it in a "philosophically acceptable way". 
Although they are attempting to rethink how philosophy should understand 
judicial decision-making they are still attempting to fit the decision into 
philosophical paradigms and concentrate on providing solutions to 
philosophical problems rather than seemg in them the opportunity to 
reunderstand legal decision-making. 
This concentration on methodology and on the relationship between the 
theorist and the material reflects the concerns of contemporary philosophy 
which has become increasingly self-referential. All three theorists are 
working within the tradition of philosophy and Emmanuel Levinas has argued 
that the strength of philosophy, which he describes as speaking Greek, is its 
ability to say anything but that this is also is the source of its problems: 
I believe that Greek philosophy cannot be eliminated. Even in order to 
criticise the ultimate character of Greek philosophy, one needs Greek 
philosophy ... The Greeks have taught us how to speak. Not to speak, 
not the saying but to rediscover ourselves in the said. Greek philosophy 
is a special language which can say everything to everyone because it 
theory has been largely about attempts to understand the ways in which meaning is 
produced and created. 
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never presupposes anything in particular. Greek philosophy is the way 
that people speak in the modem university the world over ... It is a 
certain way of presenting things. It is a way of using a language which 
everyone can enter. The second quality of this language is that one is 
not obliged to take the forms of the language for the actual forms of the 
meaning it represents. In spite of the fact that something has been said 
in a certain way, the forms of this saying do not leave a trace in what 
has been shown. And consequently, one can show what goes beyond the 
universality of comprehension. It is a form which leaves no trace in the 
matter it presents. You can unsay what you have said. (Ainley, Hughes 
and Wright 1988, 178) 
This means that there can be problems within philosophy with founding 
theories and making those theories compellable. This is a particular problem 
for these three theorists who are seeking to understand a form of reasoning 
which seeks to be both grounded and compellable and further exacerbated by 
the loss to philosophy of the ways it has generally sought to be so, logic and 
rationality. 
The theorists chosen have all explored reasoning and rationality and share the 
view that the traditional methods of describing law and the way in which 
people reason within the legal process is in some way inadequate. They 
therefore deal with the problems raised by twentieth century philosophy and 
this is one reason why they have been chosen. 
Although their interests in reasoning and in finding new ways to describe the 
reasoning process makes them suitable for this study, they are not alone. 
Many others have looked at these issues. These three have been chosen 
because of the way they relate to the texts which are being considered here. 7 
7 It may appear that there are others who are equally relevant. Notably, Dworkin, who has 
dominated the discussion of judicial reasoning since Law's Empire (1986); and Goodrich 
(1987) who has written on rhetoric. These theorists, though, do not show the range of 
interests which has led to the decision to focus on the three theorists chosen here. They 
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Chalm Perelman's work cuts directly across the concerns of this thesis. 
Perelman has developed a new theory of reasoning that borrows heavily from 
Aristotle's theory of rhetoric and that puts persuasion at the very heart of 
reasoning. His theory, thus, shows one way in which an historical theory that 
is being considered can be adapted to fit modem practice as well as centring 
on the central concept of the thesis - persuasion. 
Bernard Jackson also has a strong link to one of the traditions being studied 
here. He has published widely on biblical law and the early stages of Jewish 
legal development. 8 This alone would make him of special interest to this 
study but his theory of legal reasoning adds extra weight to this. Like 
Perelman, Jackson has sought to find new ways to describe law. He has 
turned to semiotics to provide a model for legal meaning. Unlike Perelman, 
he does not stress the relationship between persuader and persuaded but his 
work is based on language and communication. 
Neil MacCormick was chosen, partly, to contrast with these two theorists. He 
has worked in legal reasoning for some years and has been interested in the 
process of justification as well as the nature and status of legal reasoning 
itself. Unlike Perelman and Jackson, he has tried to work within the positivist 
view of legal reasoning. He has updated and adapted this to take account of 
problems in this view and has described himself as a post-positivist. Despite 
this he still remains within the traditional paradigm of legal reasoning. 
Although he has no direct links to the two traditions that the thesis analyses, 
he is a Scots jurist and this does link him to the section that explores 
contemporary practice. 
These three then show different aspects of legal theory and provide three 
will be dealt with where relevant. 
8 Some of these are dealt with in chapter 3 below though this thesis will not deal in detail with 
Jackson's recent application of his semiotic theory to this field - see n 43, chapter 2. A 
full list of all of Jackson's published works can be found at 
http://www.legaltheory.demon.co.uklIib_biblioBSJI.htmI 
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different models for explaining law and legal reasoning. The analysis of their 
work concludes by arguing that at the core of the failure of all of these models 
is the person. They all use individuals at key moments in their theories but 
this person is a construct fulfilling the need of the system and they fail to 
explain why a real individual becomes committed to and works within the 
system of legal reasoning. It is in seeking to understand these questions and to 
provide legal theory with a form of analysis which can include the emotional, 
ethical and character-based aspects of reasoning that the thesis turns to a 
comparative analysis of very different models of law in practice. 
3. Developing a theory of judicial decision-making. 
Chapter 3 contains an analysis of decision-making presented in two very 
different texts, the Talmud and the Ars Rhetorica. This methodology has been 
chosen in response to the problems described in chapter 2. Instead of seeking 
to approach legal theory with an abstract or generalised theory the studies of 
these texts allows a theory to be developed which, by staying close to the 
details of reasoning and using a comparative approach, seeks to understand 
the aspects of legal decision-making which a more philosophical approach 
which encourages a focus on the rational and logical elements obscures. 
The study of the Talmud, a work of legal reasomng that evolved over 
centuries and whose schematic restrictions are highly developed, generates a 
complex understanding of the traditional within law. Aristotle's work on 
rhetoric deals with decision-making in a legal context where the impact of 
law was minimal and highlights the influence of character on the process of 
persuasIOn. 
These two studies were chosen in part because they both deal with law in the 
context of a lack of authority, the Talmud developed a system that remain 
authoritative without a state and Aristotle considers persuasion in a system 
which had few limitations on what could be said. The other reason behind the 
choice of these two texts is the recognition of the central role that Greek and 
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Jewish tradition has had on western thought and philosophy.9 As has been 
said: 
Such was the acquisitive reach of Hellenistic and Hebraic articulation, 
that genuine additions and new finds have been rare. (Steiner 1998, 
23)10 
Recently Greek and Jewish approaches have been used as exemplary 
paradigms and given this and their influence on western philosophy a study of 
them should also help to illuminate some assumptions which might otherwise 
go unchallenged. ll 
There is a need though to be careful as Rose has pointed out in becoming 
symbols in the post-modem debate about philosophy Jerusalem and Athens 
are in danger of being misused: 
Jerusalem against Athens has become the emblem for revelation against 
reason, for the hearing of the commandments against the search for first 
principles, for the love of the neighbour against the explanation of the 
world, and for the prophet against the philosopher. (Rose 1993, 1) 
Stone (1993) argues in particular that in such debates Jerusalem is being used 
because of the perceived failure of liberal philosophy represented by 
Athens.12 This, though, has led to Jewish thinking being deliberately 
misinterpreted to suit contemporary needs. Rose (1993) makes the same point 
and argues further that the conflict that is set up also misinterprets western 
philosophy: 
In their attempts to find a way to voice commandment and commentary, 
these rediscoveries of Judaism at the end of the end of philosophy are 
9 See Tully (1988) for the argument that both these traditions affected canon law and through 
this English common law. (Leites 1988,3; Sampson 1988, 88). 
10 Handelman makes a similar point: "Matthew Arnold, in the nineteenth century, defined the 
tension between "Hebrew and Hellene" as the essential creative dialectic of western 
culture." (1982,3) 
11 Kuczewski (1994) outlines the main movements in Aristotelian influenced works on ethics. 
Kronman (1993) has used Aristotle's concept of Phronesis to generate the concept of the 
lawyer-statesman. Stone (1993) details the use made by American constitutional theorists 
of Jewish law, the most influential of whom has been Robert Cover (1983). 
12 Kronman (1993) turns to Aristotle because of the same perceived failure. 
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deeply misleading: they misrepresent the rationalism or knowledge 
against which they define themselves; they misrepresent Judaism; above 
all, they misrepresent the modernity and the history in which they and 
Judaism are implicated the <nature' and the <freedom' so cavalierly 
cashiered in both approaches. (1993, 16) 
This argument that philosophy is misunderstanding its subject in order to 
solve its own problems is similar to that which will be made against the legal 
theories presented in chapter 2. It is hoped that by using these texts as models 
and seeking not to abstract from them but to use them as examples of 
persuasive strategies this thesis will avoid some of these dangers. 
At the end of this chapter these studies are used to present a view of 
persuasive reasoning which includes the ethical, emotional and character-
based aspects of reasoning that legal theories have often missed. This 
concentrates on identity formation and the way in which structures which 
seek to be persuasive stay close to the particular and define the distance from 
the text. The chapter concludes by considering the implications of this for 
legal theory and introducing the approach taken to the study of common law 
reasoning that follows. 
4. The common law 
The study of the common law in chapter 3 highlights six influential decisions 
in which judges have explicitly considered their methodology and what forms 
of reasoning should be considered persuasive. These all come from the area 
of negligence an area where the judiciary have had to explicitly consider their 
understanding of the role of law in society. 
The chapter concentrates on the limitations that the judiciary impose on their 
own decision-making. It starts by exploring the concept of precedent and the 
way in which this founds the authority of the judge. It then considers the 
development of the law of negligence in Scotland and in England and the way 
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in which different views of the limitations on law affect the arguments which 
are possible. The chapter concludes with an indepth exploration of two 
methodologies, case based and principled reasoning. This exploration looks at 
the way in which these strategies reveal, hide and enforce the personal 
commitment of the judge to the law. This is revealed by the use of language 
and persuasive techniques. 
5. Conclusion 
The thesis concludes by revisiting the core themes of the thesis. It considers 
the relationship between philosophy and persuasion and judgment and 
persuasion and the ethical choice that is made between choosing to undertake 
either philosophy or judgment. It also reexplores in the light of this the 
reasons why legal theory has so often failed to consider the importance of the 
emotional and the symbolic. It, and the thesis, concludes by arguing that 
judgment should not be seen as a paradigm of understanding and although 
philosophy has made us aware of our limitations in understanding there is a 
need to both understand the power that limitations provide and the need to see 
beyond them. This chapter introduces the problem of understanding which 
this conclusion seeks to resolve. 
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Methodology 
1. Understanding 
The process by which we understand each other or texts often appear 
immediate and even unmediated but it is clear, especially since Gadamer's 
Truth and Method,13 that all understanding requires a set of preconceptions. 
The speed with which we are able to understand someone or some text is 
dependent on how many preconceptions are shared. It is not possible to come 
to any topic without preunderstanding: 
The mere recognition of a fact is theory-impregnated and guided by a 
number of anticipations. (Bleicher 1980, 102) 
The rise of cultural analysis has participated and resulted from the extension 
of this problem to all knowledge. For Foucault: 
The breakdown of philosophical subjectivity and its dispersion in a 
language that discourses it while multiplying it within the space created 
by its absence is probably one of the fundamental structures of 
contemporary thought. (1977,42) 
This raIses questions about any attempt to understand. If the subject is 
determined, preconceptions cannot be avoided. Gadamer (1994) suggests that 
they can be limited: 
The important thing is to be aware of one's own bias, so that the text 
can present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its own truth against 
one's own foremeanings. (1994,269) 
Thus, to understand, the interpreter must be aware of hislher own bias. This 
leads to the problem of representation and of self-representation as to 
13 The original Truth and Method was published in German in 1960. The text that will be 
referred to is the English second revised edition (1994) which translates not the original 
1960 edition but the fifth German revised edition of 1986. 
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understand requires the interpreter to be able to represent hislher own bias. 
This though is impossible: 'To be 'historically' means that knowledge of 
oneself can never be complete." (Gadamer 1994, 302) This is not simply 
because, as Gadamer suggests one is embedded in history but because every 
attempt to understand and in particular to understand one's own 
preconceptions changes that understanding. The difficulties of representing a 
process whereby the process itself changes the subject is one that will be 
returned to throughout the thesis and is a particular one for theorists who in 
seeking to understand have to freeze a process which keeps moving. George 
Steiner (1998) has asserted that any act of understanding is an act of 
translation and that if the ideal translation is the one that recreates the other's 
thoughts in my own terms with as little interference as possible, the goal of 
translation would appear to be replication and in this sense: 
any genuine act of translation is, in one regard at least, a transparent 
absurdity, an effort to go backwards up the escalator of time and to re-
enact voluntarily what was a contingent notion of spirit. (1998, 75) 
He (1998, 264) has though helpfully pointed out that: 
The defense of translation has the immense advantage of abundant, 
vulgar fact.. .. Somehow the 'impossible' is overcome at every moment 
in human affairs. Its logic subsists in its own rigorous limbo, but it has 
no empirical consequences. 
Steiner's description of translation is not of a structure but of a four step 
process. He describes the four steps as: trust; aggression; incorporation; and 
reciprocity.14 Trust refers to the basic assumption that the text is meaningful 
and that there is something there from which we can learn. Aggression is the 
moment of appropriation where choices are made about what the text means. 
14 Although Steiner and Gadamer agree on the basic structure of understanding, their 
methodology is different. Rather than agreeing that understanding requires "loss of self', 
Steiner seems to suggest it requires a strong awareness of self Not only of the 
preconceptions that are brought to the text but also of the ethical dilemmas that arise in 
the way that the text is appropriated. The reader needs to know not only what influences 
himlherselfbut also what the act of interpretation does to texts. 
Malloch VA 2002 Introduction and methodology 15 
Incorporation is the natural result of this understanding where the knowledge 
taken from the text is incorporated in to the world-view of the interpreter. 
Reciprocity is the overtly ethical step where the original source is dignified. 
This process is similar, though in more detail to that described by Gadamer 
(1994) who argues that understanding does not mean trying to think: the same 
as the other but rather: 
... understanding always involves something like applying the text to be 
understood to the interpreter's present situation. (1994,308) 
This is a temporal process where "past and present are constantly mediated" 
(1994, 290). This though leads to the danger that the past is not questioned 
and this is why Gadamer has been criticised, by Apel amongst others 
(Bleicher 1980, 147), for failing to consider the question of justification, for 
abandoning "normatively relevant critique" and settling for mere description. 
It is alleged that Gadamer can explain but not question the tradition. 
This is a slightly unfair critique. In Truth and Method (1994) Gadamer clearly 
maintains that participation in the process of understanding requires critique. 
D sing law as an example he argues that: 
... judging the case involves not merely applying the universal principle 
according to which it is judged, but co-determining, supplementing and 
correcting that principle. (1994,39) 
In law, critique is supplied by the participation of the interpreter or judge. In 
applying the law to his/her present situation the tradition is altered by it. 
Gadamer uses law as a paradigm because of the necessity within law to 
reunderstand previous principles and it could be argued that it is because of 
the power of the principle to ensure that it is noticed that leads to it not only 
being applied but criticised. 
Thus Gadamer does provide for the possibility, indeed necessity, of critique 
within any structure of understanding. He does not seem to allow room for 
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fundamental critique of the principles that form that structure. Fundamental 
critique requires the capacity to go outside, to use something from beyond the 
tradition as a guide to critique. Implicit in any such critique is the assumption 
that the standards used to judge the traditions are somehow more universal 
and not as historically determined. For Gadamer no text can do this as "The 
text that is understood historically is forced to abandon its claim to be saying 
something true."(1994, 303) After all, texts are written and edited and read by 
historically determined subjects. 15 If understanding can be seen as a process 
where an established law, truth, principle or text is understood in a new 
context the question becomes how does one establish what is relevant, what 
needs to be reunderstood. 
2. Relevancy 
The moment when a translator decides that a text is relevant s/he assumes not 
only that it can be understood but that understanding is useful and specifically 
that it can somehow speak to their present. This section looks at two aspects 
of this, what a reader looks for in the text and the impact of texts which are 
defined as relevant. 
Any reader starts by assuming that the text in front of him/her can speak to 
him/her. This leads them to consider what in the text s/he should be expecting 
to hear. Traditionally, s/he would be expected to look for authorial intention. 
For Derrida (1988) the name attached to the piece of writing is not the same 
as the person who wrote it. It is not the person's thoughts that live on in the 
text but: 
Only the name can inherit and this is why the name, to be distinguished 
from the bearer, is always and a priori a dead man's name, a name of 
15 Gadamer (1994, xxxiv) makes the point that historically determined consciousness means 
not only that consciousness is determined by history but that consciousness is aware of 
being so determined. 
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The name at the end of the text is as much a creation of the reader as it was of 
the real person who had that name. Derrida (1988) makes this point directly 
with reference to Nietzsche: 
To hear and understand it one must also produce it, because, like his 
voice, Nietzsche's signature awaits its own form its own event. This 
event is entrusted to us. (1988,51) 
It is up to the reader to decide then what should live on. There is reason 
though to suggest that the reader is not completely free in this process. 
Whenever a text is approached there is an instinctive urge to go beyond it, to 
find out what the author really meant, or if it relates to the 'real' world 
Hillis Miller (1987) argues that: 
... reading is subject not to the text as its law, but to the law to which the 
text is subject. This law forces the reader to betray the text or deviate 
from it in the act of reading it in the name of a higher demand that can 
yet be reached only by way of the text. This response creates another 
text which is a new act.(1987, 120) 
The effects of this law that seems to transcend the text can be seen in a 
number of ways e.g., the tendency of the reader to generalise from the text, to 
make of it an example or to see it as a moral law. Hillis Miller (1987) 
describes this as a linguistic necessity rather than a transcendental one. The 
need to see more in a text than there is, the search for relevance or the elusive 
'author', comes from within the language itself16 
Foucault (1972) sees this need to go beyond as deriving from the poverty of 
language, from its failure to say enough and therefore: 
To interpret is a way of reacting to enunciative poverty, and to 
16 Chapter 5 will return to this need to see beyond the text in exploring philosophy. 
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compensate for it by a multiplicity of meaning; a way of speaking on 
the basis ofthat poverty, and yet despite it. (1972, 120) 
Readers then have a need to generate meaning from the text to apply it 
beyond its own context. This is particularly true for those readers who are 
aware that the text they are reading is traditional, a text that has been passed 
down to them as relevant or "classic".17 Classic texts in all disciplines exert a 
certain amount of dominance. They are regarded by those working in the field 
as important and this regulates what is and is not studied. 18 Conal Condren 
(1985) has studied the effect in political theory of designating some texts 
'classic' and has found that: 
As a field, they structure our judgements on an extraordinarily wide 
range of intellectual enterprises past, present and future. (1985,3) 
These texts came with a set of readings which have already defined what in 
them as relevant and this not only limits the way the reader approaches these 
texts but in doing so affects the way all other texts are approached. 19 
Critchley'S (1992) definition of the Derridean concept of Cloture or closure 
echoes this. "Closure is the double refusal both of remaining within the limits 
of the tradition and of the possibility of transgressing the limit." (1992, 20) 
Such texts then impact on the context within which they can be understood. 
They still though need to be reinterpreted to live on and though the reader will 
be given a text with a set of readings they will still need to apply it to their 
own context. There remains then a need to see something more in the text. 
The gap between the reader and the text still needs to be dealt with, in 
Steiner's structure this is not a question of meaning and understanding but as 
a choice is a matter of ethics. 
17 Handelman (1982) points out that it is from Judaism that we have the concepts of a canon or 
"classic" texts. 
18 In some ways they operate in a similar way to the structure of precedent considered in 
chapter 4. 
19 Although Dworkin's chain novel metaphor (Dworkin 1986) would appear to be related to 
this point. Dworkin does not fully explore the way in which such texts can limit the way 
they are understood and interpreted. 
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3. Ethics 
The question of ethics and in particular how it is revealed through the 
language and structures used in persuasive reasoning will appear as a concern 
throughout this thesis. This section looks at the role of ethics in the decision 
made to understand or reunderstand a text. When research is dealing with 
human beings, ethics is usually considered at an early stage.20 This is rarely 
the case with texts. 
Human beings have developed thousands oflanguages. George Steiner (1998) 
believes that languages proliferated to protect societies: 
There have been so many thousands of human tongues, there still are, 
because there have been particularly in the archaic stages of social 
history, so many distinct groups intent on keeping from one another the 
inherited, singular springs of their identity, and engaging in creating 
their own semantic worlds, their 'alternaties'. (1998,243-4)21 
This extends right down to individuals each of whom has, to an extent, hislher 
own language. It can also be applied to each work that an interpreter or 
commentator is attempting to understand. Translation of all sorts seeks to 
break through the barrier of language, to make what is personal and unique 
belong to all: 
in this sense there is in every act of translation - and especially where it 
succeeds - a touch of treason. Hoarded dreams, patents of life are being 
taken across the frontier. (Steiner 1998,244) 
Simon Critchley (1993) points to the choices inherent in all translation or 
20 The British Sociological Association for example has produced a statement of Ethical 
Practice which considers the ethics of doing research with human subjects in some detail. 
21 That language is integral to the identity of a culture or society can clearly be shown in the 
way that attempts have been made to control societies. Following the '45 rebellion in 
Scotland, the government amongst other provisions banned Gaelic in an attempt to 
undermine highland culture and there are numerous contemporary examples; ego 
prohibitions on Kurdish in Turkey. 
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interpretation and concludes that: 
Betrayal is the fate of all commentary. For commentary is never neutral, 
it employs a meta-language which always derives from a choice or a 
decision - in short, a critical judgement which focuses upon certain 
texts, themes, and authors to the exclusion of others.(1993, 60) 
This appears to be another way of stating the problem of relevance but it is 
possible to see this also from the writer's point of view. Derrida (1988) has 
looked in some detail at the proper name and finds that it contains a 
dichotomy within itself A proper name both proclaims its uniqueness, in that 
it cannot be understood as other than itself, and yet it appeals to be interpreted 
for that is how it endures: 
On the one hand, don't translate me, that is, respect me as a proper 
name, respect my law of the proper name which stands over and above 
all languages. And, on the other hand, translate me, that is, understand 
me, preserve me within the universal language, follow my law, and so 
on. (1988, 102) 
Writers and the texts they produce are subject to the same law as readers, they 
want to live on and to become exemplary. Gadamer argues that it is possible 
to limit the betrayal and allow the text priority over the translator's views: 
Translation allows what is foreign and what is one's own to merge in a 
new form by defending the point of the other even if it is opposed to 
one's view. (1994,94) 
This approach respects the otherness of the text but it may be asked if it is 
possible to approach the text so neutrally? Steiner (1998) feels that the 
translator owes something to the text with which slhe works but that this 
consists of giving back to the text and comes at the end of the process: 
The translator, the exegetist, the reader is faithful to his text, makes his 
response responsible, only when he endeavours to restore the balance of 
forces, of integral presence, which his appropriative comprehension has 
disrupted. (1998, 318) 
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As Boucher (1985, 27) puts it: 
The prejudices which afford us our initial entry into a text become 
modified by being recognized and confronted with what is identified as 
other. But this confrontation always occur in the world of the 
interpreter, and the modification brought about in the encounter is not 
of the complete suppression of the self, but one of the assimilation in 
and broadening one's horizon by the appropriation of a text's meaning. 
Thus focused understanding illuminates the text and, if the interpreter takes 
the text seriously, s/he dignifies it and thus the text remains relevant. The 
paradox of the name has to be maintained rather than avoided. The otherness 
of the text and therefore the difficulties in presuming to speak for it need to 
be recognised. Yet if it is to continue to exist it needs to be interpreted. 
This description of the process explains a need to go beyond that exists in 
both the text and the reader but does not deal with the gap, the distance 
between the text and reader, the details of the relationships. Steiner has 
described two poles - critic and reader - and describes how they relate: 
The critic argues his distance from and towards the text. To "criticize" 
means to perceive at a distance, at the order of remove most appropriate 
to clarity, .. to communicate intelligibility. (1979,423) 
It is the distance that allows the critic to understand the text, Steiner uses the 
example of the movement of stepping back from a painting and argues that 
the "good critic makes this motion conscious to himself and to his public". 
This relationship is ethical because it is open to argument, the good critic is 
the one who allows this motion to be revealed, who makes the distance clear, 
Steiner describes this as "responsible", in the sense of open to a response. 
This is certainly a relationship that can fill the content of the process of 
translation. 
The relationship between reader and text is very different. The goal of the 
reader is to repeat the text. 
The reader attempts to negate the space between the text and himself. 
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He would be perpetrated by, immersed in its presentness. The reader 
strives for fusion with the text via internalization ... At its primary and 
most radical level, the thorough act of reading, the full apprehension of 
the presences transcedantes in language ... entails memorization. The 
act of learning by heart - an idiom of notable precision - is no technical 
auxiliary or carry-over from liturgical or pedagogical practice. It is of 
the essence of the reader's attempt to abolish or sublate that very 
distance which the critic stakes out. (1979, 445i2 
The reader seeks to allow the text to become part of him/her and although this 
may seem to be a more ethical approach than that of the critic, it is perhaps a 
less responsible one. The reader cannot communicate fully this experience, 
indeed it has to be unique - it cannot be shared, cannot be translated. This 
suggests that translation is not the only approach to a text and that taking it 
assumes a specific ethical approach. 
It also brings to light an aspect of methodology that has not yet been dealt 
with - the power of the text itself So far what has been considered has been 
the way in which the text ought to be approached, not what lies within the 
text itself, Steiner's description of the reader suggests an openness to 
something in the text, and clearly that is something powerful. Umberto Eco 
(1989) takes a less mystical approach but also argues that the way texts are 
written will affect how they are approached and in themselves generate 
different sorts of relationship to the text, something which helps to fill the 
content of not only the ethical final step, but the first step of the process of 
translation - trust. 
Eco starts from the author rather than the reader and points out that in order to 
communicate authors too need to consider their methodology or, as he 
22 This brings to mind the Borges short story, Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote where 
Pierre Menard is described as seeking to "reconstruct, word for word, the novel that for 
him [Cervantes] was spontaneous." (1998, 92). 
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expresses it, in order to communicate an author pictures a model reader who 
shares a series of codes or underlying assumptions. These codes go beyond a 
shared language and would include shared knowledge of society and even of 
textual interpretation. Indeed the way the author sets out the codes in the text 
can limit the approach that can be taken. Eco describes two types of texts, the 
closed text which sets out with an average reader in mind and is resistant to 
ot4er interpretations and the open text which will retain a closed text at its 
heart but is open to other interpretations. Eco uses as an example of the way 
authors can close texts the discovery of perspective in art: 
The scientific and practical development of the techniques of 
perspective bear witness to the gradual maturation of this awareness of 
an interpretative subjectivity pitted against the work of art. Yet it is 
equally certain that this awareness has led to a tendency to operate 
against the "openness" of the work, to favour its "closing out." The 
various devices of perspective were just so many different concessions 
to the actual location of the observer in order to ensure that he looked at 
the figure in the only possible right way - that is, the way the author of 
the work had prescribed, by providing various visual devices for the 
observer's attention to focus on.(1989, 5) 
It appears that the author of a closed text does not trust the reader's own 
subjective point of view and it is interesting that the phrase Eco uses "the only 
possible right way" has strong echoes of judicial decision-making. Judge's 
often use rhetoric to make their decision seem inevitable, to make their text 
closed, and indeed later in this thesis it will be shown how the systematic 
restraints on their reasoning helps to impart this sense of certainty. The closed 
text would seem to be closer to Steiner's reader in that it seeks to restrain 
points of view, the raison d' etre of the critic but Eco links openness to 
interpretation and subjectivity and it is this that allows the reader to approach 
the text in such an individual way. The author of a closed text is worried 
about the way it may be used, while the author of an open text is happy to 
trust the many interpretations that may be placed on it, indeed as the text 
gives no hints of a point of view, all are justifiable, no reader can ever judge 
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the text or others' view of that text. Steiner indeed refers to "the judicial 
authority of the critic" (1979, 438) and links criticism directly to judgment.23 
The ethical nature and place of judgment and its relationship to understanding 
will be considered in more detail in the conclusion of this thesis. This will be 
in the light of the analysis of the way in which judges deal with texts and the 
way in which philosophers/theorists understand judges. 
23 Gadamer (1994) also uses the judge as a model and it may be that it is the judicial element 
which has appealed to so many theorists in using Judaism as a model - the final chapter 
will consider whether judicial decision-making can or should be used as a model for all 
reasoning. 
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In seeking to understand judicial decision-making, this thesis goes far from 
the original subject, to works on legal theory, historical studies and in the last 
section on methodology to the problems of understanding. All though are 
used to build up a picture of the process of judgment that is revealed through 
the language of the judiciary. 
Hannah Arendt has described judgment as a twofold process, the individual 
first establishing a proper distance between himlherself and the object and 
then reflecting on the object in the light of common sense. This thesis will be 
considering the many ways in which this common sense can become 
established and how it is revealed in the way that judges communicate their 
decisions. This is similar to the role of the critic described by Steiner but 
according to Curtis, Arendt can be understood as arguing that this process 
always creates a strong emotional response: 
As we travel in imagination through the public, the light from our visits 
floods the thing in question, more deeply illuminating its distinctive and 
complex particularity .... Having taken the beat of the world, we feel we 
have achieved a community sense, a feeling for how our world should 
look, sound and feel; what should be in it; and what it is to which we 
collectively belong .... Yet this feeling has a paradoxical quality. Having 
performed, in relation to an event or issue in need of our judgment, the 
difficult task of representative thinking, we emerge with the feeling that 
others ought to agree with us, the issue just as we see it. Indeed we 
emerge feeling compelled to make such a claim on others. And yet the 
mode in which we do so is persuasion, as if, though compelled by the 
rightness of our judgment, we are nonetheless oddly aware that it is 
uniquely and vulnerably ours. (1999, 119-120) 
This thesis seeks to represent this emotional aspect of judgment and to 




These three theorists are being used to show the ways in which legal theory 
has tried to come to terms with difficulties raised by twentieth century 
philosophy. Each theorist is approached in the same way. First the problems 
that they are seeking to solve is set out, then their general theory of reasoning 
and finally their view of a legal theory of reasoning. This approach recognises 
that this is a standard philosophical or theoretical pattern and one, indeed, 
which can be seen in the theorists own work as well as within this thesis 
itself 1 
One of the reasons why they have been chosen is because they have all 
responded to a specific problem, the broader sense of a problem with theory, 
in a different way. Perelman's response is the most personal coming from his 
desire to end violence. Jackson and MacCormick are both responding to the 
change in the philosophical world view that has occurred since the war, the 
experience of which escalated the break with previous philosophical 
certainties such as the nature of objectivity and the independence of the 
subject. All in effect are responding to a change in what can be considered 
meaningful and reasonable. 
Although the problem is a shared one, each theorist identifies it differently 
and seeks to solve it differently, Perelman turns to rhetoric; Jackson to 
semiotics and narrative theory and MacCormick has redeveloped positivism. 
Despite this, this study will show that there are similar themes through all 
three theorists. The clearest is the centrality given to the person, which may 
seem odd given a philosophical climate where the subject is under threat. Yet 
for all of them the person fulfils two roles. One is as a construct essential to 
the theory but effectively created by the theory, whether it be discourse in 
1 Chapter 5 below discusses this structure in more detaiL 
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Jackson, the committed participant in MacCormick or the audience in 
Perelman. There are problems with this use of the person in all three theories, 
they are not real people all are constructs based on the system within which 
the theorists are working. They fulfil a theoretical need. Jackson's theory 
almost seems to describe not people but a space through which discourse 
occurs and MacCormick's committed participant is a construct of 
assumptions about the nature of reasoning used to persuade those actually 
involved in a legal system to mimic its motivations. 
The second role is a more vital one where real people reappear. All of these 
occur at what could be described as crisis points, for Jackson and 
MacCormick the person appears at the limits of the system and indeed can be 
seen to save the system, for Jackson the integrity of an individual links the 
semiotic world to some form of real world, and for MacCormick it is also a 
virtuous individual, a judge, who saves his system from infinite regress. 
Perelman's core concern is the impact of his theory on real people because he 
wishes to change behaviour and the problem is his recognition that they can 
choose to turn their back on justice. A good example of the possibility of 
people to simply reject or turn their back on others and refuse to found a 
community of spirit can be seen in the exploration of a debate between 
MacCormick and Jackson about the syllogism at the end of the chapter. 
MacCormick and Jackson simply reject each others foundations and end up 
talking about and being destructive of the others theories rather than to each 
other. 
Yet in dealing with the person all are brought back to the problems they are 
trying to solve and which are linked to the contemporary philosophical 
climate in which humans are both created and controlled by systems, where 
there is no objective view point but no independent subject. The chapter 
concludes by arguing that it is their inability to understand the role of aspects 
of individual character, ethics and emotions which are the real problems with 
their own theories. 
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Chaim Perelman (1912 - 1984) 
In Traite de f 'argumentation, fa nouvelle rhetorique, which he co-wrote with 
Lucie Olbrects-Tyteca and published in 1958, Chaim Perelman updated the 
traditional study of rhetoric and transformed it into a general theory of 
reasoning.2 This was Perelman's solution to a problem with theory, the 
problem of the subjective/objective split which had dominated western 
thought since Descartes. Later he used legal reasoning as a paradigm example 
of this general theory. The driving force behind his work was the need to 
restrict violence. This ethical choice led both to his rejection ofthe contention 
that it was impossible to reason about values and led to a focus on the 
individual and relationships within reasoning. 
1. The problem with scientific reasoning 
Perelman developed his theory of rhetoric as a response to his profound 
dissatisfaction with a study of justice that he published in 1945. Perelman was 
hoping to find a way to avoid the conflict that disagreement about such 
powerful concepts could create. This is why he chose not to subscribe to one 
ofthe six forms of justice that he identifies in the work: 
Whatever our reasons for choosing one formula, antagonists would 
advance equally valid reasons for choosing another. The debate, far 
from bringing about agreement, would serve only to provoke a conflict, 
which would be the more violent in so far as each party was more bitter 
in defence of his own conception. And anyhow the analysis of the idea 
of justice would be little forwarded thereby. (Perelman 1963, 11) 
Written in the immediate aftermath of World War II, in which Perelman had 
2 Mme Olbrechts-Tyteca also co-wrote a number of essays with Perelman that were published 
after the Traite. But Perelman very quickly became the main proponent of this theory 
and, although his main work was co-written, it is still fair to regard him as mostly 
responsible for this theory. 
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fought as a member of the resistance,3 his desire to avoid conflict and seek 
agreement is understandable. This was though considerably hampered by his 
acceptance that the only route to knowledge was the scientific, objective one. 
This meant the only way that he could generate agreement about justice was 
to take it from the arena of philosophy and place it in the field of science: 
In seeking to secure agreement on the conceptual meaning of an idea of 
this kind, one will inevitably be led to play down its affective role: only 
so will one succeed, if ever, in solving the problem. By the same token, 
the idea will cease to be philosophical and will admit of a scientific 
analysis which is devoid of passion but yields more satisfaction to the 
logician.4 (perelman 1963,4-5) 
He also accepted that values were subjective and it was not possible to have 
knowledge of values or to reason about them. In his study he set out a formal 
definition of justice: 
Formal justice consists in observing a rule containing an obligation to 
treat all the members ofa given category in a certain way. (1963,43) 
Perelman then considered the place of rules in formal justice. He argued that, 
in order to solve problems of interpretation and arbitrariness in their 
application, they form a hierarchical structure.5 This led him to compare 
formal justice to scientific theories whose rules can also be structured 
hierarchically. This not only allowed him to link his theory to science, thus 
fulfilling a key aim of the study, but also showed up the limitations of his 
3 Autobiographical information comes from Foss, Foss and Trapp (1991) 
4 Perelman (1963) argues that this would not affect the size of the field of philosophy. "By this 
very fact the field of science will be enlarged, without however, that of philosophy being 
diminished. As will be seen from the example of this study, the emotive colouring which 
is dissociated from an idea that has become more scientific will attach itself to some other 
idea which will enrich the field of philosophic controversies. As an idea is denuded of all 
emotive colouring, the emotivity is reflected back on to another idea which is 
complementary to the first. Thus it is that the efforts of philosophic thought, which opens 
to science a new domain of knowledge, recall those of the Dutch engineers, who, in order 
to hand over to the ploughman a pocket handkerchief of dry land, drive back the waters 
of the sea without causing them to disappear." (1963, 5) 
5 Note that Perelman (1963, 43) argues that justification in this rule-based structure would be 
syllogistic. 
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attempt to objectify justice. 
In Perelman's VIew of science, scientific rules can be shown to form a 
structure of explanation with the higher rules explaining the lower rules. This 
structure is not infinite and comes to a halt at the barrier of our present 
capacity to understand reality. The rules of justice can also be shown to form 
a hierarchy. This structure is a normative structure. The rules are linked not 
by "is" but "ought" and they form a justificatory schema. The higher, more 
abstract rules justify the lower more particular ones.6 This structure ends, not 
at a barrier which can be overcome by improving our understanding, but with 
some arbitrary value about which it is impossible to reason. Even when 
describing its most formal aspects Perelman could not fully exclude values 
from the concept of justice and argued that: 
A system of justice constitutes no more than the development of one or 
more values whose arbitrary character is linked to their very nature. 
(1963,53) 
The requirements of formal justice that Perelman sets out does mean that 
these values can be applied rationally but the values themselves cannot be 
discussed rationally. They are simply a matter of choice and: 
If we regard a rule as unjust because it accords pre-eminence to a 
different value, we can only note the disagreement. No reasoning will 
be able to show that either one of the opponents is in the wrong. (1963, 
53) 
The result is that only a limited aspect of justice, its application, can become 
scientific and open to rationality. This will reduce conflict only where there is 
substantive and irrational agreement about values. Perelman's study onjustice 
fails in its aim to generate consensus and agreement. He does try to suggest 
that this does not necessarily mean that conflict is unavoidable and argues 
that if people were made aware that their values were arbitrary it might 
6 There are similarities between this structure and MacCormick's described below. 
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incline them to tolerance: 
No system of justice should lose sight of its own imperfection. Every 
system should thence conclude that an imperfect justice, without charity 
is no justice. (1963, 60) 
Perelman spent the rest of his career creating a way to explain how people 
could and do reason about values.7 In a 1963 edition of his study onjustice he 
appends a footnote to the phrase "There is no value which is not logically 
arbitrary." (1963, 56) - "Since these lines have been written, the author has 
tried to present through his theory of argumentation, a way of reasoning about 
values." (1963, 56) 
Although the first signs of the answers that he found to resolve these 
problems can be seen in an article in 1949, it was only in 1958 with the 
publication of his Traite de I 'argumentation that his full theory of reasoning 
was revealed. A theory explicitly dedicated to finding a way beyond the 
subjective/objective split and which would clearly need to see law in a non-
hierarchical non-scientific manner. 
2. General theory of reasoning 
2.1 Rhetoric 
Perelman could have retained the subjective/objective structure and simply 
tried to reclassify values as objective. He chose not to do this as he believed 
that giving values objective status would lead to people arguing that their 
views on values were conclusive and that they should, therefore, be imposed 
on others. By rejecting objectivity he felt that there was an instant gain in the 
status of the individual in reasoning: 
Le rejet des criteres objectifs, en toute matiere, revalorisant, ala fois, la 
7 Dearin (1989) has argued that Perelman's attempts to solve the issue of justice are at the 
core of all his work and this is why the juridical model is such a constant theme. 
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liberte d'invention, a fait de l'individu humain, dans son unicite, 
l'element central de la philosophie. (1989,297)8 
Perelman found his answer in the ancient theory of rhetoric which had been 
influential until the Middle Ages but had since fallen into disrepute. 9 In 
rhetoric, and particularly in the rhetoric of Aristotle, Perelman found a middle 
way, a way of reasoning about values that was rational and not purely 
arbitrary but that did not give its conclusions the invariant force of objective 
truth: 
L' etude de la rhetorique, com;ue comme une logique des judgements de 
valeur, portant non sur Ie vrai, mais sur Ie preferable, OU I' adhesion de 
l'homme n' est pas simplement sousmission, mais decision et 
engagement, introduirait un nouvel element dans la theorie de la 
connalsance, et ne limiterait pas Ie deb at a l'acception entiere d'un 
rationalisme inspire des procedures scientifiques ou a son rejet complet. 
L'introduction d'une technique intellectuelle qui permetrait de rompre 
les cadres de l'altemative "objectivisme sans sujet" ou "subjectivisme 
sans objet" ne peut que contribuer d'une favon appreciable a la 
comprehension des conditions d' exercise de notre liberte spirituelle. 
(1989,299) 
Having found the answer, Perelman set out to develop the theory of rhetoric 
and bring it up to date. His methodology was inspired by Gottleib Frege's 
study of mathematical logic. Frege had sought to understand mathematical 
logic not by looking at it in the abstract but by cataloguing the practice of 
mathematicians. Perelman, with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, undertook a ten-year 
study of how people reason about values in practice and used this as the basis 
of their theory. The result was the large and influential Traite de 
8 This article was first published in 1949 and contains the earliest reference that I have found to 
rhetoric and Aristotle in Perelman's work. (1989, 299) This shows how soon after 
publishing his work on Justice (1945) that Perelman started to rethink the foundations of 
his philosophy. 
9 Eubanks (1989, 233) cites the talmudic theory of truth as a source. Perelman accepted this 
(1979, 12) but Aristotle remains the major influence on his work. 
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L 'argumentation. La Nouvelle Rhetorique (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
1988) - the foundation of all his later work. 10 
The depth of the shift that his thinking had taken since 1945 can be seen in 
the very first line of this book: 
La publication d'une traite consacre a rargumentation et son 
rattachement a une vieille tradition, celIe de la rhetorique et de la 
dialectique grecques, constituent une rupture avec une conception de fa 
raison et du raisonnement, issue de Descartes, qui a marque de son 
sceau la philosophie occidentale des trois derniers siecles. (Perelman, 
1988 1)11 
Perelman is careful to point out that he is not rejecting all aspects of western 
philosophy since Descartes but he does insist that the achievements of logic 
and science should not be allowed to deny the benefits of reason to other 
aspects of life: 
Faut-il tirer de cette evolution de la logique, et des progres 
incontestables qu' elle a realises, la conclusion que la raison est tout a 
fait incompetence dans les domaines qui echappent au calcul et que la 
ou ni r experience ni la deduction logique ne peuvent nous fournir la 
solution d'un probleme, nous n'avons plus qu'a nous abandonner aux 
forces irrationnelles, a nos instincts, a la suggestion ou a la violence ? 
(1988,3)12 
This contrasts directly with his earlier goal to bring philosophy into closer 
contact with science. But despite this shift, his primary goal remains the 
same, the need to avoid violence and reduce conflict and this can be allied to 
a related desire to protect and dignify the individual. 
10 In this thesis, I will be using the French fifth edition of this work, published in 1988. 
Wherever possible, I include footnote references to each quote pointing to the equivalent 
page in the English edition published in 1969. Although the English (Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969) edition is a translation of the French first edition rather than the 
fifth, (perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1988) the core text has changed little. 
11 (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 1) 
12 (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 3) 
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Perelman's theory borrows most heavily from Aristotle's theory of dialectical 
arguments. Indeed his reliance on this theory is so strong that he has to 
explain why he uses the word rhetoric rather than dialectic. He has two 
explanations for this: the first is simply to avoid confusion with the very 
different Hegelian dialectic; the second takes us to the heart of Perelman's 
theory: 
Le raisonnement dialectique est considere comme parallele au 
raisonnement analytique, mais traite du vraisemblable au lieu de traiter 
de propositions necessaires. L'idee meme que la dialectique concerne 
des opinions, c'est-a-dire des theses auxquelles on adhere avec une 
intensite variable, n' est pas mise a profit On dirait que Ie statut de 
l' opinable est impersonnel et que les opinions ne sont pas relatives aux 
esprits qui y adherent Par contre, cette idee d'adhesion et d'esprits 
auxquels on adresse un discours est essentielle dans toutes les theories 
anciennes de la rhetorique. Notre rapprochement avec cette derniere 
vise a souligner Ie fait que c 'est en fonction d'un auditoire que se 
developpe toute argumentation; l'etude de l'opinable des Topiques 
pourra, dans ce cadre, s'inserer a sa place. (1988, 7)13 
Therefore, although Perelman is concerned with "les preuves qu 'Aristote 
appelle dialectiques" (1988, 6)14 he believes his approach and focus is 
different from Aristotle. I5 He is concerned less with the relationship between 
dialectical and analytical reasoning and instead emphasises the role of the 
audience which becomes a central concept to his theory of argumentation. 
This is why Perelman prefers the word rhetoric to dialectic as rhetoric implies 
a relationship. At its simplest this is the relationship between a speaker and an 
audience but Perelman's theory is much broader than a theory of public 
speaking. He is seeking to produce a general theory of reasoning. 
13 (perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 5) 
14 (perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 3) 
15 This can be clearly seen from the study of Aristotle's work on rhetoric below. 
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This general theory of reasoning IS what he calls the new rhetoric or 
argumentation. 16 As can be seen III the quote above, Perelman defines 
argumentation by contrasting it with raisonnement analytique, which he also 
calls demonstration or logique formelle. Thus, although a general theory of 
reasoning, it is not a comprehensive theory as it does not cover scientific 
reasonmg or fully explain the relationship between the two forms of 
reasoning. 17 
Argumentation has two aspects that differentiate it from the scientific form of 
reasoning - a distinct domain and a distinctive purpose. The domain of 
argumentation is the same as that of dialectic and is "celui du vraisemblable, 
du plausible, du probable, dans la mesure ou ce dernier echappe aux 
certitudes de calcul." (1988, 1)18 The purpose of argumentation is to 
persuade. By persuasion Perelman means "de provoquer ou d'accroftre 
l'adhesion des esprits aux theses qu'on presente a leur assentiment." (1988, 
5)19 
Perelman's general theory of reasoning covers not only the written word as 
well as public speaking but "la discussion avec un seul interlocuteur ou 
meme la deliberation intime relevent. " (1988, 8)20 In his study he chose to 
focus on the written word as he felt that this was the most general form. 
As a result of this study Perelman produced a detailed analysis of reasoning in 
practice. This analysis forms the bulk of the Traite, comprising two of the 
three sections. Yet despite the size and comprehensiveness of these two 
sections titled Ie point de depart de I 'argumentation and les techniques 
argumentatives, this analysis has been largely ignored. Instead the first 
16 When referring to Perelman's theory, I will use the term argumentation rather than rhetoric 
as rhetoric is being used as a general term throughout the thesis. 
17 This relationship is discussed in Perelman's work on legal reasoning. (Perelman 1976, 1-4) 
See n 36. below. 
18 (perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 1) 
19 (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 4). Persuasion also includes persuading to act. 
20 (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 6) 
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section les cadres de I 'argumentation, the theoretical section In which 
Perelman shows how he has updated and adapted Greek rhetoric for the 
modem age, has dominated the discussion and debate that this new theory of 
rhetoric inspired. This is even true of much of Perelman's own later work. 
It is hard to say why this is so. Certainly the first section contains most of the 
ideas of the book and the later sections can be a bit dry. It would be surprising 
if this were the sole reason why Perelman's academic audience has chosen to 
ignore these sections. Perhaps the simple answer is not that the last two 
sections are more boring but that the first section is much more interesting. 
This is because it is in this theoretical section that Perelman sets out his 
general theory of reasoning. But whatever the underlying reason, this study 
will follow this trend and in considering the Traite only the first section will 
be dealt with. 
2.2 Les cadres de I 'argumentation. 
The theoretical section of the Traite deals mainly with the concept of 
audience, which Perelman uses to differentiate his approach from dialectic. 
Perelman's theory is as much concerned with the people involved in 
reasoning as the structures of reasoning that they use and in the theoretical 
section he mainly considers how reasoning fits into social and personal life 
and impacts on relationships. In this Perelman's key aim of avoiding violence 
and conflict within relationships comes to the fore. 
Argumentation does not occur simply because people have to make decisions. 
It can only occur when there is a relationship. Argumentation does not 
necessarily involve more than one person. An individual can reason with 
himlherself but to do so the individual needs to conceive of himlherself as 
two persons. All persuasive reasoning requires a relationship of some kind. 
Perelman argues that, for argumentation to occur, this relationship must be 
based on respect there must be a communaute effective des esprits. (1988, 
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This relationship is created by the decision of the speaker to use 
argumentation. By choosing to use persuasion the speaker implicitly 
recognises that the view of the other is not only valid but that it is important. 
S/he is allowing the audience to be the judge of the worth of his/her argument. 
S/he is also excluding violence. As the goal of argumentation is to gain the 
adherence of the other and not just influence the behaviour of the other the 
speaker will fail to achieve this goal if s/he uses violence to force the 
audience to accept his/her argument. 
Yet, although this form of contact excludes violence, Perelman is aware that 
this openness to the other may be negative: 
II faut, en effet, pour argumenter, attacher du prix a l' adhesion de son 
interlocuter, a son consentement, a son concours mental. C'est donc 
parfois une distinction appreciee que d'etre une personne avec qui l'on 
discute .... Mais, on l'a dit maintes fois, il n'est pas toujours louable de 
vouloir persuader quelqu'un: les conditions dans lesquelles Ie contact 
des esprits s'effectue peuvent, en effet, paraitre peu honorables. (1988, 
20-21i2 
Having set out the minimum conditions and fundamental moral content of 
argumentation, Perelman spends most of the theoretical section exploring the 
speaker/audience relationship in depth. He is particularly interested in how 
this relationship impacts on the form of reasoning used in argumentation. As 
the goal of reasoning is to gain the adherence of the audience, any 
argumentation must be relative to the audience that it is trying to influence. 
The audience dictates the form of reasoning to be used. 
This does not mean that the role of the speaker has become diminished. 
21 (perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 14) 
22 (perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 17-19) 
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Although the nature of the audience affects the nature of reasoning used, it is 
the speaker who identifies the audience. The speaker forms an idea of the 
audience in his/her mind and this is the audience that s/he tries to persuade. 
This may seem rather abstract but it should be noted that persuasion is not 
only conducted face to face. The writer of an opinion piece, for example, will 
not have an audience before him. S/he will create an imaginary audience and 
persuade them. But the reasoning s/he uses will only be successful if the 
audience s/he imagines corresponds closely to a real audience. (1988, 22-
25i3 
If it is the audience, described by the speaker, which dictates the form that 
reason takes, what does this mean for those who seek the highest abstraction, 
for those who look for universal truths? It could be thought that in seeking to 
move beyond the subjective/objective split that Perleman can avoid this 
question but his core aim is to find a way to reason about values and thus the 
ability of argumentation to deal with truth claims in these fields is key and 
Perelman not only does not ignore this group of people, instead he focuses on 
those who seek universal audiences - philosophers. 
2.3 Philosophy as conviction by persuasion 
In seemg philosophy as a form of argumentation, Perelman IS bringing 
together two old adversaries - philosophy and rhetoric: 
En fait, nous assistons ici a la reprise du debat seculaire entre les 
partisans de la verite et ceux de l'opinion, entre philosophes, chercheurs 
d'absolu et rheteurs, engages dans l'action. C'est a l'occasion de ce 
debat que semble s'elaborer la distinction entre persuader et 
convaincre, que nous voudrions reprendre en fonction d'une theorie de 
l'argumentation et du role joue par certains auditoires. (1988,35)24 
23 (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 17-19) 
24 (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 26-27) 
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In highlighting these two aspects of reasoning, persuading and convincing, 
Perelman is trying to show that they can be reconciled and do not constitute 
two profoundly different ways of thinking. Indeed they cannot do so because 
if he were to accept that they are he would simply be accepting that there are 
some areas where one can be objective and others where one cannot. Instead 
he argues that what the difference between them lies in their different 
audiences. Persuasion is the term used for an argument aimed at a particular 
audience, convincing is that which seeks to obtain "Z'adhesion de tout etre de 
raison. .. (1988, 36)25 
This audience of all reasonable beings clearly does not exist and so is 
completely a construct of the speaker. It is perhaps the most subjective of all 
audiences yet it is this audience that Perelman describes as playing "Ze roZe 
normati!" (1988, 39)26 The speaker who approaches such an audience seeks 
not to persuade but to convince. In addressing such an audience, the speaker 
lays claim to a high level of rationality. Concrete others judge these standards 
not according to how much they personally are persuaded but as to how well 
the speaker fulfils these claims to be convincing. This judgement will include 
a judgement of how well the speaker has understood the nature of this 
universal audience, or to put it another way, how well the speaker understands 
what it means to claim to be rational. 
Perelman identifies two other audiences in which this form of thinking 
appears and which are, therefore, also central to his thought: the audience of 
one in a dialogue; and the audience of oneself. In relating to these audiences, 
Perelman argues also that the speaker is trying to convince not persuade. It 
should be noted that Perelman does not believe that it is possible fully to 
convince any audience because argumentation can never achieve the level of 
rationality that is seen in the sciences. Ultimately the speaker will only 
persuade others that hislher reasoning is convincing, s/he will not be 
25 (perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 28) 
26 (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 30) 
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convincing. 27 
Perelman analyses each of these three audiences separately. Only two points 
from this analysis will be considered here: his rehabilitation of self-evidence 
as an aspect of argumentation and his positive view of rationalisation. These 
points are the ones that best reveal aspects of Perelman's wider theory. 
Perelman links self-evidence to the universal audience, which is the most 
important of the three models. The universal audience does not exist in 
reality: 
11 s'agit evidemment, dans ce cas, non pas d'un fait experimentalement 
eprouve, mais d'une universalite et d'une unanimite que se represente 
1'0rateur, de l'accord d'un auditoire qui devrait etre universel, ceux qui 
n'y particient pas pouvant, pour des raisons legitimes, ne pas etre pris 
en consideration. 
Les philosophes pretendent toujours s'adresser a un pareil auditoire, non 
pas parce qu'ils esperent obtenir Ie consentement effectif de tous les 
hommes - ils savent tres bien que, seule, une petite minorite aura jamais 
1'0ccasion de connaitre leurs ecrits - mais parce qu'ils croient que tollS 
ceux qui comprendront leur raisons ne pourront qu'adherer a leurs 
conclusions. L 'accord d'un auditoire universel n 'est donc pas une 
question de jait, mais de droit. C' est parce qu' on affirme ce qui est 
conforme a un fait objectif, ce qui constitue une assertion vraie et meme 
necessaire, que l' on table sur I' adhesion de ceux qui se soumettent aux 
donnees de l'experience ou aux lumieres de la raison. (1988, 41i8 
Although Perelman has made it clear that there can be no assertion necessaire 
in argumentation, arguments which are aimed at the universal audience seek 
27 There appear to be similarities between this and the distinction made in law between the 
standards of proof; beyond reasonable doubt and on the balance of probabilities. Neither 
of these require absolute proof 
28 (perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 31) 
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this standard. A philosopher will never fulfil the strict criteria of self-evidence 
but his/her ability to convince others that the reasoning used has achieved this 
standard is the measure of his/her success. 
The universal audience is a constructed audience. Each philosopher appeals 
to a slightly different version but, to be successful in convincing other 
philosophers that s/he has achieved self-evidence, this imagined audience 
must have a substantial amount in common with those imagined by the 
majority of the philosophic community. This shows that although Perelman 
stresses the place of the individual within reasoning he is aware of the impact 
of socially generated knowledge and opinions. 
Rationalisation would appear to be the opposite of self-evidence. Whereas 
self-evidence suggests rational, impartial and almost scientific reasoning, 
rationalisation seems to be a dubious form of reasoning that occurs after the 
event to justify past behaviour. Yet Perelman discusses rationalisation in the 
context of arguments that, like self-evidence, aim to be convincing and 
compelling rather than merely persuasive. 
Rationalisation is the form of argumentation that the individual undertakes 
when s/he considers past actions. Perelman argues that it need not be 
dishonest and that it fulfils an important function in the life of an individual: 
Notre these est que d'une, part une, croyance une fois etablie peut 
toujours etre intensifiee et que, d'autre part, l'argumentation est 
fonction de l'auditoire auquel on s'adresse. Des lors, il est legitime que 
celui qui a acquis une certaine conviction s'attache a. l'affermir vis-a.-vis 
de lui meme, et surtout vis-a.-vis des attaques pouvant venir de 
l'exterieur; il est normal qu'il envisage tous les arguments susceptibles 
de la renforcer. Ces nouvelles raisons peuvent intensifier la conviction, 
la proteger contre certaines attaques auxquelles on n' avait pas pense des 
Ie debut, preciser sa portee. (1988, 58i9 
Unlike scientific facts, which are accepted as true or false, values can be 
29 (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 44) 
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accepted in part. In this case rationalisation, justifying a decision after the 
event, is not hypocrisy but is necessary for the individual to improve hislher 
understanding of values. This may be needed to increase hislher adherence to 
values and to ensure that in the future the individual will be able to act in 
according with those values. It will also allow a speaker aiming to convince to 
become more convincing in line with communal values and Perelman goes 
from his consideration of rationalisation to consider not the relationship 
between the reasoning individual and hislher own values and action but the 
relationship between the reasoning society and its values and action. 
Argumentation aIms not just to persuade in isolation but to generate a 
tendency to act within an audience, or as he puts it, elle se propose de 
provoquer une action ou d y pre parer, en agissant par des moyens discursifs 
sur l'esprit des auditeurs. (1988,62)30 It does this by using the values that the 
audience already adheres to and persuading them to follow the implications of 
those values. When this is done within a social context, it takes the form that 
Aristotle called epideictic rhetoric.31 
2.4 Epideictic rhetoric 
Epideictic rhetoric is one of Aristotle's three categories of rhetoric but has 
traditionally been the least respected form and has largely been ignored. In 
contrast to this the other two forms of rhetoric that he identified, forensic 
rhetoric which looks at the language of the courtroom and deliberative 
rhetoric which looks at debate, have been studied in depth. Perelman feels 
that this is a mistake and that epideictic rhetoric is at the heart of rhetoric not 
the fringes. 
Epideictic or display rhetoric was the term Aristotle used to cover exhibition 
30 (perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 47) 
31 See chapter 3 below for a full exploration of this and the other forms of rhetoric identified 
by Aristotle. 
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speeches that were common in ancient Greece. The speaker aimed to please 
the audience by a flamboyant use of language and by supporting opinions that 
were already widely held. It was often used to praise local heroes or to 
commemorate feast days. 
Why does Perelman see this rhetoric as the key to persuasive reasoning? After 
all it simply persuades people to believe what they already believe. It is this 
that interests Perelman. Like rationalisation, which allows the individual to 
understand hislher values and motivations better, epideictic rhetoric helps 
society to understand its values better. 
By reiterating the society's values, epideictic rhetoric reinforces them. This 
not only protects those values but also increases the likelihood that the values 
will be translated into action. It protects society as a whole by generating 
agreement around the nature and identity of these values. In doing so, it 
pushes language to its highest forms: 
C'est dans l'epidictique que tous les procedes de l'art litteraire sont de 
mise, car il s' agit de faire concourir tout ce qui peut favoriser cette 
communion de l' auditoire. C' est Ie seul geme qui, immediatement, fait 
penser it de litterature, Ie seul que l'on aurait pu comparer au livret d'un 
cantate, celui qui risque Ie plus facilement de tourner it la declamation, 
de devenir de la rhetorique, dans Ie sens perjoratif et habituel du 
mot.(Perelman 1988,67)32 
The power of language can be seen as dangerous. It could be used to persuade 
people to do things that we may see as evil. Perelman cannot rid rhetoric of 
this danger. His theory of reasoning means that he cannot condemn those who 
try to persuade us on the grounds that their arguments are true or false 
according to some objective standard. We can only oppose them on grounds 
that are more or less persuasive. That is, we can only use the same power of 
language against them. 
32 (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 51) 
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Although Perelman cannot deny the danger of rhetoric, there is an answer to 
this problem within his theory. Perelman cannot protect us from the power of 
persuasion but he can protect us from the power of violence. As s/he is 
involved in argumentation, the speaker must respect the people that s/he is 
trying to persuade and cannot force them to agree with his/her point of view. 
This respect implies other values, openness and tolerance, that a society that 
used argumentation rather than violence would espouse. Epideictic rhetoric 
would be used to enhance these values and, in doing so, would tend to create 
a liberal society.33 
An example of this can be seen in the way Perelman approaches the problems 
of scepticism and fanaticism. Both of these could be seen as possible results 
of the misuse of rhetoric. Scepticism could be the result of being persuaded to 
believe nothing and fanaticism the result of being too well convinced. 
Perelman argues though, that in the same way as violence is excluded, 
argumentation excludes both of these extremes. Argumentation allows us to 
be committed whilst remaining open: 
La preuve rhetorique n'etant jamais tout a fait necessaire, l'esprit qui 
donne son adhesion aux conclusions d'une argumentation, Ie fait par un 
acte qui l' engage et dont il est responsable. Le fanatique accepte cet 
engagement, mais a la maniere de quelqu'un qui s'incline devant une 
verite absolue et irrefragable; Ie sceptique refuse cet engagement sous 
pretexte qu'il ne lui paralt pas pouvoir etre definitif. Il refuse d'adherer 
parce qu'il se fait de l'adhesion une idee qui ressemble a celle du 
fanatique: l'un et l'autre meconnaissent que l'argumentation vise a un 
choix entre des possibles; en proposant et justifiant leur hierarchie, elle 
vise a rendre rationnelle une decision. Fanatisme et scepticisme nient ce 
role de l' argumentation dans nos decisions. Ils tendent tous deux a 
laisser, a defaut de raison contraignante, libre champ a la violence, en 
33 It has been argued that to be involved in argumentation requires such rigorous standards 
participants would have to undertake a specific course of instruction or education 
(Fischer 1986; Ede 1988; Scult 1989 and Dobel1986). 
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recusant l'engagement de la personne. (1988, 82_83)34 
While it is possible to accept much of this with regard to debate about values, 
it does seem that Perelman might have a problem when it comes to areas 
where people need to act following debate, when irrevocable decisions need 
to be made how is it possible to be committed while remaining open, and 
what of law, where decisions are enforced. Perelman though did not see law 
as a problem for his theory but as a paradigm example of argumentation. 
3. Legal reasoning 
Legal reasoning has featured in Perelman's published work from the start and 
it has a key place in Perelman's early work on justice.35 (Perelman 1963) In 
that study he defined justice as essentially a system of rules working out a 
value or values and he linked this explicitly to a legal system. The effect of 
his shift in thinking on his view of law can be seen in the way he approaches 
the problem of equity. 
In his 1945 article on justice (Perelman 1963), equity is used in cases where 
application of the rules of the system would lead to a result that is seen as 
unjust. This sense of injustice is not related to the working out of the rules 
and is arbitrary and subjective. Perelman explains that it occurs in cases in 
which the rules fail to take into account certain characteristics which are felt 
to be important to considerable sections of the population. It arises from a 
conflict between values held by the community and the rules applying the 
values that have been built into the legal system. (1963,30-35) 
Following his shift in thinking (perelman 1979) equity remains a tool that is 
used to ensure that the order itself is seen as just, but Perelman's view of the 
34 (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 62) 
35 Abott (1989) suggests that law is Perelman's model rather than rhetoric and certainly 
Perelman sees law as paradigmatic. 
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sense of injustice that triggers this resort to equity has changed. It no longer 
results from the clash between rational and irrational justice but between 
formal justice, justice in the sense of impartial rule-application, and justice as 
defined by the core values of the system which are reasonably held. Equity is 
used to protect the core values, but it does not simply void the rational result 
Instead equity interacts with formal justice: 
... the idea ofthe reasonable in law corresponds to an equitable solution, 
in the absence of all precise rules of adjudication. But it can be that 
recourse to the reasonable only gives a provisional solution, waiting for 
the elaboration of a new legal construction which would be more 
satisfying. The reasonable guides this endeavour toward systematization 
toward the rational systematic solution. (1979, 123) 
Law is neither a wholly rational nor a wholly reasonable structure. Instead it 
is both and legal systems have to find a balance between the formal rule-
application that insures equality and impartiality which are important legal 
values and a specific, reasonable response to the concrete situation before 
them. 
Perelman sees the relationship between these two forms of reasoning as both 
complex and reciprocal. This means that the demonstration of legal reasoning 
is never as scientific as that of the sciences, and its persuasive reasoning can 
appeal to a judge other than the audience - legal rules.36 
36 In Logique juridique Perelman focuses mostly on law but he does use the work to rethink 
the relationship between science and argumentation. (1976, 113-114) He refers to the 
works of Kuhn and others which had put scientific reasoning under the same pressure 
that the social sciences had been and concludes. "Si l' on rejette ce nihilism, si l' on croit 
que tout ce qui concerne les valeurs n'est pas arbitraire, et que les jugements de realite 
n' ent sont pas entierement independants, on ecartera, comme non fonde, Ie fosse etabli 
par Ie positivisme entre Ie jugements de realite et les jugements de valeur." (1976, 114) 
This brings science in to his structure of general reasoning but does not require a radical 
rethink of the relationship between the rational and the reasonable in his view of legal 
reasoning. Science, although now a form of argumentation can still have a very different 
methodology to law. "On arrivera, au contraire, it la conclusion que, au sein d'une etude 
generale des raisonnements practiques, des considerations propres, it la methodologie 
feront prevaloir certains modeIes et certains criteres dans les sciences, et, que d' autres 
considerations caracteriseront Ie raisonnement juridique et la methodologie propre aux 
differents systemes de droit." (1976, 114) 
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This mixed form of reasoning is not distinct to law. The rational and the 
reasonable appear in other aspects of human thought. Law, as a form of 
reasoning about values, sits alongside philosophy and morality and like these 
two it is a form of practical reasoning. Practical reasoning for Perelman is 
reasoning in situations where the answers are not necessary, the reasoning is 
not conclusive but persuasive or convincing and the reasoning has to do with 
action. Practical reasoning is, in short, another way of saying argumentation. 
Perelman sees law as the prime example of this mixed sort of reasoning, 
which is a clear development from the Traite and brings us back to his early 
work which set out the rational approach. Law, like these other fields, has 
developed techniques and methods for reasoning about values that allows it to 
appear impartial and rational as well as reasonable but does so in a highly 
developed way and in his last article, published posthumously in 1984, he 
goes as far as to say that law has the same place in practical reasoning as 
maths does in science. (Perelman 1989) 
What makes law different is its specific context which helps to solve the 
problem identified at the end of the exploration of the Traite. Legal reasoning 
has a fixed goaL It has to arrive at an answer. Philosophers may seek a 
decision but they are not time-limited in the same way that judges are and, 
whilst they may want to enforce that decision or close the debate in some 
way, they cannot. In legal reasoning, once the decision has been made, the 
authoritative nature of law ensures that this decision is carried OUt.37 
In some ways, it is strange that Perelman is so enthusiastic about law. Legal 
reasoning is backed up by authority and by force. Surely this would disconcert 
Perelman? Yet Perelman never even seems to see this as a problem. It could 
be that he sees legal authority as fundamentally different from forcing other 
people to accept opinions. Perelman, though, never makes this clear. He does 
37 The implications of the way in which law seeks to make its decisions compellable are 
discussed in more detail in chapter 5 below. 
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though set out a detailed analysis of legal reasoning - Logique juridique - in 
which he sets out his views both as to why legal reasoning is so significant 
and why argumentation is the only form of reasoning acceptable in a legal 
context. In Logique Juridique (Perelman 1976), Perelman links historical, 
theoretical and practical studies of legal reasoning. He uses all these different 
techniques as a way of testing his own and other theories against practice, 
both historical and current. This contrasts with his purely empirical approach 
to general reasoning in argumentation. 
As a result of this study, he believed that he had drawn attention to the heart 
of legal reasoning: 
Les pages qui precedent ont suffisamment attire l' attention sur Ie fait 
que Ie raisonnement judiciare vise it de gager et it justifier la solution 
autorisee d'une controverse, dans laquelle des argumentations en sens 
divers, menees conformement it des procedures imposees, cherchent it 
faire valoir, dans des situations variees, une valeur ou un compromis 
entre valeurs, que puisse etre accepte dans un milieu et it un moment 
donnes. (1976, 135) 
For Perelman than, legal reasoning is reasoning under pressure. There is a 
need to justify the decision according to core values and to make the decision 
within strict time limits. As Perelman's view of reasoning is person-led, this 
means that legal reasoning puts a person under pressure. He makes this clear 
at the very start of his exploration of legal reasoning: 
Celui qui est charge de prendre une decision en droit, qu'il soit 
legislateur, magistrat ou administrateur, doit prendre ses responsibilites. 
Son engagement personnel est inevitable, quelles que soient les bonnes 
raisons qu'il puisse alleguer en faveur de sa these. Car rares sont les 
situations ou les bonnes raisons, qui militent en faveur d'une solution, 
ne soient pas contrebalancees par des raisons plus ou moins bonnes en 
faveur d'une solution different: c'est l'appreciation de la valeur de ces 
raisons - que I' on ne peut que tres rarement reduire it un calcul, une 
pesee ou une mesure - qui peut differer d'un individu it un autre, et qui 
souligne Ie caractere personnel de la decision prise. (1976,6) 
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Whatever the law, it is the person who applies it that makes the decision and 
must justify that decision by reasoning. Perelman shows that even in a 
situation where law is regarded as divinely given, the Talmud, there are times 
when the law is seen to be open to numerous interpretations and the judge has 
to make an authorised decision: 
Quand les autorites s'opposent, on peut etablir une hierarchie entre 
elles, ou l'on peut tenir compte du nombre des avis autorites, mais rien 
ne prouve que la decision devant laquelle il faudra bien s'incliner soit 
effectivement la seule solutionjuste du probleme souleve. (1976, 7) 
As a result of this, formal logic is always insufficient to describe legal 
reasoning. Formal logic may control the inferences made in judging but it 
does not deal with the value of the decision which is the core of legal 
reasorung: 
C' est Ie rOle de la logique formelle de rendre la conclusion solidaire des 
premises, mais c'est celui de la logique juridique de montrer 
I' acceptibilite des premises. Celle-ci resulte de la confrontation des 
moyens de preuve, des arguments et des valeurs qui s'opposent dans Ie 
litige; Ie juge doit en effectuer I' arbitrage pour prendre sa decision et 
motiver sonjugement. (1976, 176) 
The judge is not though completely free in the choices he can make. The 
authority he uses to enforce his/her decision is based on traditions or laws that 
bind the judge's use of that authority. The judge does not solve problems by 
simply using his/her authority to prefer one argument to another. The judge is 
aware of his/her responsibilities towards the law that has given himlher that 
authority and needs to justify the decision in a manner acceptable to the legal 
system that s/he works within. 
The key to this for Perelman is his/her view of the relationship between 
society and law. In the very final paragraph of Logique Juridique Perelman 
states that: 
La logique juridique, et specialement judiciare, que nous avons cherche 
a de gager par I' analyse du raisonnement des juristes et plus 
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particulierement des Cours de cassation, se presente, en conclusion, non 
comme une logique formelle, mais comme une argumentation qui 
depend de la maniere dont les legislateurs et les juges conc;oivent leur 
mission, et de l'idee qu'ils se font du droit et de son fonctionnement 
dans la societe. (1976, 177) 
This sense does not belong to the judge alone, in coming to a decision 
informed by this sense the judge has to persuade not one but three audiences, 
a complex form of epideictic rhetoric: 
II ne faut pas oublier, en effet, que les decisions de justice doivent 
satisfaire trois auditoires differents, d'une part les parties en litige, 
ensuite les professionnels du droit et, enfin, l' opinion publique, que se 
manifestera par la presse et les reactions legislatives aux arrets des 
tribunaux. (1976, 173) 
There is a form of communal values at work here and in his historical study, 
Perelman identifies the dominant views of the function of law that have 
existed in continental Europe and the impact of this theory on practice. 38 
These views have affected the way legal reasoning has been undertaken and 
presented and individual judges would have evolved their own particular 
sense of the function of law within these dominant paradigms. 39 
Perelman identifies three phases in the continental view of legal reasoning. 
The first saw law as: 
mettant l'accent sur Ie caractere juste de la solution, et n'accordant 
guere d'importance it la motivation, etait neanmoins lie par la regIe de 
justice exigeant Ie traitement egal de cas essentiellement semblables. 
De lit l'importance accordee aux regles coutumieres et aux precedents. 
(1976, 136) 
This changed considerably under the impact of the French revolution and 
38 Although, Perelman speaks about the whole continent, he shows a francophone bias and 
most of his examples come from the French and Belgium systems. 
39 A parallel process can be seen occurring in other jurisdictions. See the study of Scottish and 
English attitudes towards negligence in chapter 4 below. 
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enlightenment philosophy. 
Enlightenment theory led to the doctrine of the separation of powers which 
Perelman describes thus: 
La doctrine de la separation des pouvoirs est liee it une psychologie des 
facultes, ou volonte et raison constituent des facultes separees. En effet, 
"la separation des pouvoirs" signifie qu'il y a un pouvoir, Ie pouvoir 
legislatif, qui par sa volonte fixe Ie droit qui doit regir une certaine 
societe; Ie droit est I' expression de la volonte du peuple, telle qu' elle se 
manifeste par les decisions du pouvoir legislatif. D'autre part, Ie 
pouvoir judiciare dit Ie droit, mais ne l' elabore pas. Selon cette 
conception Ie juge applique tout simplement Ie droit qui lui est donne ... 
Cette conception conduit it une vision legaliste; la passivite du juge 
satisfait notre besoin de securite juridique. Le droit est un donne, qui 
doit pouvoir etre connu par tout Ie monde de la meme fayon. Cette 
vision du droit conduit it un rapprochement du droit avec les sciences. 
Qu'on Ie considere comme un systeme deductif ou qu'on assimile Ie 
fait de rendre la justice it une pesee, Ie juge semble participer it une 
operation de nature impersonelle, qui lui permettre de peser les 
pretentions des parties, la gravite des delits. etc ... Mais pour que cette 
pesee se fasse d'une fayon impartiale, depourvue de passion - ce qui 
veut dire sans crainte, sans haine et aussi sans pitie - il faut que la 
justice ait les yeux bandes, qu' elle ne voie pas les consequences de ce 
qu'elle fait: dura lex sed lex. Nous voyons ici une tentative de 
rapprocher Ie droit sout d'un ca1cul, soit d'une certaine pesee, en tout 
cas de quelque chose dont I' exactitude rassurante devait pouvoir nous 
proteger contre les abus d'une justice corrompue d' Ancien regime". 
Cela nous donnerait l'idee que nous ne sommes pas it la merci des 
hommes, mais it I' abri des institutions, plus ou moins impersonelles. 
(1976,24)40 
40 The extended quote in this passage is cited as: Perelman, Chalm. 1973. Droit, logique et 
epistemologie. In Le droit, les sciences humaines et la philosophie. 227-228. Paris: Vrin. 
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This philosophy not only impacted on French legal theory but also on French 
legal practice. Following the French revolution, it was adopted by the 
legislature. Laws were seen to embody the will of the people and were to be 
applied and not interpreted by the judges. Judges were servants of the law and 
their job was seen as purely logical and rational. The person of the judge was 
not to be involved in the decision-making process and if a situation arose that 
had not been foreseen by the law then the judge had to refer that matter back 
to the legislature. In effect, the judges had lost their authority to decide. 
In practice this was unworkable and the legislature was flooded with 
references. In the Code Napoleon this problem was solved by article four 
which expressly states that the judge must give a decision: 
Le juge qui refusera de juger sous pretexte du silence, de l'obscurite ou 
de l'insuffisance de la loi, pourra etre poursuive comme coupable de 
deni de justice. (1976, 17) 
Perelman sees in this justification for his view that a purely logical law could 
never deal with the complexity of practical legal reasoning. 
The third phase of continental legal theory brings us to the present day. 
Perelman sees the reaction against the view of law that characterised the 
enlightenment continuing to the point where continental theorists are being 
led to accept the common law view of legal reasoning: 
Nous assistons depuis quelques dizaines d'annees it une reaction qui, 
sans aller jusqu'it un retour au droit naturel, it la maniere propre aux 
xvne et XVIIr siecles, confie neanmoins au juge la mission de 
rechercher, pour chaque litige particulier, une solution equitable et 
raisonable, tout en lui demandant de rester, pour y parvenir, dans les 
limites de ce qui son systeme de droit l' autorise it faire. Mais on lui 
permet, pour realiser la synthese recherchee entre l' equite et la loi, 
d'assouplir celle-ci grace it l'intervention croissante des regles de droit 
non ecrites, representees par les principes generaux du droit et la prise 
en consideration des topiques juridiques. Cette nouvelle conception 
accroit l'importance du droit pretorien, en faisant dujuge l'auxiliaire et 
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Ie complement indispensable du legislateur: elle raproche 
inevitablement la conception continentale du droit de la conception 
anglo-saxonne, regie par la tradition de la common-law. (1976, 137) 
This move requires a new form of reasoning and Perelman argues that the 
form of reasoning that is most appropriate for this new situation is his own 
new rhetoric or argumentation. 
Common law reasoning, which he identifies as a form of argumentation, does 
exist within a similar context to that which he is describing. It does not, 
though, yet exist in continental legal reasoning at least not in the written 
records of decisions with which this thesis is primarily interested.41 Although 
Perelman set out to describe legal reasoning in Logique Juridique, what he 
has done is set out the contexts within which legal reasoning can occur. This 
fits with his theory of reasoning which is heavily context-based. However, in 
looking at the reasoning appropriate for the contemporary legal context he 
does not look at what happens within that context, as he has done in his 
general theory, but suggests a form that is more appropriate.42 
Despite this tension between description and explanation the implications of 
Perelman's study are clear. Thus in looking at the history of legal reasoning 
Perelman suggests that argumentation is inevitable in a legal context. This 
means that there must be aspects of the legal context that solve the problem of 
the why of argumentation, why undertake such reasoning. Perelman has 
already suggested that education could encourage people to do so but in law 
such reasoning is inevitable which suggests that in law the perfect or optimal 
41 John Bell (1991) has pointed to the similarities in reasoning styles between what occurs 
behind the scenes in the Conseil d'Etat and the common law which suggests that common 
law reasoning may occur in this civilian tradition but he also points out: "If the content of 
justifications and legal arguments put forward in the course of the decision-making 
process have great similarities to common law judgments, then the source of difference in 
the content of the judgment relates essentially to tradition and, more importantly, to the 
function of the judgment itself" (1991, 227) 
42 The tendency of legal theory to become normative as well as descriptive is a common 
criticism. 
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circumstances for argumentation are created. 
The aspects of the context which Perelman has concentrated on are two-fold, 
the sense of social roles and values which are akin to epideictic rhetoric and 
the presence of rules and situations to which they need to be applied to within 
a time limited process of reasoning which brings us back to his first works 
and his attempts to be scientific. The judge combines the two, reasoning 
about values that can use some of the appearances of a science. It could be 
argued that Perelman, for all his denial that argumentation needs such a 
structure ultimately recognises its power. 
It is notable that Perelman, although recognising the limitations of authority 
does not deal with laws' violence. Previously argumentation prevented 
violence and extremes because of the priority given to the other but in legal 
reasoning violence is ever present and even exists in the way in which the 
individual and the problem are depersonalised and classified in the process of 
reasoning itself. This return to an "objectifying" view brings back the 
problem he first identifies, that where one view is considered correct, or in 
legal terms enforceable, the time for debate is over and yet it is this that gives 
law its power and makes it the paradigm view because the person exercising 
the violence is not free but controlled by a wider community view, the judge 
has to persuade others that his convincing, rational argument contains 
appropriate legal values. Perhaps Perelman finally accepted the place of 
violence in reason but felt the limited and constrained nature of legal 
reasoning controlled that. 
4. Conclusion 
Perelman's return to rhetoric allowed him to concentrate on the role of the 
individual within reasoning. This allowed him to dignify the individual and 
places ethics at the heart of his theory. His turn towards law though signals a 
desire to find a way to ground this theory in something other than the choice 
of an individual, whether encouraged by education or not, to treat the views of 
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another with respect. He wishes to show that this argument is inevitable and is 
not dependant on the individual by stressing the importance of the community 
point of view and the limitations on the judge. Yet he does not fully develop 
some of these aspects of his theory, he refers to the importance of the judge's 
own sense of role but not how this is formed. He recognises the importance of 
the wider communities view of law but not how this relates to the judicial 
role. His use of the judge as a model is undermined by the way he fails to 
focus on the judge and thus shows how the judge is constrained but not why 
the judge accepts these constraints. His resurrection of the rational is also 
intriguing. After seeking to get away from a scientific, hierarchical style of 
reasoning, he praises law for its ability to combine the two. This use of the 
rational gives law legitimacy and makes it seem impartial. Perhaps law's 
appeal for Perelman lies in part in the opportunity it gave him to return to his 
goal to see values understood in a scientific manner. 
Perelman's theory does though begin to attempt to understand what it means 
to be involved in seeking to be persuasive. His explorations of rationalisation 
and epideictic rhetoric start to set out a model which could describe why an 
individual finds arguments persuasive and compellable even in circumstances 
where no one has the authority to impose a form of reasoning. His description 
of the universal audience is an interesting concept with which to explore the 
way apparently impartial standards can be created by individuals within 
certain contexts but he remains bound to his own need to persuade others that 
his view of reasoning is compellable and this leads him to placing limitations 
around the individual reasoner without considering how that conflicts with his 
core aim to dignify the individual and prevent violence being done to hirn/her. 
Malloch VA 2002 Contemporary theorists 56 
Bernard Jackson 
Bernard Jackson's work on legal theory is predominantly concerned with 
legal meaning. Legal meaning is the process by which law makes sense - the 
process that enables it to understand and structure the world. This section 
concentrates on Jackson's narrative theory.43 It follows a similar pattern to 
that taken with Perelman. It looks first at the problems that Jackson wants his 
theory to solve and then at his general theory before looking at his legal 
theory.44 Jackson's work contrasts with Perelman's in that he sought to draw 
on one of the new philosophical theories, semiotics, as a way of dealing with 
the issues raised by contemporary philosophy. As a result he is less interested 
in the problems philosophy poses which he feels he has dealt with but rather 
the problem he identifies lies with the failure of legal theory, specifically 
positivism to face up to them and incorporate their insights. 
Jackson has found traditional theories of sense making in law unsatisfactory 
because they do not take into account developments in the theory of 
knowledge and truth that have rendered some of their assumptions 
43 Jackson has not only turned to semiotics but has sought to find answers in everything from 
linguistics to cognitive development. This study will concentrate on his use of semiotics 
rather than attempting to explore the full breadth of his work. In particular his most 
recent work on semiotics and Jewish law (Jackson 2000) will not be dealt with as its 
interpretation of Jewish law is still being evaluated and would have dominated the 
discussion of the Talmud in the next chapter without adding greatly to this study of his 
view of contemporary legal reasoning, though, some aspects of his interest in Jewish law 
will be dealt with. A good introduction to the many other aspects to Jackson's work is 
Making Sense in Law. This is based on a course Jackson gave in law, linguistics and 
psychology. (1995, x) This includes a brief section on rhetoric (1995, 60-67) which he 
describes as a speech act without illocutionary force ie that does not claim that their very 
utterance performs some action but that has a perlocutionary effect - a psychological 
effect which the utterance seeks to produce but cannot guarantee by its mere utterance. 
This could be simply described as words which aim to have effect but do not have 
authority, a concept which will return throughout the rest ofthis thesis. 
44 Unlike the study of Perelman's theory, this study will not look at the development and 
evolution of Jackson's work. Jackson's published works on semiotics and legal theory, 
although showing signs of development, do not display the same rupture that occurs in 
Perelman's work. In looking at his theory of reasoning, therefore, the cumulative effect of 
his work will be considered rather than the process. This means that although Law, Fact 
and Narrative Coherence (1988) will remain the focus of this exposition, it will be 
supplemented with later works, especially where these show a shift, development or 
refocus of ideas presented therein. 
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In contrast to this, Jackson takes the problems created by linguistic scepticism 
seriously and, although he finds directions within contemporary legal theory 
interesting, he chooses to look outside legal theory to find answers. (Jackson 
1995) The core of his narrative theory lies in his adaptation of Greimasian 
semiotics. (Jackson 1997) 
1. The problem with positivism 
Jackson has specific problems with what he identifies as three of the central 
tenets of positivism: the concept of the unified legal system; the belief that 
there is a strong and indeed determinative connection between decision-
making and interpretation which normally consists of the interpretation of law 
determining its application to facts; and the doctrine that there is a specific 
legal form of interpretation. 
In identifying these problems Jackson is attacking positivism at the point 
where it understands its subject and its relationship to the world.46 He is thus 
attacking the way positivism understanding legal meaning. His attack on the 
concept of a unified legal system is based on his argument that it 
demonstrates that positivists are actually accepting a metaphysical claim that 
law exists somewhere out there. As Jackson puts it: 
"the law" or "the norms" are not objects external to particular forms of 
discourse, to which those discourses refer; they are constructed within 
those forms of discourse, and form part of the system of signification 
which makes such discourse meaningfuL Of course, the content of the 
message includes the claim that "the law" or "the norms" do have some 
form of metaphysical existence external to particular forms of legal 
45 Many of these are echoed in the discussion in the previous chapter on methodology. 
46 The philosophical tendency to attack foundations will be discussed in more detail in chapter 
5 below. 
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discourse. But that is simply part of the message of the discourse, which 
we have to study; it is not a condition of accounting for the meaning of 
the discourse itself (1988, 141) 
The idea that there is something "external" or "out there" which the theorist 
can objectively view has been one of the first casualties of philosophy's own 
concern with how meaning is created and Jackson's own critique of 
positivism is grounded in his acceptance of a "non-referential" theory of 
language which makes any claim to either an autonomous form of legal 
reasoning or to a unified legal system impossible. 
As a student of discourse Jackson does not though dismiss the way law 
describe itself but instead argues that it has been misunderstood. These tenets 
are reunderstood as part of how law imagines itself, they are not part of the 
way that legal sense is created. This can be seen in his critique of the concept 
of the unified legal system. For Jackson, the idea of the unity of the legal 
system is founded on a simple error. The positivists have believed the image 
put forward by those who work in the system. This image is not a description 
of how the system operates but is projected by the system and is designed to 
generate dignity. It fulfils a goal of the system. Legal theorists who support 
this image have failed to dissociate what law says it is from its real nature. 
Law can refer to itself as an object but given the philosophical world in which 
Jackson is operating this can not be true, this statement therefore needs to be 
evaluated not as how law makes sense but as part of the stories generated by 
the sense-making process. 
This argument is used, with a little variation, against the third tenet of 
positivism that Jackson finds problematic - that there is a separate and 
autonomous form of reasoning. The variation lies in a shift in focus, from the 
discourse itself to the source of the discourse. (1988, 147) 
Jackson sees legal decision-making as exemplified by the judge in a 
courtroom. In coming to a decision the judge will reflect the view of the 
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professional community within which s/he works as to what reasoning is 
acceptable in that context. The decision will also reflect the forms of 
reasoning that are recognised by the wider community within which the judge 
lives and ultimately it will also contain a mix of conscious and unconscious 
elements. The judge as an individual cannot block off these different parts of 
himlherself from influencing each other. As long as there is no such thing as a 
purely legal person, there will be no such thing as purely legal reason. 
Semiotics for Jackson is not purely language in the abstract but language as 
used. 
The place of the individual in reason lies behind his attack on the second 
tenet of positivism, the way it portrays the relationship between interpretation 
of law and the determination of facts. Specifically, Jackson's target is the 
normative syllogism. As this is the subject of a later section in this chapter it 
will not be dealt with here in detaiL It should be noted, though, that Jackson 
feels that this view of interpretation excludes the place of the person who has 
to make a decision: 
Interpretation, at least as it is conceived in the positivist tradition, 
depends exclusively upon the relationship between propositions (their 
semantic and syntactic relations); decision-making contains a necessary 
pragmatic element: what to do with people. (1988, 144) 
Though he rejects these views, he does point out that they fulfil the important 
doctrinal purpose of justifying interpretation by suggesting that it is 
predictable and a matter of logic rather than a subjective process and show 
the areas where he believes his own work can be more effective. (1988, 131) 
Jackson expands his critique by arguing that the failure of legal theorists to 
recognise the semiotic nature of law has led them into confused debates about 
the nature of hard cases, a core jurisprudential debate. This confusion is 
caused by the fact that they have not been considering why cases are hard but 
have been creating strategies for solution: 
The methodology of "core" and "penumbra" is really a strategy of 
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persuasion, a rhetoric, relevant to the resolution of cases, and it thus 
provides an answer to the questions of the second type. Similarly, 
Dworkin's particular form of justificatory argument is a rhetoric of 
persuasion in relation to the solution to problems; it does not tell us why 
these problems are generated in the first place. (1988, 146) 
Positivism here is confusing part of the discourse of law, which is about 
solving problems, with the "reality" of the creation of legal meaning. Indeed, 
in this area, positivism has become part of the discourse. 
In rejecting these three aspects of positivism, Jackson is committing himself 
to seeing the legal system as complex, legal reasoning as an aspect of general 
reasoning and to finding a new non-syllogistic way of describing the process 
oflegal reasoning. 
2. General theory of reasoning. 
2.1 Truth 
In turning to semiotics Jackson confronts the problem of whether discourse 
has anywhere to stand, whether there is any viewpoint which can be 
privileged as true. In accepting the semiotic view that language is a construct 
Jackson has rejected the view that language relates to something "out there". 
This means that he cannot accept a correspondence theory of truth, that things 
are true depending on how accurately they relate to the "real world" or to 
"facts". If truth is not to be found somewhere out there, then where does it lie, 
or does semiotics presuppose a rejection of the concept itself? 
Jackson accepts that a strong reading of semiotics could lead to this 
conclusion but he prefers a weak reading and supports a coherence theory of 
truth. Truth relates to how things are fitted into the semantic narratives. It has 
to do with how plausible the presentation is and how well the story fits 
together. Truth does not relate directly to individual facts. It is not an absolute 
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but a relative concept 
Jackson is aware that this view of truth has led to him being criticised as a 
nihilist He seeks to counteract this argument by bringing into this structure 
the notion of integrity: 
"integrity" ... may now be viewed as an alternative to the truth. The 
focus here is in trust in people not in the relationship between what they 
say and eternal reality. (1988, 193) 
In introducing the concept of integrity, Jackson highlights four elements: truth 
telling; telling the whole truth; honesty in seeking out the values implicit in 
the material; and honest communication. This is similar to Steiner's structure 
of interpretation though its basis is not trust but faith:47 
We have an interesting model for this form of activity. Many 
theologians doubt the literal truth of the Bible. Yet they write as if the 
Bible were literally true. We may understand such activity in a number 
of different ways. One might be to distinguish the degree of fulfilment 
of the sincerity-conditions of the act of making a truth-claim as between 
such a theologian or our historian and the enunciator of a truth-claim 
about an event which s/he has actually perceived (such as the witness in 
court). Alternatively, the theologian might simply respond that truth 
here is a function of faith, not reason. Moreover, s/he would assuredly 
add, it is useful to propagate such a faith, in that it adds to our cultural 
heritage and has beneficial effects on society. Essentially, I believe, the 
claims which may legitimately be made by the historian are of a 
comparable order. (1988, 167) 
Jackson argues that truth telling in this context simply means telling the truth 
that the individual is capable of, the truth about his/her own feelings about the 
process: 
In short, we are telling the truth of the fulfilment of the sincerity-
47 This grounds his theory not in others but in the self 
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condition of the particular performative act in which we are engaged. 
(1988, 173) 
Integrity is very much an "academic" virtue in the sense that it is perhaps best 
exemplified by the work of academics. Jackson uses the example of a 
historian to explain its practical implications. For the historian this would 
mean explaining how believable s/he thought the evidence before himlher 
was and how well it fitted with his/her experience of other historical 
documents and hislher interpretation of standards accepted by the profession. 
Telling the whole truth in this context would mean that the historian would 
reveal all the data presented to himlher, including that which may conflict 
with hislher theory of events. The historian should try to be aware of the 
political and power relations that may influence hislher views and be honest 
that there are value assumptions in hislher work. 
Finally, the historian should be honest about the importance of what is being 
said. In communicating hislher view of the truth, the historian needs to be 
honest about the value of that communication. 
There is a great deal of similarity between Jackson's view of integrity and 
some of the discussion in the previous chapter in methodology. Jackson even 
calls his process an "ethics of reading". (1988, 193) 
This similarity occurs because, like the theorists considered in the 
methodology section, Jackson takes the current scepticism about truth and 
knowledge seriously and like them he wishes to see a way forward. Perelman, 
who for different reasons finds himself dealing with the same problem, 
similarly places his faith in people and bases his persuasive reasoning on their 
abilities. This concept of truth requires a great deal of self-awareness on the 
part ofthe individual which at times may seem to conflict with Jackson's own 
general theory of reasoning which stresses that we are often unaware of the 
way we use language and that we are bound by the discourses in which we 
participate. 
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This, though, is not Jackson's final word on the subject. In considering the 
role of truth in the criminal verdict he focuses not on individuals and whether 
or not we can trust their relationship to facts but on pragmatics. Pragmatics is 
part of Jackson's narrative theory and will be dealt with more fully in the next 
section but what should be noted here is that it contains more detail on the 
performative conditions that an individual needs to achieve for his/her 
propositions to be accepted as true. 
In stating that «truth is not a quality inherent in propositions, but is attributed 
to those propositions in accordance with the perspectives of the users of these 
propositions." (1998, 259). Jackson directs attention to what influences those 
perspectives and these are found in socially generated narratives of the way 
we expect the truth to be told: 
The persuasiveness of a story is a function not only of the narrative told 
in the story (the semantic level), but also of the narrative of the telling 
of the story. We have narrative typifications of persuasive story telling 
which involve not only such factors as style and setting but also the 
ascribed authority of the story teller. (1998,265). 
These typifications are internalised and to an extent will be unique to the 
individual but the dominant influence will be the discourse within which the 
individual is making truth claims and thus it is possible that in one situation 
different discourses and different perspectives will lead to different standards 
of truth claims which may well conflict. Integrity, thus, would simply mean 
that an individual had fully internalised and understood the standards required 
in that discourse. This, of course, may well be inevitable given the semiotic 
perspective from which Jackson is considering truth and perhaps then the 
truth of his theory of legal reasoning should be judged by how well his 
description fulfils the truth conditions of semiotics. Jackson though is 
engaged not only in semiotics but in legal theory and is seeking to show that a 
semiotic theory can fulfill the truth conditions of legal theory and in a more 
effective way than that of the positivist. 
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2.2 A narrative theory of reasoning 
Semiotic theory regards sense as a construct Sense is a creation of humans 
and not something that exists "out there." Although sense is created through 
all forms of communication, it is essentially a linguistic value and is created 
primarily in and through language. 
Greimas, a foundational semiotic theorist, argued that narrative structures 
were fundamental to this form of sense making and it is this aspect of his 
theory that Jackson has used. Jackson is not the only contemporary theorist 
who is interested in narrative theory. He himself cites MacCormick, Twining, 
White and Van Roermund but he finds all of these theories lacking to varying 
degrees and argues that he pursues a very different form of narrative theory. 
(Jackson 1988, 18-26) certainly although these others see a place for narrative 
structures it is only Jackson who has placed them so centrally and 
foundationally in his work 
Jackson's theory is based on the works of Greimas and Saussure and he 
accepts their basic assumption of semiotics that the relationship between 
words and meaning and words and reality as matters of social convention. 
There is no reason why one word should refer to one object or concept It is 
merely social convention that keeps the relationship between words and 
meanings stable. Words, therefore, do not exist on their own and do not 
simply relate to individual pre-existing concepts. They relate primarily to 
other words and their value comes from this relationship. 
According to Saussure, two principle types of relationship exist between 
words: syntagmatic, and associative or paradigmatic. Associative or 
paradigmatic relationships look at what other words are associated with that 
word in memory - what words are brought to mind by that word. 
Theorists, following Saussure, have argued that these associative relationships 
are not arbitrary but related structurally in small groups that they have called 
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semes.
48 The content of a seme is limited by its semantic field. The semantic 
field links the phenomena normally associated together in a particular 
context. The example Jackson uses is of boy which in a seme could be 
associated with not man or not girl or both dependant on its semantic field or 
context. Opposition is not the only relationship of association, Jackson also 
refers to hyponymy. In a hyponymatic seme classes are structured by 
subordinate relationships, man and boy would both belong to the seme - male 
- and would be related by age. 
The context tells us which relationship is being communicated. This context 
need not be outside the langue. Sentences and larger textual structure can 
provide the context and this is what Saussure called the syntagmatic sphere or 
aXIS. 
Greimas wanted to see how these micro features combined to produce large-
scale effects and, from Saussure's theory, he generated a universal model. In 
this model, sense is constructed at three levels. The most foundational level is 
a universal level and is essential for sense making to exist at alL It reflects the 
structure of meaning at word level and has both syntagmatic and paradigmatic 
levels. 
At this deep level the syntagmatic axis - the contextual axis - consists of 
underlying patterns that make sense of all discourse. Greimas used the 
analysis of Russian folk-tales by Vladimir Propp to show what these 
underlying patterns would look like. Jackson summarises this: 
Every human action, for Greimas, begins with the establishment of a 
goal, which thereby institutes a semiotic object as "subject". In realising 
the action, the subject will be helped or obstructed by other actions of 
other social actors. The desired action itself will be achieved, or not 
achieved. But it is a characteristic of human action that the sequence 
does not finish there. Man, as a thinking being, reflects on past actions. 
48 It should be remembered that all of this is conventional and socially constructed. 
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As a consequence, the syntagmatic axis of Greimas concludes with the 
concept of recognition (or "sanction"). Human action (whether real or 
fictional) thus appears meaningful in terms of a basic ("narrative") 
sequence, which consists in the setting of goals ("contract"), 
"performance" (or non-performance) of those goals, and "recognition" 
of that performance (or non-performance). These goals may be of any 
kind. (1988,28) 
Although this deep level is essential for sense, it is not enough and only 
contains the broadest and most foundational aspects of sense making. The top 
two levels provide much of the content of sense making. The second or 
middle level is called the thematic level and deals with the social aspects of 
sense making. It consists of social knowledge organised into narrative 
structures. These socially generated narrative structures help us to make sense 
of the environment, both "natural" and "man made." They are also associated 
with social evaluation and arrange stories according to type, e.g., a funny 
story, a sad story. The first level is the level of manifestation and, as the name 
would suggest, this is the level that covers language as it is used and brings us 
back to Saussure's description of language use. 
These three levels; deep, thematic and manifestation combine and interact to 
generate sense. In an article published in 1996, Jackson suggests that only the 
top two levels of manifestation and thematics may be strictly necessary for 
sense making. (Jackson, 1996) Though he accepts that the universal level of 
narrative structures obviously plays an important structural role it is the 
interaction of these two top levels of meaning that generates sense making in 
everyday life. 
This process is not mechanical, a case of slotting one structure into another. 49 
Language and sense-making structures are affected by the way they are 
49 In Law, Fact and Narrative Coherence, (Jackson 1988, 170) Jackson suggests that this 
comparison would be based on a loose resemblance and would have similarities to 
analogy. 
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presented and used and how this process is understood. To get a full picture 
of sense making in practice rather than at an abstract level this semantic 
structure needs to be combined with an understanding of the pragmatics of 
discourse. As Jackson puts it, is it is not enough to understand the story in the 
trial, there is a need to understand the story ofthe trial. (Jackson 1988, 84-88) 
Pragmatics mediates the narrative structures that process linguistic sense. 
Jackson considers how people are persuaded to do something new, something 
that almost seems precluded by the structure of sense making that he has 
related. He argues that individuals are only open to new ways of acting if they 
are persuaded to do so in a way that they recognise. The mode of 
communication of this new knowledge must fit into a pragmatic pattern that 
they recognise as a way that new knowledge is communicated. 50 This suggests 
that there is something similar to second level narrative typifications in the 
pragmatics oflanguage. (Jackson 1996, 186) 
Jackson does not deal in any great detail with the relationship between 
pragmatic and semantic narrative structures but he does suggest that this 
relationship will not be a purely mechanical one. Instead he prefers the 
"negotiated interactional model" presented by Sbisa and Fabri in an article in 
the Journal a/Pragmatics. (Jackson 1996, 186) 
If the how of presentation is important then so is the who and another 
important part of sense making covered by pragmatics is the existence of 
semiotic groups. A semiotic group will have its own discourse: 
networks of people who communicate messages to each other, using 
codes and other semiotic devices particular to those groups. (1988, 31) 
This discourse will differ from standard discourse not only at the level of 
50 Jackson does not deal with pragmatics, the story of the trial, in the same detail as the 
narrative structures of semantics. He does use the phrase "narrativisation of pragmatics" 
which suggests that there is a parallel structure. (Jackson 1996, 177) 
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manifestation but the group will also have its own social typifications at the 
thematic level. This does not mean that each semiotic group is closed to all 
the others - an individual may be part of several groups and there will be 
substantial overlap between these groups. A scientist will be part of a larger, 
culture-wide semiotic group as well as part of a more specific scientific 
semiotic group. 
Thus, although Jackson rejects the positivist stance that law is totally 
separate, he can accept that there could be a distinctive form of legal 
discourse. It is not enough, though, that lawyers say they have a separate 
discourse. Their claims need to be empirically investigated and he does 
consider whether law contains one or more semiotic groups when he looks 
more closely at legal theory. (Jackson 1997,283-310) 
3. Legal discourse 
In discussing the possibilities of a separate legal discourse, which suggests 
specialisation of meaning rather than separation of meaning. Jackson 
considers two aspects of language use by lawyers that suggests that legal use 
of language may be sufficiently autonomous to justify the identification of a 
separate legal discourse; language used by lawyers and closure rules. 
Jackson uses socio-linguistic studies of legal language to show that lawyers, 
in legal settings, use a higher number of multi-member semes and that there is 
a greater degree of mono semi city than would be seen in normal language. 
(Jackson 1997,39-46) 
Multi-member semes and monosemicity are aspects of the paradigmatic axis. 
They restrict what can be substitutable at points along the syntagmatic axis. 
They, therefore, deal with what vocabulary is understandable within different 
sentence structures. 
Semes link together vocabulary In relationships that show how that 
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vocabulary is understood in that context. The most common seme relationship 
is the binary or oppositional relationship. Take the sentence "It was dark." A 
semiotician could say that the seme dark/light is present. This simply means 
that we understand dark by opposition to light. Multi-member semes do not 
use oppositional relationships but are structured by "hyponymy." Hyponymy 
puts the components of the seme into a hierarchy. These components are 
understood according to where they fit in that hierarchy. To use a legal 
example, rules created by delegated legislation will be understood according 
to the legislation which creates the power to make those rules. 
Monosemicity simply means words that have only one meaning. Most words 
have polysemicity and will mean different things in different contexts. In 
legal language, though, words are often given a very definite meaning that 
applies no matter what the context. For example, the word "partner" can have 
a number of different meanings but in a legal context it always refers to a 
particular business relationship that is governed by specific rules. 
In using more of these law does differ from the every day use of language, 
and this use of specialised vocabulary almost suggests a code. This is even 
more so in the case of closure rules. 
The closure rules which constrain the construction of sense in particular 
forms of legal discourse may be regarded as part of the "code" which 
defines the identity of particular communicational systems. (1988, 135) 
Closure rules limit what meaning is possible. Jackson shows the importance 
of these rules by using them to illuminate the debate between Hart and 
Dworkin. Not only are they part of legal discourse but even more they are part 
of subdiscourses: 
The Hartian model fitted legislative discourse in the sense that it 
reflected the intentions of the draftsmen of legislation, and the 
determinacy and finitude of their intentions. The Dworkinian account 
fitted doctrinal as opposed to judicial discourse, in the sense that it 
insisted upon a restriction to legal principle as opposed to legal policy 
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(despite considerable evidence that the judges do indulge also in the 
latter), and utterly neglected to take account of the strictly adjudicatory 
aspects of judicial discourse, namely its necessary inclusion (whether 
explicit or implicit) of consideration of the possible impact of any 
decision in the particular circumstances of that case, for the particular 
parties before the court. (1988, 139) 
Legal discourse can first be identified by legal language but within this 
closure rules allow us to restrict this even more. These semiotic groups do not 
work in splendid isolation. The same legal texts and the same communication 
may be received by different groups simultaneously. Jackson identifies 
judicial discourse as the most complex discourse within law as it addresses at 
least three different audiences - litigants, other judges and the wider legal 
audience. Each of these can be seen as comprising a separate discourse or 
semiotic group but this is recognised: 
We may therefore expect the discourse of the judgement to mediate 
between (set constraints to, impose closure rules upon) the relations 
between the different discourses which it contains. The judgement is 
thus both a discourse and a meta-discourse, and to understand the latter 
we need a theory of meta-discourse. (1988,96) 
This theory of meta-discourse is likely to resemble much of Jackson's general 
semiotic theory. 
Despite the specialised vocabulary and closure rules, it is the place of the 
unconscious in rationality that further undermines the argument that law 
could be autonomous. Jackson argues that it shows that law can never isolate 
itself from other forms of reasoning: 
Legal rules are linguistic expressions of narrative models, the latter 
loaded with tacit social evaluations. The translation of these narrative 
models into conceptual language may conceal their origins, but 
interpretation based upon the language of the propositions is likely to 
prove unstable to the extent that it runs counter to the social evaluations 
of the narrative models underlying the text. In short, subconscious 
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rationality, reflecting social knowledge and values, may actually 
threaten to subvert legal doctrine. (1988, 103) 
In place of a unified legal system, Jackson presents a model of interacting 
semiotic groups and instead of an autonomous system of legal reasoning, he 
presents a form of reasoning that is general and will apply whenever people 
reason. 
The question for Jackson's theory is whether he has himself been persuasive 
in the discourse of legal theory. Jackson has criticised positivism for 
confusing the strategies of persuasion with structure of meaning but could be 
argued much of what he describes as meaningful could also be described as 
persuasion, not in what stories are told but in the way that the narrative 
pattern is used to make arguments inevitable. Jackson would probably not 
dispute this but would argue that he understands why these strategies are 
used, how they relate to the structure of language and meaning itself and that 
he is not falling in to the mistake that positivists make by regarding them as 
telling the truth about law. It seems from his work that the standards he is 
trying to achieve is that of increased clarity. This then for Jackson is the goal 
of legal theory, to clarify the legal process and this is not a purely scientific 
goal, returning to the concept of integrity, the academic virtue, the legal 
theorist would be expected to be aware of the impact of prejudices and of 
perspectives on his/her study and this could be seen as an ethical goal. It 
would also mean that slhe would have to have some understanding of the 
social typifications that had been internalised and how they operated on 
hislher thinking. 
This could lead to the problem of infinite regress but it is likely that the 
ultimate discourse would be semiotics and that these assumptions would be 
the ones that could not be questioned if a theorist wanted to play this 
particular game. 51 
51 Thus although it is possible to translate almost any structure into Jackson's terminology this 
is based on an acceptance of its foundations. 
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4. Conclusion 
Jackson turns to semiotics because of its descriptive value. He is arguing that 
it explains the process and experience of legal reasoning better than 
traditional positivism. His theory is certainly all-encompassing and can 
contain much not only of legal practice but legal theory. It thus fulfils one of 
the core aims of any philosophical theory - the ability to describe everything. 
The disadvantage of such attempts are though clear. All a critic has to do to 
reject this as compelling is to deny the validity of the basic assumptions. 52 
Jackson's theory also contains a dichotomy at its core it is dependant on his 
own integrity and yet this appears to be created by the structures he describes. 
The individual is both made responsible for being aware of his/her part in 
discourse and is controlled and limited by it. There are clearly ways in which 
this could be understood in a complex manner but Jackson is seeking to 
clarify and the result is that real individuals disappear and become simply 
carriers of discourse. His view of legal discourse portrays it as almost as 
autonomous and unified as the positivist view that he criticises and it is not 
clear how it can deal with time. He seems to be taking a snapshot of discourse 
but cannot explain how it evolved or how it could develop. It makes law and 
discourse philosophically acceptable but at the cost of making it seem unreal. 
Like Perelman he seems to be happier when seeing it as almost scientific, 
structural and unemotional. 
52 The implications of this for philosophy and theory in general are considered in chapter 5 
below. 
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Neil MacConnick 
Neil MacConnick is also playing the legal theory game and like Jackson and 
Perelman is responding to the concerns of contemporary philosophy but he 
seeks to improve the work of legal positivism not bypass it. This section 
follows the structures of the last two and primarily considers two aspects of 
Neil MacConnick's theory, his institutional theory of law and his defence of 
the nonnative syllogism. 53 
These two aspects of his theory reveal MacConnick's central goals. His 
defence of the nonnative syllogism is based on his belief in the ethics of the 
rule of law and the need for government to be subordinated to rules while his 
institutional theory seeks both to establish a "respectable" theory of law and 
to fulfil the ethical goal of providing a reconstruction of law to which it is 
possible to be committed. 
1. The problem with legal theory 
Unlike Jackson and Perelman, MacConnick's work is not founded on a strong 
sense of the problems of legal theory. His work is a continuation of legal 
theory and seeks in his defence of the nonnative syllogism to defend aspects 
of positivism. He does though see his work as a development of theory and 
his nonnative theory of law is based on a sense that theorists have tended to 
extremes. Idealists have seen nonns as non-factual, as entities separate from 
the natural world and purely human constructs. Reductivists have taken the 
opposite approach. They have seen nonns as purely factual - a way of 
describing human behaviour and views. What is more, reductivists tend to 
argue that nonns get in the way of understanding the human behaviour that 
they describe and should be replaced with a sociological analysis. This split is 
reminiscent of both Perelman's earlier work and Jackson's adoption of 
53 These are the aspects that are most relevant to this theory. They do also provide a good 
overview of Mac Cormick's work. 
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semiotics and has been a response to the problems with discussing the 
reasonable that Perelman discusses. MacCormick, writing with Ota 
Weinburger,54 criticise both of these views for failing to appreciate the 
complexity of social life. 
Idealists, they maintain, fail to fully appreciate the importance of the social 
setting in which norms operate whilst reductivists fail to appreciate the 
importance of norms to the social setting. In trying to put forward a '"socially 
realistic development of normativism," MacCormick and Weinburger are 
explicitly seeking a middle route between these two theories in order to 
consider both together. This, therefore, accepts, that to an extent previous 
theorists were right in identifying important aspects of law but were simply 
too exclusive. They also argue that seeing law in this way invests sociology 
with meaning and rehabilitates the view of law put forward by legal 
academics: 
Thus we can claim that our aim is, precisely, to present a socially 
realistic development of normativism; ... As a development of a 
nonnativism theory, then, ITL offers to the sociology of law (and to 
sociology more generally) an ontology which we claim to be essential 
for any realistic analysis, explanation or description of the legal sphere 
and indeed all of those distinctly human and social institutions and 
phenomena which correlate with, depend upon, or presuppose legal or 
other rules or norms. At the same time, however, our ontological theses 
also lead on to a suitable theory of knowledge for legal dogmatics 
('black letter law') as a wholly respectable and indeed valuable domain 
of human knowledge. (MacCormick and Weinburger 1986, 7) 
This institutional theory of law then claims not just to provide a legal theory 
but a general theory of normativity and, specifically, a theory that sees 
54 In 1986 MacCormick and Weinburger published a series of articles which they had written 
separately in the decade before but which they felt showed a similar understanding of law. 
They also wrote a joint introduction and that is cited here as MacCormick and 
Weinburger. Individual articles within the collection are cited to the respective author. 
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normativity as an important aspect of social life. 
2. General theory of reasoning 
MacCormick's institutional theory has evolved through a series of essays that 
were written over a number of years. 55 In them MacCormick is guided in his 
central belief: 
All human life is implicitly normative, in the sense that whatever a 
person is doing at any time, either as an individual or in common with 
others, it is an open question whether she or he is doing the right thing, 
or doing it the wrong way. (2000, 39) 
This suggests that at the core of human nature is the tendency to judge and 
this requires "grounds of judgment" - norms. Further MacCormick's desire to 
understand normativity beyond the narrow confines beyond law comes from 
his belief that positivists have been too statist, too focused on only on state 
law and instead "once we clarify the concept of the institutional normative 
order, we are able to see that state law is simply one species of this genus". 
(2000, 43) This allows him to reject the views of those such as Derrida who 
see violence as implicit in the very structure oflaw. (2000, 45-46) 
MacCormick's understanding of normativity appears in two forms. In his 
earlier work including that published with Weinburger his approach is 
strongly analytical whereas in more recent institutional theory it is more 
practical and ethical. These are not necessarily incompatible as will be seen in 
the consideration of his ethical upholding of the rule of law. First though to 
his early exposition. 
2.1 Normativity 
In seeking to avoid the dangers of reductivism and idealism, MacCormick 
55 They were first published in the mid 1970's-1980's. 
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adopts what he describes as a hermeneutic approach. (MacCormick and 
Weinburger 1986, 15) 
Hermeneutics evolved out of biblical interpretation. The reformation had 
challenged traditional interpretations of the Bible and encouraged a focus on 
the text and how it should be understood. 56 Schleiermacher and Dilthey, 
reflecting the concerns of nineteenth century philosophy, extended the sphere 
of hermeneutics by concentrating on meaning itself (Warnke 1987, 5-6; 
Bleicher 1980, 12-26) The goal of these early explorations of meaning was to 
generate objective interpretations, to make the process more rigorous. 
Gadamer's Truth and Method (1994), reflecting the concerns of twentieth 
century philosophy, reinterpreted hermeneutics by making clear the 
impossibility of objective interpretation. This view has since become 
dominant and contemporary hermeneutics no longer seeks to find a way to 
produce objective interpretations but to achieve a clearer understanding of the 
process of interpretation itself 57 
Contemporary hermeneutics seeks to understand the world in an 
intersubjective manner. It seeks to find a middle ground between subjective 
and objective approaches and to formulate a method of understanding that 
recognises that knowledge can never truly be one or the other. As such, it 
concentrates on the boundaries at which individuals interact with the outside 
world and places interpretation; the way individuals structure and understand 
their experiences, at the heart of knowledge. 
What this means for a legal theorist is that when attempting to understand law 
s/he needs to look at how the legal process is understood by the people who 
56 This is a complex process because the Bible is authoritative but needs to be applied to 
everyday life. A similar, though less philosophical, exploration of meaning occurs in the 
Talmud's interpretation of the Bible and of the Mishnah another authoritative text that 
needed to be applied. 
57 See Warnke (1987) for a brief history of hermeneutics and a consideration of Gadamer's 
role in this process. Bleicher (1980) considers the history in more detail. Both consider 
the current state and future of hermeneutics. 
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apply, interpret and follow the rules and not simply to consider the texts. This 
should avoid the two extremes because in relating to the everyday use of rules 
it avoids abstraction and the rules are not simply a code for behavioural 
patterns. 
The most fundamental requirement of rationality in action is this: that 
every act or forbearance to act ought to be justifiable by reference to 
some reason for action. (1986c, 190) 
The most basic form of reason is desire. These reasons are so primitive that 
MacCormick describes them as non-rational. To simply follow these with no 
further reasoning would lead to chaos. This is why reasoning is needed: 
Such purposes have, therefore, to be subjected to the discipline of 
higher orders of rationality, that is, to the business of setting them in 
order through higher-order principles of preference sustained 
consistently over time and universalisability over persons and cases. 
(1986c, 195) 
Reasoning, then, is based on an innate aspect of human nature. This does not 
mean that it is simple, there is a hierarchy and this structure needs to be 
consistent and applied universally. This can seem like rather a large jump 
from simple desire. MacCormick builds the structure by first identifying two 
basic forms of reason, reasons which are good in themselves or 'value-
rational', and reasons which tend to bring about a desired goal or are 
'purpose-rational' . These two forms of reasons can be used to help us 
organise our desires. Clearly these reasons may collide and thus, a higher 
level is needed and soon a system is formed with higher reasons providing a 
rational way of choosing between conflicting lower-order reasons. 
Underpinning all this is the simple fact that this order is better than chaos. 
Reasons are used in everyday life. They have a temporal aspect and need to 
adapt over time. Rationality requires that the long-term pattern of reasons is 
also rational. So, from a simple structure which just requires reasons for every 
action, MacCormick generates a structure of rational action which requires a 
hierarchy of reasoning that is applied consistently in the long-term: 
Thus rational thought, whether about what to do or about what is the 
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case, must exhibit the qualities of consistency over time and of 
universalisability over cases, and must accordingly be systematic. In my 
opinion the province of formal logic is none other than the elaboration 
of the detailed implications of these requirements of consistency, of 
universalisability and of systematic quality in discourse. It accordingly 
follows that formal logic is no less applicable to the topics of practical 
reasoning than to those of theoretical or speculative reasoning. In 
neither case however does consistency mean or imply non-revisability; 
... (1986c, 193) 
This again echoes Perelman's early work, to apply one system of rationality 
throughout the field of human knowledge. The system of rationality has its 
own structure and system goals. These system goals relate to different parts of 
the system. Consistency is a logical system value whilst coherence relates to 
the «standing ends" of the system and allows them to be evaluated: 
This depends on treating the standing aims or ends legitimated within 
the system as constituting general justifying aims of the system; that is, 
as values or goods which its observation in practice tends to realise. In 
cases of difficulty, adjustments to or corrections in lower order 
principles or rules may be justified in view of the desirability of further 
or more firmly upholding such values. (1986c, 196) 
If these standing aims are treated as values, it appears that value-rational 
reasons form the highest point of the hierarchy, the highest purposes being 
transformed into the highest values: 
Hence our principles cannot be deemed merely instrumental to realising 
some extraneous or ulterior end; rather, they are means only in the sense 
of that whose realisation is an intrinsic part of the overall good to be 
realised. At this level, the initial analysis of two distinct categories of 
rational grounds for action is better seen as revealing two aspects of 
what is in reality a complex unity. For a fully rational being, the 
capacity to adopt means which are well adjusted either instrumentally 
or intrinsically to ends of action must be conjoined with a capacity for 
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reflection upon the value of ends, and of taking a coherently 
systematised view of a variety of ends valuable in themselves within a 
system of practical reason. (19 86c, 197) 
The hierarchy of reasoning is generated by society and culture. The individual 
reasons within this system and, the individual desires must clearly be 
constrained by the system,58 is still capable of criticising the system. This is 
because the system itself creates room for critique. It does so through the 
system goals of consistency and coherence. Such a system, however complex, 
can not have all the answers to every question: 
So far as one can judge at present, from the best and most thorough 
accounts of practical discourse or practical reasonableness hitherto 
achieved, it is not in fact the case that the requirements that we be 
rational generates for any given individual or group but one single 
system of practical principles. Thus the most significant limit of 
rationality is that, although it may exclude many putative principles of 
action as 'discursively impossible', it yet leaves open the possibility that 
there may be a plurality of equally rational schemes of practical 
reasoning, different in their practical substance though not in their 
rational form. Rationality is then a common element in all acceptable 
systems of practical reason, but not one which can determine the choice 
among equally rational possibilities. (1986c, 199) 
This is where MacCormick ceases to be a traditional philosopher and echoes 
the problems that Perelman identifies as part of all post-descartesian 
philosophy. Unlike Perleman, though, MacCormick does not see this problem 
as so unsurmountable that there is a need to reconsider the entire project. 
Instead MacCormick argues that there may be virtues beyond rationality 
which help to choose between rational choices. 
58 It should be noted that MacCorrruck simply sets out the start and then goes on without too 
much more explanation, having established a basic context he becomes more interested in 
the structure itself 
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There are four virtues which MacCormick feels would be valued within any 
rational system and that could go beyond that system to fill the gap that 
rationality alone cannot fill. These virtues are wisdom, farsightedness, justice 
and humanity: wisdom is the ability to learn from experience; farsightedness 
is the ability to see consequences; justice is the ability to balance values; and 
humanity allows us to see things from the point of views of others: 
That it is rational to cultivate such virtues, that they themselves generate 
rational grounds of choice, and that their value can be expressed only 
within rational systems of practical reason, does not imply at all that 
these virtues are in some deep sense either identical with, or simply 
aspects of, rationality. (1986c, 200) 
MacCormick makes it clear in his own work that law should be understand 
from one point of view that of the committed participant. This is a person 
who regards the law as real and valid and slhe is central because it is the 
committed participant who provides structure to law, legal knowledge resides 
in them.59 
Legal knowledge is knowledge of what for the committed participants 
are the norms of the order, and of the institutional facts constituted by 
the interpretation of natural events within the schemata which the 
norms provide. (1986a, 105) 
This privileging means that the views of these "committed participants" are 
central to legal knowledge but this does not mean that the person seeking 
legal knowledge needs to share that view. As MacCormick puts it, the 
59 MacCormick's acceptance of hermeneutics may suggest that there is more than one form of 
legal knowledge, which may vary from society to society. Yet he is trying to create an 
ontology of normativity. This suggests that norms fulfil similar roles wherever they are 
found and that there is a form of understanding that is peculiar to norms. These two 
positions are not necessarily incompatible. It could be argued that a large degree of 
variety of legal knowledge could occur within a structure that recognises only one way of 
understanding norms. Law is after all about the interaction between norms and society. 
There is nothing about the goal of institutional theory that implies that this interaction 
could not be complex enough to generate many forms of legal knowledge. MacCormick 
does not follow this line and it should be noted that he seems to assume the existence of a 
highly developed and indeed western legal system. 
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observer who seeks to understand law can remain "volitionally external" but 
not cognitively externaL What this means is that the observer needs to 
understand what the committed participant understands but need not choose 
to accept the value structure that that knowledge may contain. For example, 
the observer may accept that the committed participant is committed to a 
certain definition of justice that affects the way slhe applies norms. In doing 
so s/he cognitively enters the reasoning of the participant. However, slhe need 
not agree that this is a valid definition ofjustice.60 (MacCormick 1986a) 
MacCormick uses the "committed" participant to link together the normative 
reasomng and institutional facts in creating the legal system, normative 
reasomng comes from hislher own nature (see next section) while 
institutional facts come from hislher interpretation of the real world. 
3. Legal reasoning 
For MacCormick the reason legal reasoning exists is because of the problems 
with normativity. Law exists to deal with the point at which reasoning 
becomes problematic: 
Alexy's theory of rational practical discourse is a refutation of 
scepticism which shows that we have discursive procedures and criteria 
for discriminating between sound and unsound practical arguments. . .. 
The trouble, however, is that too much remains possible. For many 
courses of action, more than one outcome is justifiable. In a political 
setting this can mean that two or more conflicting courses of action are 
equally reasonable - but then the conflict will have to be resolved. . .. 
The upshot is that one discovers from general practical discourse the 
incompleteness of general practical discourse and the necessity of some 
institutionalised forms of practical discourse, most notably legal 
discourse. The relative indeterminacy of general practical reason 
60 This is not MacCormick's only view oflaw as shall be seen later when he roots his theories 
in ethics. 
Malloch VA 2002 Contemporary theorists 82 
determines a need for law, constitution and constitutionalist politics. 
(1989, 187) 
As an institutional order law reflects the basic normative structure but goes 
further, MacCormick describes the difference between informal an 
institutionalised orders as the institutional order is authority the ability to 
make authorised interpretations and at the base of this is not simply raw 
power but an acceptance of that authority: 
All institutional order has in fact a customary foundation, in the sense 
that the ultimate reason for accepting some ultimate source as 
authoritative must be a shared sense of the nonnative among those who 
acknowledge the ultimate authority. (2000, 41 )61 
What this means is that the committed participant must regard legal norms in 
a certain way: 
They provide a standing set of exclusionary reasons excluding acting 
even upon purposes which at the first level it would or might appear 
rational to act. (1986c, 202) 
The impact this has on the system is that as well as applying the basic rules 
that apply to all rational systems, the rules and structures of legal reasoning 
need to fulfil the requirements of rationality. Norms need to be consistent and 
coherent. Like other forms of reasoning, though, legal reasoning is rarely 
simple. Norms can conflict and where this happens there is a need for second-
order justification. The reasons that are acceptable will come from within the 
legal system and its principles. When there is a conflict between low-level 
legal norms, the participant looks to a higher level where norms are 
generalised: 
What has to be done is to evaluate the merits and demerits of the types 
of decision in other similar cases to which the court will be committed 
by its ruling in law upon the disputed point in this case. Weare thus out 
61 This quote follows his open acceptance of the ethics involved in his theory. 
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of the realm of the particular purposes and into the realm of those 
generalised values which are supposed to be upheld by the general 
observance of legal rules and principles. Nevertheless, as legal values 
they are in effect generalised statements of the purposes which under 
law it is legitimate to pursue, as moral values, they are generalised 
statements of the purposes which the norms of our general system of 
practical reasons authorise us to pursue. Their appeal to us, as distinct 
from their legitimacy within a scheme of practical rationality, is a 
matter of the strength of our emotional or affective commitment to this 
within the constraint of our presupposed commitment to rationality. 
(1986c, 204) 
Like all systems of rationality, law will eventually come to a point where 
rationality is not enough to solve certain problems and in law this occurs at 
the point of the judicial decision. This is not surprising, it is the judge, after 
all who has to apply the law to daily life. Following Alexy, MacCormick 
considers that legal reasoning is primarily concerned with the justification of 
decisions but legal decisions can rely on the authority of the judge. This puts 
specific pressure on legal reasoning and limits the place of rationality: 
As with general practical rationality, we come to that point at which it is 
values or virtues other than rationality itself which furnish us with 
rational but not conclusive grounds of choice. The virtues we seek in 
those who make such choices include of course practical rationality and 
high intelligence in appreciating complex arguments (and disentangling 
their strength from their rhetorical trappings). But to those must be 
added also wisdom and far-sightedness, together with a sense of justice, 
humanity, and the courage of one's convictions (or considered 
preferences). (1986c, 205) 
In applying law, the judge needs to possess these virtues so that they can be 
used when s/he is deciding between interpretations of norms. This brings us to 
an aspect of legal normative structures that differentiate them from other such 
social structures, the need to make authoritative decisions, the need to find an 
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authoritative way to fill the gap. 62 
Although the place of authority will limit the need to reason, judges have only 
circumscribed authority. (MacCormick 1982) They are required to justify 
their decisions and the scrutiny that those decisions are given means that, 
although outcomes can be determined conclusively by an individual judge, 
the judge cannot decide what is or is not a good reason for justifying that 
decision. This is why their pronouncements are 'discursive' as well as 
authoritative. (1982, 277) MacCormick argues that in discursive dialogues 
arguments are accepted by the authority of speaker's reason not by reason of 
speaker's authority.63 
What then are good reasons for justifying such a decision? Clearly, judges 
will work within the general system of reasoning described above. They also 
need to work with the core value of any legal system - justice. 64 
Justice leads judges to treat like cases alike. This fulfils one of the basic 
requirements of rationality by ensuring consistency. It also means that the 
judges tend to universalise their decisions. 65 This occurs because judges have 
to determine what similarities between cases are to be regarded as important 
not just for the case before them but for future decisions as well. In the 
simplest cases, though: 
The norms of the legal system supply a concrete conception of justice 
which is in ordinary circumstances - where deductive justification is 
sufficient in itself - sufficiently fulfilled by the application of relevant 
62 Although he accepts that the context does affect legal reasoning, MacCormick does not 
believe that there is a separate and autonomous form of legal reasoning. (MacCormick 
1993) 
63 The role of authority in law will be explored more fully in chapter 3 when systems with 
different forms of authority are considered. MacCormick borrows this terminology from 
Habermas and Alexy. (MacCormick 1982) 
64 Justice is used in two ways in this section. There is the general, formal value which requires 
that all normative systems be coherent and consistent and the more specific legal value 
which relates to a specific conception of the rule oflaw. 
65 In the new edition of Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, MacCormick states that he has 
moved away from his early views on the centrality of universalisability of law and needs 
to deal more with the "particularity of practical judgement." (1994, xv) 
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and applicable rules according to their tenns. (1986b, 73) 
This view of justice is closely linked to the rule of law which requires 
impartial application of the rules. MacConnick maintains that in 
straightforward cases this occurs through deductive reasoning or the 
nonnative syllogism. This point will be considered in detail in the next 
section, but what should be noted here, is that MacConnick feels that, where 
the case is straightforward, the judge simply needs to apply deductive 
reasomng. 
The legal system works within a generalised theory of nonns but also within a 
generalised sense of social morality that links it to the wider society and 
which will help the committed participants to be committed to the legal 
structures and institutions. By making the focus, a person, in whom can reside 
a number of systems and non-rational elements, MacConnick absorbs the 
non-rational into his theory, explaining the emotional element, after all at root 
of all reason is desire. Thus, although MacConnick refers to a legal system, it 
should not be argued that he means a closed system. 
Law, for example, has a very close relationship with the non-legal world. 
Judges, to justify their decisions fully, need to show that they are consistent 
with the non-legal world as well as with the legal system. MacCormick calls 
such arguments consequentialist. 66 These ensure that law is coherent and 
consistent with the judicial experience of the world as well as the judicial 
experience of law. 67 
Although MacConnick has grounded his theory in the nature of an individual 
it could still be argued that it remains in the field of ought, that it remains an 
66 Bernard Rudden (1979) has argued that MacCormick seems to limit such arguments to their 
normative effect. He maintains that such arguments are used in a much wider way by the 
judiciary. 
67 More recently, (2000, 52) MacCormick argues that following comparative studies in 
contemporary legal systems three sorts of arguments are used in interpreting statutes and 
precedents, (1) arguments that deal with the meaning of the words, (2) arguments 
focusing on the legal context (coherence), and (3) arguments concerning justice or utility 
or consequences. 
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idealistic system. MacCormick himself accepts this and further that more is 
needed than reasoning, to avoid idealism he needs facts. 
MacCormick argues that if it is not possible to show that such facts exist legal 
knowledge itself is not possible: 
If there are no legal facts it is our duty to admit candidly that there are 
none, resign our posts and deliver ourselves to the mercy of public 
prosecutors, confessing freely and openly the imposture in which we 
have hitherto been engaged. (1986a, 96)68 
Bringing facts into law creates another problem. 
The embarrassment of accepting the other conclusion, that there are 
legal facts is of a different sort. It does not expose us to the charge of 
fraud, but to the charge of intellectual confusion. For it is an accepted 
truism that laws are normative, indeed that laws are norms. Yet it is 
equally a profound article of analytical faith that norms are not facts; 
that norms express the sollen, the devoir etre, the ought to be, which 
must be rigorously distinguished from the sein, the etre, the is. (1986a, 
96) 
He argues for a different sort of fact, institutional facts.69 According to 
MacCormick facts are simply things that have an existence and about which 
statements can be made which can be described as true or false. Using this 
definition of facts, MacCormick argues that this can include the non-material: 
They are facts in virtue of being statable as true statements. But what is 
stated is not true simply because of the condition of the material world 
and the causal relationships obtaining among its parts. On the contrary, 
it is true in virtue of an interpretation of what happens in the world, an 
interpretation of events in the light of human practices and normative 
68 See chapter 4 for a consideration of the way in which the judiciary seek to use facts to 
ground their decisions in the "real" world. 
69 MacCormick is dependant on Searle for this concept. (MacCormick and Weinburger, 1986) 
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rules. (MacCormick and Weinburger 1986, 10) 
Institutional facts form the foundation of legal knowledge. Such facts are 
identified by an act of interpretation.70 This is an act that links natural events, 
which clearly would include social behaviour, with the norms already 
recognised. This means that institutional facts straddle the divide between 
norms and social behaviour and this places them at the core of Mac Cormick's 
normative ontology. 
These facts are true or false according to a complex process that involves not 
simply observation but interpretation. Norms are used to interpret facts and 
this allows them to become institutional but, though dependent on norms, 
institutional facts are distinct from them. 
In contemporary legal terminology, what MacCormick would identify as legal 
institutions are often described as legal concepts. He cites contract, 
ownership, trust, marriage and others as concepts which, under his theory, 
would be termed institutions: 
Let me try to say what those concepts have III common. Most 
importantly, they all denote things which for legal purposes we 
conceive of as existing through time. (1986b, 52) 
Institutions are not ideal but factual. Institutions have a starting point, an end 
point and consequences, all of which are regulated by rules. MacCormick 
calls these institutive, consequentialist and terminative rules. These rules 
create and regulate the institution but do not exhaust the limits of the 
institution. 
A general institution can be created simply by legislation and law-creating 
rules but a particular institution is created by acts in the world that activate 
70 Committed participants do not recognise all social norms as legal norms. There must be 
something that distinguishes legal norms from other norms. MacCormick does not deal 
with this point in depth, but it is likely that there is some kind of Hartian rule of 
recognition in operation. 
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the law-creating rules in specific circumstances. These particular institutions 
will not be exact copies of the institution created by legislation. 
This flexibility is not unique to creative rules and both helps the system to 
achieve the goals of constancy and coherence and to regulate the nature of the 
relationship between people and norms. Legal norms provide reasons for 
action and if too precise will fail to foresee all circumstances. Norms, though, 
can be too flexible for if they are too imprecise they will fail to direct 
behaviour. 
This is not left to chance instead there are recognisable limits to flexibility 
which MacCormick argues are ordinarily necessary and presumptively 
sufficient conditions. 
Ordinarily necessary conditions are the conditions that, in ordinary 
circumstances, will ensure that rules apply. For a creative rule, they will lay 
down conditions in which an instance of the general institution will be 
created. There are, though, circumstances that legislation will not have 
foreseen and in some cases, even though the ordinarily necessary conditions 
are present, these conditions will not generate an institution. This usually 
occurs when a legal principle conflicts with the rules. The principle, higher in 
the legal structure, will then apply. MacCormick uses administrative law to 
show how this works in practice: 
It would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that the whole of the law of 
judicial review of administrative action consists in the judicial 
elaboration and use of wide principles of law which are presented as 
justifying an open-ended range of implied exceptions to the expressed 
statutory institutive rules of administrative adjudication, decision-
making and legislation. (1986b, 70) 
As well as ordinarily necessary conditions, rules lay down presumptively 
sufficient ones: 
Presumptively sufficient conditions are sufficient unless and until 
challenged either on points of interpretation, or by arguing for the 
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recognition of some new vitiating circumstances on grounds of 
principle. (1986b, 72) 
This brings facts into line with values and MacCormick's structure of norms 
can thus be created as dependant not only on the nature of the individual but 
also from the nature of institutional facts and the rules that apply to them . 
.... the necessary flexibility of the law depends upon the elaboration and 
acceptance of arguments from policy and from principle, we see at the 
same time why the concept of law cannot be tied down to being simply 
an institutional concept in the philosophical sense, covering simply the 
criteria of validity and the rules valid in terms of them. . ... The legal 
principles are the meeting point of rules and values. (1986b, 73) 
MacCormick's theory keeps returning to boundary points, this is perhaps 
inevitable with his concern to avoid extremes and his interest in hermeneutics 
which in itself deals with boundary points. This concentration continues with 
his defence of the deductive syllogism which is the boundary between facts 
and law which for MacCormick is at the core of legal reasoning. It deals with 
the moment when the judge has to make and justify hislher decision. 
3.1 The deductive syllogism 
The deductive syllogism is only one part of MacCormick's theory of legal 
reasoning but it is for his defence of the normative syllogism that he is 
perhaps best known. In Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1994) he places it 
at the centre of legal theory which he describes thus: 
It accounts for legal reasoning as one branch of practical reasoning, 
which is the application by humans of their reason to decide how it is 
right to conduct themselves in situations of choice. It expresses a 
simple, widely denied, but essentially sound idea. The idea is that the 
process of applying rules is central to legal activity and that studying the 
rational structure of this process is central for explaining the character 
of legal reasoning as a branch of practical reasoning. Despite recurrent 
denials by learned persons that law allows scope for deductive 
reasoning, or even for logic at all, this book stands foursquare for the 
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idea that a form of deductive reasoning is central to reasoning. (1994, 
ix). 
The deductive syllogism is, therefore, central to all normative reasoning and 
not just legal reasoning. It sits at the point of contact between the norm and 
the world outside the norm. It has particular significance in the legal context 
because it is linked to the process of justification: 
... logic does not determine what we decide to do or say; it determines 
only the relation between the content of our sayings - what do they 
entail, are they self-contradictory, or tautological or whatever? Logic 
concerns not what we can say, but what we can justifiably say, given 
respect for a certain very basic form of rationality in discourse. (1992a, 
218) 
MacCormick is suggesting that if our reasoning is to be rational it must be 
justified according to a form of logic. Many aspects of this logic have been 
seen in the discussion of his view of legal reasoning above and include 
consistency and coherence. At its core, though, reasoning that uses norms will 
apply the deductive syllogism. It is the simplest way of applying rules and is, 
logically, the most convincing form. Even in cases of legal reasoning where 
the structure is not immediately present it can still be found: 
Thus a rational reconstruction of the reasoning in a strictly deductive 
form is well adapted to showing why it is compelling, even though the 
informal presentation is more elegant and persuasive rhetorically. 
(1992b, 184 fl 
At its most basic, MacCormick defines the deductive syllogism thus:72 
71 See chapter 3 for a similar point made in considering Aristotle's Rhetoric. 
72 MacCormick's definition of the syllogism has evolved over the years from its first 
appearance in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory. The version portrayed here is that 
which comes from his more recent articles in the International Journal of Semiotics 
(MacCormick 1992a and MacCormick 1992b) in which he carried on his most recent 
debate with Jackson (1992). This version is much more complicated than the original. In 
the most recent edition of Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, MacCormick accepts that 
his original description of the deductive syllogism was too simple. In fairness to 
MacCormick this could be seen as a development of his general theory rather than a 
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you postulate a general hypothetical rule, you establish facts III a 
particular case subsumable within the rule's hypothesis, and you draw 
the logical conclusion for the particular case from rule plus facts. 
(1992b, 182) 
This makes deduction appear simple but the process of generating statements 
to fit into the deductive syllogism also has to be considered: 
Certainly, my thesis is only that once certain information is supplied, 
the process of reasoning with that information is a deductive one. That 
it is supplied by a process involving judgement does not entail that it 
lacks truth-value as supplied, or therefore that it cannot form a premise 
or premises of deductive reasoning. Moreover, even information about 
"brute facts" requires a process of determination or judgement to supply 
it. It does not follow that the information-providing function requires its 
own justification, and that this justification cannot itself be wholly (or, 
in some cases, at all) deductive. But that is perfectly compatible with 
my thesis that legal reasoning can be and always is in part deductive. 
(1992b, 194) 
Deduction happens after information finding, evaluation, interpretation and 
other forms of legal reasoning. This complex process of reasoning that 
precedes the syllogism and that ends by providing predicates that can be used 
as major and minor premises. (1992a) These premises are predicates and legal 
reasoning can be distinguished from other forms of deductive reasoning 
because it only admits four types of predicate as premises; descriptive, 
departure. Though he argues that the deductive syllogism is central he has always seen it 
as part of a wider structure and the development of his theory that is seen in the 
International Journal of the Semiotics of Law does fit the syllogism into this structure 
much more closely. 
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descriptive-interpretative, evaluative and normative. The major premise will 
generally consist of a normative predicate and state a legal rule. The minor 
syllogism will generally consist of a number of premises and will be of the 
other three forms of predicates. The simple case, where all that is needed is a 
deductive justification, appears to be an impossibility. 
Jackson argues that MacCormick's places the normative syllogism at the 
heart of his legal theory because he believes in a very specific conception of 
the rule of law: 
that legal decisions are justified insofar as they conform to the rule of 
law as the (deductive) application of rules to facts. But to this, there are 
two major types of objection: the first, that the deductive syllogism, as 
applied to the judicial application of law, cannot in fact justify in terms 
of the ideal of the rule of law; the second, that there are alternative, 
perhaps preferable, models of the justification of the judicial decision, 
which are suggested in part by MacCormick's own work elsewhere. 
(Jackson 1992,211) 
Jackson maintains that MacCormick is mistaken in seeing the rule of law, the 
impartial application of law to facts, as the only possible form of justification 
and further that even if the rule of law was accepted that the deductive 
syllogism can not fulfil its requirements. 
This latter point is central to the argument between Jackson and MacCormick 
and is based on Jackson's rejection of reference. In rejecting reference, 
Jackson accepts that language does not refer to objects outside of itself. The 
syllogism, though, requires reference for it to fulfil the requirements of the 
rule of law. The problem is a temporal one. The rule of law requires 
predictability. The application of a law must be determined in advance if it is 
to fulfil its behaviour-guiding function but the relationship between the major 
and minor premise in the syllogism is a-temporal. In order for the minor 
premise to be valid it needs to be intended by the major premise but the major 
(normative) premise cannot refer to a minor (factual) premise that has not yet 
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occurred. It cannot predict that a certain set of facts will be interpreted in this 
way. 
Jackson does not totally exclude the syllogism from legal reasoning, it may 
have a place in doctrine where it could be a-temporal, but he strongly argues 
that it has no place in adjudication. 73 
In replying to Jackson, MacCormick agrees that his view of reasoning is 
linked to his view of the rule of law: 
The Rule of Law, with all that it entails in terms of stability of 
expectations, Rechtssicherheit, and the rest of it, require that 
prosecutors, police and citizens at large direct their interferences in 
other people's lives to the prosecution of wrongs and the vindication of 
rights pre-established through the system on some reasonable 
interpretation of it, and above all that the judges who decide upon 
charges laid and claims made relate these rigorously to the rules of the 
system so understood. (1992a, 222) 
Elsewhere he has described this as providing an ethical basis to law, and in 
accepting this, the normative syllogism becomes inevitable: 
This leads to a normative conception of justification of decisions. On 
the given understanding of law and legal system, a decision is justifiable 
only if it is supported by a well-grounded proposition of law, at least 
stating a general principle but preferably a more concrete rule, and if 
facts can be proven or otherwise established so as relevantly to connect 
the decision to the legal proposition. The deductive model of 
justification is reconstruction of justificatory argumentation which 
exhibits with particular clarity the connections between the law, the 
facts and the conclusion that the decision proposed is the right one, that 
73 Jackson makes a related point on Jewish law which he argues is not a unified system though 
it is often taught as if there were one: "Intellectual unity, at the level of human doctrine is 
required, even while it may be inappropriate for divine epistemology on the one hand, and 
human adjudication on the other." (1989, 32) 
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which legally ought to be handed down. The deductive element in 
justification is thus indeed central to it. (MacCormick 1992a, 223) 
MacCorrnick feels that the problems that Jackson has with reference simply 
do not exist: 
... it is claimed that I fatally overlook the distinction in both cases 
between abstract theory and particular application. I do not think this is 
sound as an objection. Nobody doubts that logical relations obtain 
among abstract theological propositions. But there is simply no reason 
to suppose that logic ceases to be applicable the moment that we move 
from abstract law-like universals to the deictic sentences of particularly-
referring statement of fact, the statements that establish instantiation 
here now of a relevant universal. Applied engineering discourse can be 
illuminatingly reconstructed in those terms, and so can the discourse of 
law-application. There is no need to repeat this. (Mac Cormick 1992a, 
220) 
MacCormick and Jackson are working within profoundly different paradigms 
of thought. MacCormick, despite bringing complexity into the old structures 
by turning to hermeneutics and institutional facts, remains within a paradigm 
of thought that is recognisably that of twentieth century positivists from 
Kelsen to Hart. Jackson has turned away from this structure and into 
semiotics. All the criticisms that Jackson makes of MacCormick and indeed 
that MacCormick makes of Jackson relate to this fundamental difference. 
Jackson does though identify the ethical element in MacCorrnick's work 
which he has explored in more detail recently. 
3.2 Law and ethics 
Neil MacCormick's work has evolved over time and generally been set out in 
a series of essays. This means that it can be difficult to set out his definitive 
views. For example, the study of normative reasoning based on institutional 
law above suggests that he sees law as almost a natural part of human nature 
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and that his study is purely descriptive but when considering the ethics of law 
he states: 
There ought to be a descriptive science of law which describes and 
rationally reconstructs the legal order as (in the sense indicated) an 
order distinct from that of ideal morality or political ideals. But the 
order so rationally reconstructed should not be represented as a 
predetermined necessity which exists wholly independently of the 
descriptive science. Perhaps even more than usually, here is indeed a 
science which constitutes its own object. (1989, 189) 
What does this mean for his own reconstruction of law as an institutional 
order? MacCormick maintains that that representations of law have political 
effects and these effects come from their nature: 74 
The kind of object which law is or law are, ... is that of "thought 
objects," or "ideal objects" .... In a significant sense, they exist by being 
believed in, rather than being believed in by virtue of their existence. 
Theories therefore do not stand or fall on the issue of their independent 
existence or non existence. We have to ask: Should they then be 
believed in and brought into existence by our beliefs? (1989, 191) 
This does not contradict his own reconstruction. After all it is based on the 
way in which human beings interpret the world, but it does raise the question 
why should the committed participant be committed. 
MacCormick's support of the rule of law is his answer to this question: 
The point of law is to generate adequate determinacy in practical 
discourse in community or polity. . . . . The ethics of legalism as I 
propound them are simply a restatement of well known versions on the 
case for the Rule of Law as a moral and political value. For me as for 
Lon Fuller this crucially involves subjecting human conduct to the 
"governance of rules" and these rules count for the ethical purposes in 
74 See Peters (1997) who seeks to justifY judicial decision-making by showing its participative 
and democratic nature. 
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issue only if they combine clarity with generality, constancy over time 
with coherence in time .... (1989, 188) 
In reconstructing law he is seeking to show why the committed particpant 
should be committed nor does he forget the need to avoid both idealism and 
reductivism: 
. " legalism does not have to postulate the existence of a world of 
reportable rules absolutely independent of the activity of reporting 
them. Legislation, judicial precedents and doctrinal ("dogmatic") 
writings about the legislation and the precedents and the general 
background theories thereof are all part of the legal world, and none is 
comprehensible or perhaps even imaginable apart from the others. Legal 
certainty and clarity are systemic virtues which certain approaches to 
each of the relevant activities can help to generate. Reconstructions of 
law which are its rational reconstructions generate in a high degree law 
with these virtues. The ethics of legalism are the principles and values 
which advocate and commend us to those elements in the professional 
and academic tradition which promote them. (1989, 192) 
This suggests MacCormick is undertaking a form of epideictic rhetoric to 
reinforce the values of the rule of law and the audience to whom he is 
speaking is a doctrinal one. A reconstruction of law to generate these rational 
virtues may well be different in a judge and this may be why he refers to the 
difference between rhetorical and logical forms of persuasion when 
discussing the normative syllogism.75 The more persuasive form may be more 
appropriate for a more general audience but this would not rule out a logical 
reconstruction for a scientific purpose. This would not be simply for the 
purpose of scoring point in academic discourse as for MacConnick all of 
these help to generate an atmosphere in which the rule of law is accepted and 
his reconstructions are simply one part of that. By showing law as logical and 
rational he is helping to support judges who argue that their decisions are not 
75 Such a difference is explored in Aristotle's work and is set out below. 
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simply the result of personal whim or prejudice. 
4. Conclusion 
MacCormick's ethical turn helps to save his theory from appearing to be 
simply a reconstruction of traditional legal theories. It also allows the theorist 
to appear within the theory and sets out clearly the gap between him and the 
material he is describing. MacCormick does not set himself out to be distant 
from the material instead he defines himself as a committed participant, he is 
one for whom the law has a normative force and his structure is an attempt to 
justify it to a philosophical or theoretical audience. Specifically, he wishes to 
protect law against the charge that it is subjective, to protect the rule of law. 
He does so by showing the structures of reasoning that surround law. This, to 
an extent, undermines his argument that it is possible to cognitively 
understand law while remaining uncommitted to its basic tenets. It could be 
argued that this does not commit him to any specific law but rather to law as 
structure. It is certainly true that not any content could be fitted into this 
structure though Perelman does point to the danger of arguing with those who 
espouse extremest views, MacCormick does not see the danger of using these 
tools to legitimate and justify law in the absence of any way of assessing the 
individual laws and people who apply them. Yet MacCormick requires judges 
to have virtues. The virtues that MacCormick is committed to - consistency 
and impartiality reveal him to be at heart still a philosopher. These are 
philosophical rather than theoretical goals and perhaps suggest that beyond 
the structures of law it is a philosopher who is allowed to judge. 
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As philosophers all three theorists are seeking to satisfy Perelman's audience 
of all reasonable beings and to be convincing. Their commitment to this 
philosophical goal is revealed in the tendency of all three to start with 
definitions of human nature, to try and describe their theory in universal 
terms, and in their preference for structural models. In doing so they are 
describing not only law but how the phenomena that they define as law can be 
translated or reunderstood in a philosophically acceptable manner. This 
means that they are subject to the problems and concerns of contemporary 
philosophy and in seeking to solve these they find it difficult to comprehend 
areas of legal reasoning, such as judicial decision-making which deal not with 
conviction but persuasion. 
In this context persuasion is being used to refer to the way in which a judge 
demonstrates hislher commitment to the law and seeks to persuade others in 
an individual decision that hislher reasoning is legally and not philosophically 
acceptable. Perelman's description of the context within which a judge must 
make that decision is the most successful but he does not take the opportunity 
to explore this in any detail. Jackson's theory could be used to explain why 
certain arguments make sense semiotically but he does not seek to detail the 
pragmatic structures which would make that legally meaningful. MacCormick 
shows how his theory could be used to justify law but not why this would 
make sense in a legal context. In seeking to be philosophically acceptable all 
three lose sight of the need for a judge to produce arguments that will be 
acceptable to the legal system within which slhe operates. 
All three do though place a person at the heart of the structure but this person 
is less a participant in the system than a construct of that system which is used 
to fill in certain gaps, usually to prevent the problems of infinite regress. 
MacCormick is perhaps the most radical in his reconstruction of the law in a 
philosophically acceptable manner as ultimately he steps into the gap that is 
the committed participant and fills it with a philosopher. His commitment as 
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such to a view of law as structural and strongly rooted in a defInition of 
human nature as reasonable is understandable but does it explain the actual 
committed participant, the judge? Jackson's man of integrity performs a 
similar role and again it is a philosophical or academic person whom Jackson 
uses to ground his theory. Lawyers and judges appear to be trapped in their 
own discourse and to be legally acceptable must simply apply its semiotic 
rules. Perelman does use the judge but again this is an attempt to fulfIl a gap 
in his own system rather than to fully understand the way in which a judge 
relates to a specifIc system or structure of law. 
The chapter that follows seeks to develop a theory that can explain why and 
how a judge generates legally acceptable arguments. It tries to take a different 
approach from these theorists by avoiding the tendency to universalise and 
abstract from the law and instead uses the details of two models of reasoning 
in practice. It concentrates on areas of law which, though recognised by one 
or more of the theorists at times as important, are usually not fully explored, 
this includes the role of authority and compulsion in the system and the way 
in which character and identity or role are constructed within the system. 
Issues that have arisen in this chapter concerning the nature of philosophical 
arguments and how this can be understood in relation to judgment will be 
considered in chapter 5. 
Chapter 3 
Historical studies 
The aim of this thesis is to understand the role persuasion plays in the judicial 
decision. It is thus concerned with the methods judges use to legitimate and 
ground their decisions. This relates persuasion to the perceptions individuals 
have of their place in the legal system. In the last chapter it was shown that 
legal theory often has problems with dealing with real people. 
This chapter uses two studies of law and judicial decision-making in very 
different contexts to provide a more complex awareness of the experience of 
the individual who makes decisions in a judicial area. This is then used in 
chapter 4 to provide a framework for an analysis of judicial decision-making 
by common law judges. 
The Talmud is a series of volumes which structures the concerns of a whole 
culture around a legal text. Aristotle's work on rhetoric, the Ars Rhetorical 
attempts to provide a theoretical understanding of the place of rhetoric within 
Athenian society. 
In exploring these very different subjects this chapter both reveals how 
traditional reasoning can be used to provide an individual with access to 
authority by allowing him to hide his particularity and how, where the 
particularity of an individual is all important, the relationship between 
emotions and character can playa decisive role. 
It begins by considering the Talmud which as the core text of Rabbinic 
Judaism2 is an example of traditional reasoning both in the way it structures 
1 Rhetoric in italics is used to refer to this work 
2 Rabbinic Judaism was the dominant form of Judaism for nearly a millennium from the fifth or 
sixth century CE to the eighteenth century. As well as including many aspects of the 
Judaisms that preceded it, it is influential in the contemporary Judaisms who define 
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the relationships of its readers and in the way they relate to the text. It 
considers the way this structure generates acceptable and authoritative legal 
rulings in the absence of any state structures to enforce those rulings. 3 
The Rhetoric contains Aristotle's attempts to both understand this important 
social phenomena and provide his students with the skills required to be 
persuasive in Athens numerous public forums where citizenship both required 
participation and centred around public speaking. Athenian democracy 
provided a strong state structure but one within which all could be said and no 
one individual could gain authority without persuading others to follow him. 4 
The chapter concludes by considering the relationship between the two 
studies and showing how this exploration can provide a useful supplement to 
legal theory and generate the methodology for the study of the common law in 
the next chapter. 
themselves in relation to it. It is therefore suitable when a representative form is sought. 
It should be remembered, though, that it is not an exclusive representative of Jewish 
thought and equally that, although still influential, that it is an historic form of Judaism. 
For more information on contemporary forms of Judaism see Jacob Neusner (1995) 
3 This is an absence caused by external factors. The Talmud itself contains the details of a 
complicated court structure complete with hierarchy. It can though survive without this 
structure. It should though not be forgotten that its authors would prefer it to be part of a 
state sponsored legal system. 
4 The original bias in these texts which dealt with woman but did not see them as active 
participants and spoke only to men will be reflected in the language used in this chapter. 
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The Talmud reveals the structure of traditional reasoning which evolved to 
generate authoritative interpretation of the laws within this context. To do so 
it had to ensure that its methodology was both grounded and compellable in 
the absence of state imposed sanctions. This introduction briefly describes the 
text itself and then the traditional structure within it. In this the main themes 
of identity, responsibility and character which will be explored in more detail 
in the sections which follow are set out. 
1. The Talmud - an introduction6 
The Talmud is not a single book but a series of volumes: 
The Talmud is not a book, it is a literature. It contains a legal code, a 
system of ethics, a body of ritual customs, poetical passages, prayers, 
histories, facts of science and medicine, and fancies of folklore. 
(Abrahams 1975, 17) 
The problem the Talmud sets out to solve is a complex one. From the earliest 
days laws were central to the identity of the Jewish people and their religious 
life. These laws were regarded as divinely given but included reasons which 
allowed future generations to adapt them to new circumstances. When the 
monarchy existed there was a single authority which could issue authoritative 
rulings on the adaptation of these laws, however, conquest after conquest 
destroyed not only the monarchy but the courts and religious structures and 
institutions. This meant that no one group could rely on power to enforce their 
5 There are two Talmuds, one of which was produced in Palestine and one in Babylon. The 
Babylonian Talmud is more developed than the Palestinian and is referred to simply as 
the Talmud. 
6 I am using the 1948 Epstein translation of the Talmud. The letter T before the tractate name 
will identify quotes from the Talmud. Quotes from the Mishnah will be cited simply by 
tractate name and, unless stated otherwise, will come from the Neusner translation 
(1988). I am not using the translation of the Mishnah in the Epstein translation to try and 
recreate better the sense of these being texts in different languages and idioms. Biblical 
quotes come from the Jewish Publication Society's translation of the Tanakh (1985). 
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interpretation and the expulsion of the community from Palestine meant that 
they had lost even the link of proximity. Paradoxically this increased the 
importance of the laws, religion and education, as these were all institutions 
which could move with the people. The Talmud needed to provide for the 
authoritative development of laws without a state or other authority to impose 
interpretations. This was made easier by its own history as part of the oral 
torah. 7 
The word Talmud itself means teaching or study and it combines the text of 
the Mishnah - a law code - with commentary or Gemara. For Rabbinic 
Judaism it is the central part of the oral torah. The oral torah consists of texts 
which have the status of the written torah, the Bible, and are regarded as holy 
works but which unlike the written torah form part of a living tradition to 
which each generation is expected to add and was first transmitted in oral 
form. 
The Talmud is only part of this oral tradition and was collected and compiled 
over six centuries by generations of scholars.8 The first known as the tannaim 
or teachers compiled the core text - the Mishnah (from the word shanah 
meaning to repeat completed c. 200 CE) and later generations known as the 
amoraim (commentators) added to this by a series of debates and arguments 
based on the text. (220 CE to the end of the fifth century CE) The [mal 
generation the savoraim (sixth century) or thinkers added the debates to the 
text of the Mishnah. They did so by physically combining the debate to the 
text, if you look at a page of the Talmud in the middle lies a section in 
Hebrew. That is the Mishnah. The commentary or Gemara is in Aramaic and 
physically surrounds it in on the page and sometimes continues for many 
pages. The names given to the generations is telling and describes a decline in 
the authority of the scholars. The first generations could set out definitive 
7 See Neusner (1985) for a full analysis of the complexities of this term and the way it was 
understood at this time. 
8 See Stemburger (1996) and Lifschitz (1996) for an introduction to the history of these texts. 
Segal (1996) deals with the early period. 
Malloch V.A 2002 Historical studies 104 
teachings - later generations could only add to this using the reasoning of the 
teachers as a starting point and thus absorbing some of their authority. 9 
The MishnahlO the core of the Talmud and from which later generations 
derived authority comprises a series of tractates 1 1 on various aspects of Jewish 
law. It is a very simple text consisting of code-like statements oflaws and is a 
summary of the attempts of generations of scholars and judges to apply and 
adapt the laws written in the Bible. It was the fIrst part of the oral torah to be 
written in an authoritative form after a revolt against Roman occupation led to 
a massacre of scholars leaving the original oral system of transmission in 
tatters. It became the law code for the community under the Patriarchate. 
Having achieved written fonn the interpretation of the oral torah itself 
became the focus for future legal development and interpretation and despite 
the range of literature contained within it, the Talmud remains a work of 
interpretationl2 of laws and primarily its authors were jurists whose core 
concern remained the application of the basic code: 
The Talmud is a commentary written by philosopher-lawyers, men of 
extraordinary power to explain and amplify legal words and phrases, to 
generalize about rules, to theorise about matters of law as about 
mathematics. The reason that the sages deemed it urgent to do so, and 
with such extraordinary vigour and energy, must surely be that the 
document in hand, the Mishnah was the authoritative code for their 
courts. (Neusner 1991, 67) 
Yet, although the roots of the Talmud and its complex legal structure lie in its 
use in courts at times the laws it contains needed to be applied where there 
were no courts or those courts had no power beyond social pressure, as 
9 The system of precedent absorbs authority in a similar way - see chapter 4 below. 
10 See Goldberg (1987) for a detailed introduction to this text and an exploration of its 
historical context. 
11 Tractate simply means treatise and is the name generally used for sections of the Mishnah. 
The Mishnah is divided into six main sections; sedarim lit. orders. These are divided into 
63 subsections; massektoth literally texts or tractates. 
12 "Interpretation" is a term which has been the subject of much discussion (see Marmor 1995) 
in this context it is being used to refer to a form of reasoning which is based on an 
authoritative text. 
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Menachem Elon states at the start of his monumental study of Jewish law: 
Not only did the Jewish legal system not shrivel and die in the absence 
of a homeland, but its most vigorous development occurred during the 
period where the people were widely scattered throughout the diaspora. 
(Elon 1994,2) 
It is the ability of the Talmud to remain persuasive and to develop in these 
circumstances that is at the core of its significance for a study of persuasive 
reasoning. It did so primarily by creating a traditional system of law and legal 
reasoning that was built on a strong sense of individual responsibility for the 
laws. Although no individual had authority the Talmud creates a space where 
an individual can, by showing the correct character and virtues and by 
applying rules, make authoritative rulings that will be accepted by the 
community. 
1.1 The Talmud's traditional structure 
The roots of this tradition predate the Talmud and evolved as the 
interpretation of laws became problematic in times when there was no central 
authority. The biblical codes themselves were written down in an 
authoritative form following the loss of state structures and the collapse of the 
monarchy in the Babylonian conquest of 587 BeE and it is from this time that 
the oral torah itself evolved as a way of coping with problems in that text. 
A nation thirsting for unity could not tolerate divergences in religious 
behaviour. It was crucial that unequivocal and binding instructions be 
given. At the same time, craving continuity, the nation would not 
tolerate editorial tampering with the texts of its inheritance, even if 
these texts diverged from the binding instructions of the leadership. 
Therefore, the several textual strands - gathered from the various 
quarters in which they were considered holy - were preserved, each in 
its own peculiar form, even as corrective instructions were issued to 
smooth the textual differences. . ... Uniformity of practice and a sense 
of common inheritance, embracing all groups despite textual 
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divergences caused by dissimilar histories - these were the guiding 
concerns of Ezra's canonisation. Ezra's work retained the people's 
torah even if that meant canonising a given law in two or more 
divergent forms. Such occasional inconsistencies were overcome 
through oral instruction, fostering unity while preservmg holy writ 
intact. (Halivni 1998, 201)13 
As has been pointed out the Mishnah was also redacted in response to a crisis 
and ultimately the Talmud was compiled at the end of a long period of 
persecution and coincides with the start of the diaspora. There is thus a direct 
link between the importance of the text to the peoples identity and the need to 
issue authoritative interpretations. This is a circular structure as in tum the 
tradition within the Talmud creates the identity of the people. 
The Talmud is founded on a system of education which transmits knowledge 
and authority by a series of hierarchical and historical relationships and it is 
primarily this which defines it as traditional. The dominant relationship is that 
between teacher and disciple. 14 This relationship is designed to make each 
subsequent generation of scholars feel bound by the one that came before and 
also provides a basic stability to the structure as in such a system rapid 
changes are unlikely. Thus although the structure is circular its roots lie not in 
the current but previous generations and this prevents it from appearing too 
obviously tautological. Indeed one of the strengths of this structure is its 
ability to hide its dependence on the consent of the community. The 
teacher/disciple relationship was not limited to talmudic scholars as all male 
members of the community were educated within the same system. This 
ensured that the system of reasoning used to generate authoritative rulings of 
law was understood and accepted by the wider community. This combination 
13 Guttman (1970) shows how the Ezran reforms fit into the history of Rabbinic Judaism. See 
Cohen (1937, XX) for a discussion ofthe traditions associated with Ezra and Westbrook 
(1996) for a discussion of the history of biblical law and the role of Ezra within this. 
14 This is not the same as a teacher/pupil relationship as it implies a much stronger sense of 
submission to the teacher. 
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of a hierarchical structure which encourages incremental rather than radical 
change, where knowledge is passed down in a way where authority is retained 
by teachers and a community where all have a place within this system of 
transmission provides a way of ensuring the current generation of the 
community consent to the application and interpretation of laws while hiding 
the extent to which the structure is based on that consent. 
The relationships set up by the system of education impact on the individual's 
own sense of identity and create a sense of responsibility for the laws 
throughout the community. The Talmud itself impacts on these levels of 
context by giving itself a religious history and ensuring that to be understood 
it requires external information and therefore cannot be completely 
decontextualised These structures, traditional and textual, increase the 
likelihood that the interpretations of the Talmud will be persuasive by directly 
affecting the context within which they will be heard. 
The structures of reasoning themselves impose further limitations and rules of 
interpretation are then used to ensure both structure and a consistency to 
reasoning. They limit what can be said and ensure that scholars will present 
their interpretations in a standard manner, this makes them appear less partial 
and more likely to seem like a logical outcome from the text and almost 
automatic. 
It is the subtle interaction of all of these factors that ensured that the Talmud 
remains a highly influential and persuasive text for those who believe in its 
fundamental precepts. It also provides a very dense model of legal reasoning 
in an environment without a state structure. 
This study concentrates on the aspects which generate this persuasIve 
structure. Under the heading creating a tradition it considers identity, 
responsibility and relationships. Then, under the heading content of a 
tradition, it looks at the way memory and the dominance of the particular help 
to both teach and hide the individual's approach to reasoning. In the 
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conclusion this structure will be compared with Aristotle's understanding of 
persuasion within the Athenian legal system and be used to generate a 
complex understanding of the role of persuasion with law. 
2. Creating a tradition 
The Talmud is part of a tradition that forms the communities sense of its own 
identity. This section considers aspects of this which can be seen in the text 
itself It starts with the nature of the laws which impact on every aspect of life 
and specifically on aspects of life that set the community apart, before 
showing how all members of the community are encouraged to take 
responsibility for the application and development of these laws and finally 
describing how their relationship to these laws are constrained by a system of 
education which seeks to generate not only a system of reasoning but the 
character of each member of the community. 
2.1 Identity15 
From the earliest times laws were to playa definitive role for the community. 
The earliest law codes are contained in the Pentateuch16 and contain both 
laws which were "natural" and covered all humanity and specific laws which 
related to the ways in which the community defined themselves as separate 
this included the mosaic laws which defined clean and unclean but also dealt 
with clothing and with religious imagery.17 Bernard Jackson has suggested 
that: 
It is these dimensions of sense construction - the construction of the 
sacred through the dimensions of loyalty, visual images, body language, 
15 For reasons of clarity identity in this thesis will be used primarily to denote an individual's 
own awareness of themselves whereas character will be used for the way in which that 
identity is seen by others and is a mediated version of identity. 
16 See Cambridge Companion to the Bible for a more detailed analysis of the Pentateuch (Klee 
et al, 1997) and Westbrook (1996) and Walzer (1989) for an introduction to the codes 
themselves. Walzer considers the importance of the reasoning style within the codes. 
17 Holiness in Jewish culture implies separation of the clean and the unclean, as such it can be 
applied to any area where discernment or choice is possible. 
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smell, taste, speech and time - which the Bible here VIews as 
constituting the particular identity of the people of Israel, rather than its 
ethical teaching. (1995, 191) 
Law then was central to the way people looked, ate and interacted with each 
other. It is this that set the people apart. The importance of the laws to 
identity led to a stress on the practical application of the laws. Indeed, the 
Talmud makes it clear that the practical implications of commandments are 
much more significant than the theoretical ones: 
R. Eleazar said: When the Israelites gave precedent to we will do over 
we will hearken a heavenly voice went forth and exclaimed to them, 
who revealed to my children this secret, which is employed by the 
Ministering Angels (T Shabbat 88a) 
The Talmud expands the laws of the Bible by emphasising rules that bring the 
practical elements into everyday life and further strengthening their 
importance. The altar in this vision of Israel, is identified as much with the 
kitchen table, as with the temple. In Jackson's terms it extends the limits of 
sense construction, every aspect of life is now used to define and separate the 
community. This was to prove its strength when the laws needed to be applied 
following a loss of institutions which occurred at the time of the compilation 
of this material and would previously have provided additional support to the 
communities sense of its own identity. 
The Talmud is divided into six orders18 - 1 Seeds, agricultural law relevant 
only to the holy land of Israel; 2 Festival days which regulates behaviour on 
the sabbath and other holy days and gives the community a calendar which 
defines time as separate from that of the seasons; 3 Women, which includes 
family law and succession; 4 Damages which deals with civil law, criminal 
18 Sternberger (1996, 109-114) sets out the structure of the Mishnah and considers whether 
the structures were original and whether any structuring principle can be seen. I have 
used his translation for the title of the six orders. 
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law and procedure; 19 5 Holy things, the law relating to temple dues; 6 
Purities, laws relating to the purity of persons, things and places (including 
the best known laws which limit what can be eaten). 
The laws do not only regulate every day life but are strongly linked to the 
religious life of the community and retain an aspirational quality. This can be 
particularly seen if the law code, the Mishnah is briefly considered as a 
separate text. The Mishnah is a-historical. Everything is expressed in the 
present tense. Individual events, however dramatic, are not significant. 
History is only considered when there appear to be patterns emerging.20 This 
is particularly notable because of the time of its compilation. The Mishnah is 
the most important work produced in the aftermath of a disastrous attempt to 
overthrow the Roman occupation, yet it ignores it completely. In the midst of 
what must have been a chaotic situation, it portrays a motionless, perfect 
Israel.21 This Israel clearly did not exist but what is implicit in the Mishnah is 
the responsibility of those who accepts its precepts to bring this world about. 
... the God of Israel acts and wills only in reaction to the action and 
intention of his Israelite partner on the Land. ... As in the time of the 
Temple, then, God remains Lord of the Land of Israel and owner of its 
fruits. But when His Temple no longer stands and His Land has been 
defiled, His status as Lord depends upon the action of His remaining 
people. Those who impose upon themselves the task of 
reconstructing the human and social fabric of Israelite life make 
effective the holiness of the Land and make real the claims of its God. 
19 This includes details of the court structures as well as substantive law. 
20 E.g. Satah 9:15 There is a list of important sages, each of their deaths corresponds to a loss 
i.e. "When R Meir died makers of parables came to an end. When Ben Azzai died 
diligent students came to an end. When Ben Zoma died exegetes came to an end." The 
list goes down the generations showing a gradual decline in holiness. This is therefore not 
a historical pattern but a spiritual one. 
21 This interpretation of the laws in the Mishnah is heavily dependant on Neusner who points 
out that though the text is based on a tradition the structure of the Mishnah itself is anti-
traditional in founding everything in an eternal present. (1989) It also does not put 
forward a conservative picture, it is a contemporary book this is demonstrated in its use 
not of Biblical but contemporary Hebrew and its reference to Rabbis from the most 
recent generation of scholars as the primary authorities. 
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(Neusner 1989, 174)22 
This combination of laws which regulate everyday expenence alongside 
moral and religious elements are a powerful source of identity in that they 
dictate how the community sees itself, its sense of time and place the way in 
which it becomes visible not only to itself but to others. By setting the people 
apart it allows them to define and describe themselves. The Talmud further 
embeds itself within the community by also ensuring that all feel responsible 
individually for the system. 
2.2 Responsibility 
It has already been stated that in the structure of the Mishnah is rooted the 
idea that the community is responsible for creating the world described in the 
laws, as well as following rules which defme them as separate. This 
responsibility is extended down to each individual member. 
The Talmud itself describes the moment when all individual members of the 
community became responsible for the law. It relates the biblical story of the 
entrance by the people into the land promised by God to Moses.23 The people, 
which included woman and foreigners, all face each other and accept the 
law. 24 The Talmud takes this story and makes a complex series of calculations 
to find exactly how responsible every individual was for each law. It describes 
how for each commandment there was a curse and a blessing, a positive 
obligation to obey the command and a negative one not to breach it. It goes 
22 In his essay on the oral torah, Safrai (1987) deals with conflicts that arose when the 
Mishnah was written. 
23 The biblical source text is in Joshua (Jos 8:30). Moses is portrayed in Deuteronomy (Deut 
27:11) telling the people that they must perform this ceremony once they have entered 
the promised land and this is the fu1£l1ment of that command. This is therefore linked to 
the Deuteronomic code and to the founding of the Jewish state. It is in accepting the law 
in the land that the state is founded. 
24 This is not portrayed as God giving the law (and each time God gave the law there were 
different codes). Instead this is portrayed as in obedience to a command without God 
having to intervene and this perhaps explains why it is this giving that is associated with 
responsibility . 
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further and argues that for each command there was a general and a particular 
form of obligation and four distinct duties, to learn, teach, observe and do. 
This comes to sixteen duties and aspects to each law and as they were given 
not once but three times during the wandering this equals 48. One Rabbi goes 
further and argues that there were 48 times 603,550 commandments made 
and accepted: 
it follows that for each Israelite there are 603,550 commandments. 
What is the issue between them - R. Mesharsheya said: The point 
between them is that of personal responsibility and responsibility for 
others. (T.Sotah 37b) 
Emmanuel Levinas has said: 
The real meaning of this apparently particular ceremony performed by a 
people whose members can all look upon one another, a community 
which one gaze can encompass is that all human beings are included in 
the legislation in whose name the pact is concluded. (1989,217)25 
The individual is responsible not only for their own obedience but for the 
others and indeed it is this shared responsibility under the law which binds the 
community together. 
in the society which fully deploys all the dimensions of the Law, society 
becomes a community. (1989,226) 
The community then is defined by the acceptance of the individual member 
for the laws which in turn defme the community and, given the nature of the 
laws, the way the individual relates to others within that community and the 
world. The sense of responsibility for not only one's own but others 
submission to the laws helped to generate social sanctions which applied even 
where the community had no formal court structures and a sense of 
25 Levinas (1989) points out that the question in the Mishnah that prompts this Gemara has to 
do with the correct language to be used in matters of ritual. This example is used because 
as foreigners were present during this recovenanting it was believed that all 70 known 
languages were used. Levinas interprets this as meaning that the responsibility extends 
beyond Judaism and to all humanity. 
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disapproval within the individual themselves, they are encouraged to use 
these as standards to judge their own behaviour. 
This responsibility extends not only to the laws as they are but to ensuring 
that they remain relevant to the community. This can be seen in the 
description of a similar moment of acceptance of the biblical Deuteronomic 
code. Moses is portrayed reading the laws to the people before they enter the 
new land. These laws are described as those given to the previous generation 
who left Egypt. Moses makes it clear to those present that these laws are the 
responsibility of not just one generation: 
The LORD our God made a covenant with us at Horeb. It was not with 
our fathers that the LORD made this covenant, but with us, the living, 
every one ofus who is here today. (Deut. 5:2-3) 26 
It is notable that the laws Moses gives, although similar to and clearly a 
version of the earlier laws contained in the Covenant code also in the Bible, 
are not the same as the earlier laws. They have been expanded and adapted to 
better suit life in a state whereas the earlier laws were more concerned with a 
nomadic existence. These are laws which though seen as identical have been 
adapted to the new context. This point, that responsibility for the law lies with 
the current community and that the law can be reunderstood for each new 
context is emphasised frequently within the Talmud A phrase often used to 
express this is that on the one hand, it is a basic article of faith that "the Torah 
is from Heaven"; and on the other, it is also a basic principle that "the Torah 
is not in Heaven." The source of the law is heaven, but the place of the law 
and its life and development, are not in heaven but in human society. (Elon 
1994,242) This helps to extend the responsibility not just for the current laws 
but for its future development to all members of society. 
Although these laws which generate a sense of communal identity and 
individual responsibility allow the law to be fully grounded it does create a 
26 Note that in this version Moses says he received the laws at Horeb not Sinai. 
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problem that can be seen when the court structure, which generated definitive 
rulings and which had been supported by successive imperial rulers, 
collapsed.27 Shortly thereafter the schools of Hillel and Shammai, two rival 
schools with rival interpretations of law, appear. To begin with this plurality 
was tolerated but, over time, it became clear that it was unsustainable. It was 
particularly difficult when the two groups diverged on practical matters and 
there were dire warnings about what would happen if one, authorised ruling 
was not found. It was said that there was a risk of losing the torah itself - "the 
words of God would not be found throughout the land." (T. Shabbat. 138b) 
Given the close link between law and identity this would mean the end of the 
community. The problem was that, in the absence of the Sanhedrin, there was 
no authority. No one group had the power to impose its interpretation. It is 
related that this problem was resolved by divine intervention which 
authorised the decisions of Hillel but carefully did not condemn Shammai. 
The words from heaven are reported as having been: 
The words of both are the words of the living God, but the law is in 
accordance with the School of Hillel! (T. Erub 13b) 
This statement makes a clear difference between a true decision and an 
authorised one. The authorised decision is the law but contradictory opinions 
can come from God. This means that they can both be true. By allowing the 
status of truth to divergent opinions, the "voice from heaven" only insisted 
that there be conformity in practice not in ideology and this allows a large 
degree of intellectual freedom. It also explains why the Mishnah and the 
Talmud like the Pentatuech record contradictory and dissenting views. These 
are part of the truth.28 This allows a distinction to be made between 
responsibility for the law's development which all can still contribute to and 
contribute to as individuals with different opinions and the ability to make 
27 Perelman argues that the Sanhedrin provided the authority that allowed the Rabbis to be 
creative, following the abolition of the Sanhedrin, there was a return to stricter 
interpretation. Certainly shall see later the rules of interpretation did become more and 
more prescriptive. (perelman 1976, 153) 
28 It is the flexible attitude to truth that has led to a recent interest in Rabbinic interpretation. 
(Handelman 1982) 
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authoritative rulings. The individual is allowed to express himself within the 
structure and to reveal aspects of truth but is still expected to obey authorities 
in practical matters. 
2.3 Relationships 
The authorisation of Hillel over the school of Shammai privileged one line of 
transmission over another and turns the focus towards the structure of 
relationships by which the laws and the authority to interpret the laws were 
passed on. 
If the laws themselves generated a sense of identity by regulating the way the 
individual and the community related to the world this was further reinforced 
by the relationships through which the laws and the sense of responsibility for 
them was passed down by generation to generation and it is notable that the 
last section to be added to the Mishnah and which could be described as its 
first section of commentary provides it with a history and a tradition. 29 
Abot, or the sayings of the fathers, moves the a-historical mishnah towards a 
traditional structure by describing its history as a line of transmission of the 
oral tradition starting with Moses at Sinai. Clearly not all of the torah was 
passed down from this point. One passage in an early rabbinic text explains 
how the whole of this structure, not only the written was given to Moses by 
saying that "God taught Moses the general principles." According to Abot, 
each generation was expected to add to it but any additions made needed to 
be authoritative. 
Abot itself does not deal with the methodology of the oral torah but it does 
deal with who can apply it, this is not limited to Rabbis but it is limited to 
those who have had a specific education, the scholars and a specific 
29 Abo! is placed at the end of the legal section, linking the virtues expected of judges close to 
the rules they are likely to apply_ 
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relationship between teacher and pupil. 
Rabban Gamaliel says: (1) Set up a master for yourself (Abot 1: 16) 
Even the relationship to God is mirrored in attitudes to teacher and to the 
torah: 
R. Eleazar b. Shammua says, "the honour owing to your disciple should 
be as precious to you as yours. And the honour owing to your fellows 
should be like the reverence owing to your master. And the reverence 
owing to your master should be like the awe owing to heaven." (A bot. 
4:12) 
Outside the teacher-disciple relationship is the wider community. Attitudes 
towards it are more ambivalent. 
Two aspects of communal life are regarded as positive. The community is a 
place for learning. (nWho is a sage? He who learns from everybody," Abot 
4: 1) It also provides opportunities to carry out torah precepts. It should be 
remembered that the student of the torah would not have seen a distinction 
between theory and practice. As to say implied to do, to study implied 
practice. Indeed to study the torah without practice was futile: 
Anyone whose deeds are more than his wisdom - his wisdom will 
endure. And anyone whose wisdom is more than his deeds - his wisdom 
will not endure. (Abot 3:10) 
The first step to gaining authority IS to show that one understands the 
practical implications of the principles: 
The Halakha is bound to actual practice, and a precedent established by 
a sage who is recognised for his wisdom and for his practical behaviour 
in the eyes of most or all of the community has the power to establish 
and determine halakha. (Safra 1987, 180) 
Those seeking to enforce new interpretations would have had to show that 
they regarded themselves as ruled by them. 
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Danger came from inappropriate relationships. (This is the reverse side to the 
stress placed on finding the appropriate relationship.) The danger is of 
contamination, of being infected by something unholy. Thus contact with an 
evil neighbour,30 all women3! and the ruling power are to be avoided. It 
should be remembered though that this was not written for a small bookish 
elite. Education evolved at the same time as the courts and legal reasoning 
and they are closely linked. It was in the schools that the future decision-
makers would have learnt how to make acceptable interpretations. All adult 
males would have been expected to have been educated in this structure and 
brought into these relationships. Abot goes further and seeks not only to 
regulate relationships but to impose a specific character and virtues on those 
who seek to study the laws. 
Abot uses analysis of character types to show which virtues were expected of 
the scholar. It generally does this by a fourfold comparison of different 
examples of each type. E.g.: 
There are four sorts of personality: (1) easily angered, easily calmed -
he loses what he gains; (2) hard to anger, hard to calm - what he loses 
he gains; (3) hard to anger and easy to calm - a truly pious man; (4) 
easy to anger and hard to calm - a truly wicked man. (A bot. 5: 11) 
That there are positive attributes in those who fall short suggests that Abot 
seems to wish that those who follow its precepts should do so with an 
awareness of complexity. It is clear though that certain virtues are expected of 
talmudic scholars and that having made the people responsible the Talmud 
now seeks to generate character and ethics which again would impact on the 
communities sense of identity and how the Talmud is regarded and applied. 
The virtues encouraged, piety and patience are both virtues that would be 
expected of a good judge. 
30 "Keep away from an evil neighbour." (Abot. 1:6) 
31 "In this regard did sages say, 'So long as a man talks too much with a woman, (1) he brings 
trouble upon himself, (2) wastes time better spent on studying Torah, and (3) ends up an 
heir of Gehenna.'" (A bot. 1:5) 
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The relationship between teacher and disciple was used then to reinforce the 
commitment of the community to the text and ensures not only that all those 
who obeyed the law would have been able to understand the reasoning used 
by the judges in their interpretations of the law but would have had a 
character which encouraged them to be do so. This though again raises the 
issue of authority. If all are capable of making reasoned interpretation why are 
some privileged over others? 
The next step was to have been handed down the authority to make decisions. 
After the conflict between Hillel and Shammai the authority to make binding 
interpretations of law was passed down and transmitted separately and in 
practical matters only halakhic authorities could interpret laws in ways which 
required to be followed and their authority was absolute.32 In a biblical 
midrash it is said that "even if they point out to you that right is left and left is 
right, obey them." (Sifre Section 154/3 
Tractate Sanhedrin describes how authority is held and passed down from 
one scholar to another in a process that parallels Abot' s passing of knowledge. 
"I hold it from my father who had it from Rab, and he from R Hiyya, son of 
R Huna." The passing of authority from teacher to disciple is not 
straightforward, a person who has authority can withhold some aspects and 
allow others and there are also geographic restrictions. The reason for all of 
these is the need to avoid contradiction not in theory but in practice: 
Since he was learned in the law, what need had he to obtain permission? 
- Because of the following incident, for it has been taught: Once Rabbi 
went to a certain place and saw its inhabitants kneading the dough 
32 Elon (1994) uses the phrase halakhic authorities throughout his work on Jewish law to mean 
those people who can make authorised rulings both in court and without. These would be 
scholars probably Rabbis who would generally have had community support in their role. 
33 (Hammer 1986, 190) The full quote is as follows with the biblical phrase being considered in 
italics. " ... and according to the judgement which they shall tell they to do - a negative 
commandment - to the right hand, nor to the left - even if they point out to you that 
right is left and left is right, obey them." Later scholars have found this phrase difficult. 
Elon (1994,247-261) presents the main points of the debate. 
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without the necessary precaution against levitical uncleanness. Upon 
inquiry, they told him that a certain scholar on a visit taught them. 
Water of bizeim [ponds] does not render food liable to become unclean. 
In reality, he referred to bezim [eggs] but they thought that he had said 
bizeim [ponds]. ... There and then it was decreed that a disciple must 
not give decisions unless he was granted permission by his teacher. (T 
Sanhedrin 5a-5b) 
This may seem a minor point but in a community with such strict rules of 
cleanness and where these performed the central role of defining the 
community there was a need to ensure that all would be able to eat the food 
prepared by other members without fear. This became an even greater 
problem in the diaspora when without a state this was the central way of 
defining membership. Although all would have the knowledge transmitted 
down to them only selected individuals were given the authority to make 
decisions. They though would have been constrained by the knowledge that 
all members of the community were well aware of the standards they were 
expected to live up to. 
2.4 Conclusion 
The tradition created by the Talmud is designed to place it at the heart of the 
community. The laws it seeks to interpret describe and dictate the relationship 
of the community to the world. The Talmud then supplements these by 
seeking to generate specific character and moral values in the people that 
follow the laws, embedding the laws even deeper in the individual's own 
sense of identity. The relationships it describes control the way that each 
individual receive this knowledge and the power that they have in relation to 
it. By ensuring that all the community will be scholars it also allows them all 
to judge and in doing so to be open to being judged. All the community at this 
level are equals even though there is a distinction made between those who 
have the power to make authorised decisions and those who do not. 
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This power is though very circumscribed not only by the need of these 
individuals to demonstrate a certain character which would tend to encourage 
moderation but by structures of reasoning which ensure that their reasoning is 
not individual but communal. 
3. Content of a tradition 
The individuals who have the authority to make decisions within the tradition 
of the Talmud can only make decisions based on acceptable reasoning and 
justification and this brings us to the reasoning contained within the tradition. 
Reasoning developed alongside the loss of authority, those who have power 
do not need to give reasons, and become increasingly complex. The Talmud is 
almost more concerned with the process of debate than the answers that are 
produced. Many sections of the Talmud will search through related issues 
before coming to a conclusion. Incorrect arguments are explored in depth 
simply to show why they are wrong. For the Talmud, the answer to the 
question is not the only reason for asking it. The Talmud is not just a guide to 
behaviour. According to Neusner (1991, x): 
its importance ... lies in supplying us with a model of how to use our 
minds in thinking about our lives: the rigorous intellect in search of the 
well-criticised life through the instrumentality's of practical reason and 
applied logic. 
By studying the Talmud, the student acquires a way of thinking. This way of 
thinking corresponds to the talmudic view of the truth. The Talmud states that 
the divine will can be known only through the constant interpretation of 
sacred texts: 
The Rabbinic Tradition, ... based itself on the principles of multiple 
meaning and endless interpretability, maintaining that interpretation and 
text were not inseparable, but that interpretation - as opposed to 
incarnation - was the central divine act. (Handelman 1982, xiv) 
Interpretation is not only the practice but the meaning of the Talmud. As well 
as providing a law code with a memory it impacts on the context by showing 
not only what to remember but what to forget. 
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These structures of interpretation apply not only to rules that were legally 
binding such as halakhah but also to aggadah, the moral rules and stories 
contained in the Talmud, thus this was a form of reasoning that applied to all 
aspects of life and this in turn allowed these other aspects of life to support 
the legal reasoning: 
the fact that legal norms and moral imperatives both have a common 
source and background in the halakhic system has an important 
consequence: the legal system itself functioning as such, from time to 
time invokes, even though it does not enforce, the moral imperative. 
(Elon 1994, 144) 
This section looks at four aspects of this system of interpretation; sources of 
law; memory; the dominance of particulars and rules of interpretation. 
3.1 Sources ofla~4 
the tannaitic innovation of the creation of halakah - a system in which 
the force of law is given to norms based upon rational deduction from a 
legal source, without relying upon the institutional authority of the 
medium through which the law is expressed even the authority of the 
supreme court .... This then is the method by which the Tannaim laid 
the foundation of the jurisprudence of the halakhah, and gave binding 
authority to the corpus of law known as "the oral law' which they 
themselves ruled to be based upon rational scholarship. (Segal 1996, 
108) 
Using rational scholarship as a basis not only grounded the reasons of the 
scholars but was in part a rejection of the long tradition of prophecy. In 
rejecting prophecy, the idea that only special individuals touched by God 
could interpret the law, they reinforced the idea that all subjects of the law 
could and should understand and be able to teach the law. The law itself was 
34 For a detailed consideration ofma'aseh see Elon (1994,945-986). 
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based not in an interpretation of mystic signs but in closely defmed sources 
accessible to all. Elon argues that there are six primary legal sources in the 
talmudic system: tradition, interpretation, legislation, custom, rna 'aseh and 
legal reasoning. Tradition refers to the rules which are transmitted from 
generation to generation and are believed to have been given at Sinai and is 
linked to the system of traditional relationships. Interpretation relates to 
textual interpretation and is seen in the rules dealt with below. Legislation and 
custom are self-explanatory.35 Ma'aseh is case law. All of these systems root 
the reasons within the system and the community. Individuals thus are 
prevented from bringing in reasoning extraneous to the structure. The rules 
around the use of Ma 'aseh shows that these sources were also understood in a 
complex manner. 
Ma 'aseh were the individual judgements of the courts. Though these 
judgements were made by authorised persons, they were not regarded as 
binding for future decisions. For a rna' aseh to become binding it needed to 
contain a legal norm, a halakhah, that could be used in future decision-
making. Halakhah was the legal reasoning or instruction within the decision. 
'Instruction' (hora'ah) is the legal source for those laws that the 
Supreme Court established as the result of its own legal scholarship or 
interpretation (midrash) as a precedent or instruction (i.e. either as a 
result of a case or on the basis of teaching promulgated by the court not 
in the context of a particular case.) (Segal 1996, 112)36 
Instruction can be seen as classical legal reasoning - the judges are using legal 
skills as the basis for halakhah. Therefore for a decision to become binding it 
was not enough that it was made by a court, it needed to provide reasons and 
reasons that would be regarded as legally meaningfuL It is the construction of 
35 Custom is linked to community consent and cannot overrule laws but was used to allow for 
local variations in interpretations reflecting that the community often lived in very 
different circumstances. 
36 Instruction and legal reasoning are often used as virtual synonyms. The difference appears to 
be that legal reasoning passed down in a decision is instruction but in formulating that 
legal reasoning is used. 
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these reasons through the use of memory and rules of interpretation that will 
be considered next. 
3.2 Memory 
Memory operates in two ways in the Talmud. A memory is added to the 
Mishnah by the way it is linked to other texts and to reasoning and it seeks to 
affect the memory of those who seek to add to its reasons. In this way it lays 
the foundations for the system of reasoning. 
The Mishnah, as a book of halakhah, would logically consist of rules based 
on the sources identified above. It does not though make this clear. Its 
standard form is generally a simple, almost code-like statement oflaw: 
He who leaves a jug in the public domain, and someone else came along 
and stumbled on it and broke it - [the one who broke it] is exempt. And 
if [the one who broke it] was injured it, the owner of the jug is liable [to 
pay damages for] his injury. (Baba Kamma 3:1) 
The statements are almost all of practical examples, some are very specific 
and there is little attempt to generalise into principles. Note the absence of 
any reference to authority or case law. Authorities, in the sense of recognised 
scholars, do appear but only where areas appear to have been a matter of 
some controversy: 
Two [terraced] gardens, one above the other - and vegetables between 
them - R. Meir says, "[They belong to the garden] on top." R. Judah 
says "[They belong to the garden] below." Said R. Meir, "If the one on 
top wants to take away his dirt, there will not be any vegetables there." 
Said R. Judah, "If the one on bottom wants to fill up his garden with dirt 
there will not be any vegetables there." Said R. Meir, "Since each party 
can stop the other, they consider from when the vegetables derive 
substance [which is from the dirt]." Said R. Simeon, "Any [vegetables] 
which the one on top can reach out and pick - 10, they are his. And the 
rest belong to the one below. (Baba Mesia 10:6) 
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The Mishnah does use enactment and precedents but biblical midrash is 
strikingly absent Although the Bible is rarely quoted in the Mishnah, Jacob 
Neusner argues that it underlies the statements therein which are often 
restatements of the Bible: 
To state matters simply: all of scripture was authoritative. But only 
some of scripture was found to be relevant .... That is to say, they 
brought to scripture a program of questions and inquiries framed 
essentially among themselves. (1983,27) 
This restatement of earlier codes can be seen as part of a long tradition 
relating back to the deuteronomic restatement of the covenant code. Like the 
deuteronomic code the earlier code is not specifically mentioned. Indeed the 
relationship between the two is not made clear and this was to cause problems 
with the acceptance of the Mishnah as authoritative and was one of the 
reasons that the material contained in the commentary section of the Talmud 
was created It seeks to show that within the codes of the Mishnah lies the 
memory of the debates and arguments and the sources of law that led to their 
creation. This links it to a tradition not only of relationships but of reasoning. 
These two aspects are combined in the way in which the Talmud is written. 
The Talmud is in shorthand. A teacher is needed to explain the technical 
terms that are used and to decipher the structures that are revealed by the use 
of language. The nature of the Talmud means that to understand it you need to 
recreate the debate and this encourages you to take part and add to it, to 
comment on the commentary.37 To join the conversation, the reader needs to 
reconstruct the reasoning. Only certain techniques are acceptable though 
these are not often made explicit and most of the techniques of interpretation 
used are deeply embedded in the structure of the Talmud itself These would 
have been absorbed almost subliminally as the student was engaged in 
recreating the debate. This is further reinforced by the oral nature of the 
materiaL The laws in the Mishnah were originally transmitted orally and, 
even after it was written, it was expected that students would not just study 
37 This after all is what it does to the Mishnah. 
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but memorise the statements. This meant that the reasoning would become 
automatic and ingrained. 
Neusner (1989, 18) suggests that: 
The technology of mnemonics (i.e., the technology of memory) 
therefore forms the surface of a deep texture of thought about 
communication, as well as thought about thinking, that is about 
conveying principles through details. 
This can be seen in the Mishnah which uses techniques that are designed to 
make this memorisation of the material easier. Its patterns are generally 
simple and it does not use general principles but groups detailed examples 
together. 
Consider, for example, the first line of the legal section: "[There are] four 
generative causes of damage (1) ox [Ex. 21:28], (2) pit [Ex. 21:33], (3) crop-
destroying beast [Ex. 2:4], and (4) conflagration [Ex. 22:5]." (Baba Kamma 
1.1) These four examples of injuries are the details through which the 
principle, that, if you are responsible for something which may cause injury 
then you are liable for any injury that it causes, is expressed. (This general 
point is made in the text but never supersedes the details, which still retain 
descriptive importance.) 
The dominant structure is thematic, sayings are linked together by common 
theme. This occurs not just at the tractate level which divides the book into 
six thematic sections but within each tractate, sayings are linked by 
subthemes.38 To make it easier for the student to identify a change of theme, 
38 Neusner has identified three other structuring devices. These are limited in their use and 
Neusner suggests that they represent formats that were experimented with but later 
rejected. These list sayings according to the author; or pattern of linguistic use; or group 
topics that relate to one underlying principle. (Neusner 1989, 10-13) Elon (1994, 1055-
1056) has also considered why on occasion the Mishnah does not follow its dominant 
thematic pattern. He believes that this may be because these rules had been passed down 
in this form and the compilers did not wish to disturb a traditional structure. 
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patterns of language are used. 
For example Baba Mesia (6:15-6:16): 
He who carried an ass to carry wheat on it and he carried barley on it. 
He is liable. 
[If he hired it to carry] wheat and carried straw on it. 
He is liable, 
since the [greater bulk] is hard to carry. 
[If he hired it] to carry a letekh of wheat and it carried a letekh of 
barley, he is exempt. 
But ifhe added to its burden, he is liable. 
All craftsmen are in the status of paid bailees. 
But any of them who said, "Take what is yours and pay me off [because 
the job is done]" [enters the status of] an unpaid bailee. 
[If one person said to another] "You keep watch for me, and I'll keep 
watch for you," [both are] in the status of a paid bailee. 
"Keep watch for me," 
and the other said to him, "leave it down before me," 
[the latter] is [in the status of] unpaid bailee. 
It is clear that there is a major shift oflanguage use and theme with the phrase 
"All craftsmen." 
Neusner identifies only six patterns of sentence structure throughout the 
Mishnah. The first part of this extract is in the simplest form and is made up 
of declarative sentences. The second part of the extract is in the most 
complex form: 
... we have a contrasting complex predicate, in which case we may 
have two sentences, independent of one another, yet clearly formulated 
so as to stand in acute balance with one another in the predicate, e.g., 
"He who does ... is unclean, and he who does not ... is clean. 
Neusner argues that these patterns reveal the underlying logic of the work: 
The Mishnah's logic of cogent discourse establishes propositions that 
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rest upon philosophical bases, e.g., the proposal of a thesis and the 
composition of a list of facts (such as a group of traits shared by certain 
categories of people) which prove the thesis. The Mishnah presents 
rules and treats stories (including history) as incidentaL And of merely 
taxonomic interest Its logic is prepositional, and its intellect does its 
work through a vast labor of classification, with comparison and 
contrast generating rules and gneralizations. (Neusner 1989,26)39 
The six patterns that Neusner identifies all link facts by comparison and, 
therefore, the reasoning of the Mishnah is predominantly comparative.40 It is 
concerned with finding not generalities but similarities between particular 
categories. This thematic and comparative structure is followed in the Talmud 
and though it has a much more complex structure it uses patterns at a number 
of levels which help to both guide the reader through it in a particular way. 
At its meta-level the Talmud is in two/three languages; biblical Hebrew, 
Mishnaic Hebrew and Eastern Aramaic.41 Each language indicates a different 
source. The two versions of Hebrew are used for quotes from the Bible and 
the Mishnah. Aramaic is used to show the debate that occurred in the study 
sessions of the amoraim. The language lets the reader know instantly at what 
level of debate s/he is looking at and whether it is a proof text, the starting 
point for the debate or the debate itself 
Language is also used to show how each debate progresses and the status of 
the person speaking. Special phrases are used to show how each statement 
relates to the following one. Louis Jacobs (1991) identifies a number of these 
formal terms that take the reader through the debate.42 These are designed to 
trigger in the reader the memory of the previous time that this word was used 
39 Neusner makes comparisons between mishnaic reasoning and Aristotle. This is dealt with in 
chapter 5. 
40 T. Bava Bathra BOb "Surely, in the entire [domain of] the Torah comparisons are made!" 
41 See Sternberger (1996, 101-108) for a discussion of the languages of Rabbinic literature. 
42 Mielziner (1925, 191-260) lists dozens of such terms, 
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and provides a series of models of forms of reasoning. At no point does the 
Talmud itself identify rules of interpretation instead it simply sets out the 
process and encourages the reader to join the debate. Its reasoning is made 
visible but not completely visible and this suggests that there is something to 
be gained by hiding aspects of its reasoning. The Talmud also rejects the 
temptation to generalise or abstract its reasoning instead it stays close to the 
particular details of the text. This allows it to absorb the authority of the text 
and to appear like a natural progression rather than an imposition but it also 
reveals a deeper view of the relationship between the general and the 
particular. 
3.3 The dominance of the particular 
To the Rabbis who formulated the Mishnah and later the Talmud a principle 
is best expressed through the particular. A particular instance of a principle 
provides a potent visual image that can be more helpful at understanding the 
principle behind it than an abstract formulation. The general principle does 
not tell us more than the individual expression of it. Elon (1994) has 
described the Mishnah as predominantly a casuistic work: 
The idea implicit in all the actual instances mentioned in the mishnah 
could have been expressed by stating it as an abstract legal norm 
without examples. The mishnah" however, expressed it in a series of 
illustrative everyday examples, some possibly based on decisions of 
actual cases, and others on hypothetical situations. (1994, 1074) 
Handelman (1982) argues that the form of classification that is used in the 
Rabbinic texts, where the particular is never separated from the general and 
the general principle is expressed through the particular, arose because in 
Hebrew there is no split between the essence and the thing, or the word and 
the thing. 
Like all Semitic peoples, the Jews regarded language as concrete. Words 
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could create what they described. The Hebrew for word implies deed.43 Thus 
language, particularly spoken language, denotes creation, or action. A lie 
occurs when what is said is not done or does not occur. It has no 
effectiveness. Therefore, it is an illusion. 
Study of the text would always involve reading aloud, not just because this 
would lead to creation but because of the nature of the language that it was 
written in - Hebrew.44 When written, Hebrew is an incomplete language, 
lacking vowels. It needs to be vocalised for the meaning of the words to 
become clear. 
As speech is a form of creation, the reader, by reading a text aloud, helps to 
create it. Thus, the reader takes an active part in creating the world of the 
Talmud, even when not actively fulfilling the laws within it. At the time of its 
compilation some laws could only be fulfilled by studying them, as the acts 
were not possible. (Laws relating to the temple, for example) This explains 
why the education stressed that all were responsible for learning and 
understanding how to interpret these laws. 
This attitude towards language has a powerful effect on the formulations of 
categories. Abstraction, the distillation of the essence of something from its 
concrete form, is profoundly alien to this concept of language. To be able to 
make abstract concepts, language must be separable from its object. This 
prevented the Talmud moving away from the practical implications of the 
individual halakhah it contained. Equally the underlying narrative is about 
being particular, the particularity of the Israeli people and the need to define it 
to keep it separate. 
As it was interested in the detail and in teaching reasoning by absorbing the 
43 Boman (1960) contrasts this with the Greek logos which implies thought. 
44 It is contemporary Hebrew, not biblical Hebrew and thus shows traces of Aramaic influence. 
(Goldberg 1987) 
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reader in the text, the Talmud nowhere sets out rules of interpretation or seeks 
to be clear about its methodology. This would be absorbed by practice the 
student being encouraged to first memorise and then having learnt the tone of 
the Talmud to add to it. It is possible that making such an explicit statement 
on reasoning would have conflicted with the talmudic tendency to teach by 
example. Rules of interpretation were though set out in other texts and these 
do clarify the structure of reasoning used. 
3.4. Rules of interpretation 
These rules set out what is and is not acceptable as a technique. They are not 
set out in the Talmud and were probably first used as teaching aids. They are 
still important, these techniques do appear in the Talmud and the lists appear 
in the daily prayers in orthodox synagogues.45 These are designed to be 
memorised. The lists of rules lay down the techniques of reasoning that can 
be legitimately used when interpreting holy texts. 
In particular, the seven rules of Hillel which were expanded into the thirteen 
rules of Ishmael claim to lay down techniques that can be used in the 
interpretation of halakhah. These rules were clearly regarded highly, as the 
thirteen rules of Ishmael were incorporated into the daily prayers in the 
synagogue. 46 
These rules evolved to deal with biblical interpretation but were extended to 
halakhic interpretation and became standard forms of interpretation: 
The reason is clear and quite understandable. From the moment that any 
halakhic collection, any enactment, or any other authoritative rule of 
45 The texts that they are found in are regarded as central Rabbinical words. The seven rules of 
Hillel, first appear in the Tosefta, a collection of Halakhic material designed to 
supplement the Mishnah. The thirteen appear in Sifra an early Midrash on Leviticus 
(Sternberger 1996, 16-19). 
46 The other major collection of rules is the 32 rules of R Eliezer ben Y ose ha-Gelili. These 
are used in more general interpretation. Halakhic interpretation can lay down rulings that 
affect conduct and the rules are, therefore, restricted. (Sternberger 1996, 22-30) 
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Jewish law became an integral part of the Halakhah, it was itself 
automatically transformed into a subject of halakhic interpretation. It 
was only natural, and self-evident, that new legal rules being added to 
the corpus of the Halakhah themselves called for explication by means 
of all the available methods of interpretation. (Elon 1994, 401) 
The thirteen rules of Ishmael are as follows.47 
1. Inference a fortiori. 
2. Inference from the similarity of words or phrases. 
3. Application of a general principle derived from one or two biblical 
verses. 
4. Inference from a generalisation followed by a specification. 
5. Inference from a specification followed by a generalisation. 
6. Inference from a generalisation followed by a specification that is 
in tum followed by a generalisation, in which case one must be guided 
by what the specification implies. 
7. Inference from a generalisation that requires a specification or 
from a specification that requires a generalisation. 
8. Whatever is included in a generalisation, and is also specifically 
mentioned to teach us something new, is stated not only for its own 
sake [lit. "to teach about itself'] but to teach something additional 
concerning all the matters included in the generalisation. 
9. Whatever is included in a generalisation, and is also specifically 
mentioned to add another provision similar to the general law, is 
specified in order to alleviate and not to increase the severity of that 
particular provision. 
10. Whatever is included in a generalisation, and is also specifically 
mentioned to add another provision that is not similar to the general 
law, is specified in order to alleviate in some respects and to increase 
in other respects the severity of that particular provision. 
47 This translation follows Elon (1994, 318). Sternberger (1996, 15-30) discusses the source 
and status of all three of the major lists of interpretation. 
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11. Whatever is included in a generalisation, and is also specifically 
mentioned to deal with a new matter, can no longer have the terms of 
the general law apply to it unless Scripture expressly declares that they 
do apply. 
12. An ambiguous word or passage is explained from its content or 
from a subsequent expression. 
13. When two biblical passages contradict each other, they may be 
harmonised by a third passage. 
This list is clearly a summary of the rules. Rules 1-5 need to be more specific 
before they can be applied and when used in practice they are (see below). 
Even when rules of reasoning are made explicit, there is still the need for 
either instruction by a teacher or close study of their use in the text before 
they can be fully understood. 
Elon (1994) divides this list into two categories; explicative and analogical 
rules.48 Rules 1-3 are analogical rules and rules 4-13 are explicative. 
The rules reveal attitudes towards the texts that they are used to interpret. The 
explicative rules in particular are clearly designed to be used when 
interpreting a text where it is assumed that nothing in that text is there by 
accident, it is all by design. They operate like statutory forms of 
interpretation. They help to deal with problems caused within the text itself. 
The analogical rules allow development of the laws by allowing them to be 
used to similar situations or categories. The use of these rules is essential to 
the future of the system but as shall be seen they are strictly controlled. 
The first three explicative rules, rules 4-6, all show when something in the 
text can be ignored. For example rule 5, in full, states that when a 
specification is followed by a generalisation, the generalisation broadens the 
specification, (i.e. the specification is merely an illustration), and does not 
48 Elon calls them canons rather than rules. (1994,315) 
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limit the rule. Handelman (1988, 225) and Mielziner (1925, 165-166) both 
use the same example for this rule. Exodus 22: 11 states that "When a man 
gives to another an ass, an ox, a sheep, or any other animal to guard ... ". The 
Rabbis interpreted this to mean that any animal is covered by the law that 
follows, the specific mention of the ass and ox and sheep are merely 
illustrations and do not limit the law.49 
The explicative rules also detail when the positions of words do have an 
effect. The following phrase: 
In all charges of misappropriation - pertaining to an ox, an ass, a sheep, 
a garment, or any other loss, whereof one party alleges, "This is it" - the 
case of both parties shall come before God: he whom God declares 
guilty shall pay double to the other. (Exodus 22:8) 
Is interpreted using rule 6 in T. Baba Kamma 62b: 
As our Rabbis taught: "In all charges of misappropriation" IS a 
generalization. "Pertaining to an ox, an ass, a sheep, a garment" is a 
specification. "Or any other loss" generalizes again. We thus have here 
a generalization preceding a specification which is in turn followed by a 
generalization, and in such cases we include only that which is similar 
to the specification. Just as the specification here mentions an object 
which is movable and which has an intrinsic value, there should 
therefore be included any object which is movable and which has an 
intrinsic value. 50 
The problem that the interpreters faced in interpreting the rule in Exodus was 
what should be included in the list of things for which double payment is 
required. They could have simply asked what is similar about the three things 
specified and used this to define "any other loss." To an extent in deciding 
that the rule covers items that are moveable and of intrinsic value, they do so. 
49 Given the prevailing attitude towards generalisation it is not surprising that these points 
should be made clear. 
50 The passage from the Talmud has been slightly altered. The biblical quotes used by Epstein 
have been replaced by the JPS (1985) translation to ensure consistency between the 
passages. 
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But this is not the reason that they give. The Rabbis instead explain that they 
are following a rule which is closely linked to the word order. The focus is on 
the details of the text and there is no attempt to find a deeper meaning or 
principle behind the decision. 
A particular problem arises when these texts are treated thus because they do 
contain ambiguities and contradictions. One way around the contradictions 
has been seen above, they are simply accepted and allowed to generate a 
flexible concept of truth. The final explicative rules, rules 12 and 13 show 
how some of the contradictions can be reconciled. 
Rule 12 reconciles ambiguities by looking at the context of the difficult 
phrase. Deuteronomy 19:6 states that: 
Otherwise, when the distance is great, the blood-avenger, pursuing the 
manslayer in hot anger, may overtake him and kill him; yet he did not 
incur the death penalty, since he had never been the other's enemy. 
In Deuteronomy, this is part of an exhortation to set up cities of refuge where 
blood vengeance can not happen, but in the Talmud the question the Rabbis 
try to answer is who in this law "does not incur the death penalty," the blood-
avenger or the manslayer. This seems obvious from the context and, indeed, 
the Rabbis point to the final phrase in the law, since he had never been the 
other's enemy and deduce that it refers to the blood-avenger.51 
It almost seems strange that a rule is needed for this, but this again arises 
because of the status of the text. Every phrase is deemed to be full of meaning 
and therefore, there needs to be a reason for going beyond the immediate 
words. 52 Rule 13 goes further and takes the Bible as a whole, so that where 
51 There is a dissenting voice which points out that it could refer to the manslayer who has 
after all killed by accident and not out of enmity. 
52 See D.M.Walker (2001,402-403) where he discusses three principles of interpretation that 
are used in statutory interpretation. The first noscitur a sociis is very similar to this rule 
and Walker descnoes it thus "a vague word takes a shade of meaning from the 
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two verses conflict a third can be found to explain it This seems logical but it 
means that in such circumstances, interpreters cannot go behind the rules to 
an explanatory principle but must look else where in the text. 
The explicative rules deal with problems that arise from the status of the text. 
The analogical rules allow the text to adapt and change. They start from the 
text and allow it to expand by using comparison. Analogy can be used without 
rules. The rules are used to show what sort of analogy is legitimate when it 
comes to interpreting laws. They act as a restriction to analogical 
interpretation. In addition to this, the rules themselves are further restricted. 
The first analogical rule is the argument a fortiori. It literally translates as 
light is to heavy. (Stemberger 1996) To give a biblical example: 
Well I know how defiant and stiffnecked you are: even now, while I am 
still alive in your midst, you have been defiant toward the Lord; how 
much more, then, when I am dead! (Deut. 31 :27) 
This rule hinges on the phrase 'how much more.' According to Handelman 
(1982, 54) this demonstrates a "perception of resemblance despite 
difference." (Handelman 1982, 54)53 As this rule relates to halakhah its use is 
restricted. It cannot be used to increase the severity of the penalty applied54 
and it cannot be used to create a completely new halakhah. 55 
The restrictions on the use of rule 2 are even stricter. Halakhah can only be 
created using this rule, known as a gezera shawah, if the person putting 
forward the interpretation heard it originally from hislher teacher: 
A man may infer a ruling a minori ad majus on his own but he may not 
accompanying words." The other two principles expressio unius est exclusio alterius and 
ejusdem generis are similar to some of the other explicatory principles which deal with 
the general and particular. 
53 Handelman (1982, 52-56) explains the difference between this rule and the syllogism. 
Syllogistic reasoning shows that the facts in the minor premise belongs to the class of the 
major premise. Instead here similarity is shown despite difference, one is not subsumed 
into the other. 
54 Baba Kamma 2:5 
55 Nazir 7:4 
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infer on his own one that is derived from a Gezera Shawah. (T. Niddah. 
19b)56 
A gezera shawah is used to link phrases together because they share the same 
word or phrase and it is this that distinguishes it from the first rule which 
concentrates on factual similarities. In the following extract from the Talmud, 
the word anger is used to link a saying from Deuteronomy concerning Moses 
with a phrase from Proverbs: 
R Eleazar said: A man who gives charity in secret is greater than Moses 
our Teacher, for of Moses it is written, For I was afraid because of the 
anger and the wrath, and of one who gives charity [ secretly] it is 
written, A gift in secret subdues anger. (T. Baba Bathra 9b) 
The third analogical rule seems to suggest that general principles can be 
created. Instead what it actually does is limit the making of such principles. 
This rule allows a specific rule to be used to cover other situations. It makes 
the rule more general but, as this example shows, there is no move beyond 
this to an abstract level of principle: 
He who seizes millstones transgresses a negative commandment, and is 
liable on the count of taking two distinct utensils, since it is said, He 
shall not take the mill and the upper millstone alone did they speak, 
[Deut 24:6]. And not concerning a mill and the upper millstone alone 
did they speak, but concerning any utensil with which they prepare 
food, as it is said, for he seizes a man's life as a pledge. (Baba Mesia 
9:13) 
In allowing one rule to cover a new area, the Talmud allows the law to 
develop by using one part of the Torah to explain another. This is not used 
systematically and there remains a reluctance to go beyond the text and bring 
out general principles that could be seen in the laws. 
56 Elon's discussion of this rule (1994, 351-355) concentrates on whether it should only be 
applied when the words are superfluous. This has been considered by some to be another 
restriction on its use. 
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Elon relates that traditionally the rules of analogy have been ranked in order 
of priority. This could be seen as a ranking of their persuasive power. Rule 2 
is regarded as the most persuasive followed by rule 1 and this may explain 
why rule 2 is more restricted and why the restrictions on rule 1 are more than 
those on rule 3 which is limited in itself 57 
Analogy seems to be regarded as potentially dangerous if left unrestricted, 
particularly analogy that is highly persuasive. Yet analogy as a form of 
comparison is the dominant fonn of reasoning in the Talmud. Even the 
explicative rules deal with comparison, with when general and specific facts 
can be used to compare and contrast with each other. Yet the preference for 
the particular remains. Indeed: 
The Talmud also states that one may not base a legal decision on a 
halachic statement, unless that statement was applied to an actual 
incident. Hence a lesson derived from a story where the principle was 
applied has greater substantiality than a direct statement of the 
principle. That a lesson or law derived from a "story" in the Talmud has 
greater validity than a law directly stated in the Talmud firmly 
underscores the priority of the concrete embodiment of a thought over 
its abstract representation" (Handelman 1982,66) 
All of the rules of interpretation limit the creativity of those scholars who 
seek to interpret and apply the laws. Interpretations to be acceptable as law 
that would affect people lives and be regarded as divine needed to fit very 
high standards. The complex structure that surrounded the reasoning also 
lessens any sense of individual bias. The factors that bind the scholars are 
subtle and shared by the rest of the community and this clearly helps to make 
their pronouncements more authoritative. It is this complex and often 
subconscious structure that is the key to the Talmud's success. 
57 Mielziner (1925, 150) argues that these restrictions were introduced because analogy was 
being abused by being extended too far and thereby falling into disrepute. Restrictions 
were brought in to rehabilitate analogy. 
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Arisotle's rhetoric 
1. Introduction 
If the Talmud encourages all its readers to become judges, Aristotle58 is 
seeking to understand how people can be persuasive in a structure where all 
are citizens and can say anything but laws have limited impact In this the 
phenomenon he is seeking to understand is much closer to the world of the 
legal theorists in chapter 2 who have to deal with a space where everything is 
sayable. This does not mean that everything is persuasive and it is this that 
Aristotle seeks to understand. He also though seeks to improve upon the way 
in which rhetoric is used in Athens and there is a tension in his work between 
his desire to simply understand what is there and to change it This will also 
be considered in this study which concentrates on his work on rhetoric, the 
Ars rhetorica or Rhetoric. 59 
This book is a collection of lectures given by Aristotle to his pupils when he 
was teaching in the Lyceum. At the time that Aristotle was teaching in the 
Lyceum, there would have been a number of people throughout Athens who 
would have been promising to teach young men to speak welL Plato, 
Aristotle's teacher, was dismissive of these teachers and regarded them as 
little better than flatterers. (Plato 1953,551)60 He did not teach rhetoric at the 
Academy. 
Aristotle did teach rhetoric. He felt that speech was an inherent part of the 
nature of man and a fundamental aspect of life. In Politics he writes: 
Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other 
gregarious animal is evident Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in 
58 For an overview of his work see Barnes (1995). Evans (1987) describes why Aristotle's 
work is still influential as well as introducing basic concepts. Chroust (1973) critically 
evaluates the evidence about his life. 
59 References to Aristotle's work are from the Barnes' Complete Works (1984) . 
60 See n 2, chapter 1 above 
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vain, and man is the only animal who has the gift of speech. And 
whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is 
therefore found in other animals ... the power of speech is intended to 
set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just 
and the unjust. And it is characteristic of man that he alone has any 
sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the 
association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a 
state. (Pol 1253a6.tl 
Speech and choice are placed at the core of the identity of people and as will 
be seen the relationship between speech and identity is central to Aristotle's 
understanding of the role of emotions and character in rhetoric. Speech is 
always seen in relationship and this is certainly true of rhetoric. Rhetoric is 
though only one of these forms of speech and Aristotle seeks to understand 
what it means in a very specific context - fourth century Athens. 62 
Aristotle taught rhetoric because it was an important part of life for an 
Athenian citizen.63 Athens had a form of democracy which would impel 
participation and to an extent force citizens to approach each other on an 
equal footing. The Athenian democratic structure was based on speech. All 
citizens could participate in the assembly, the centre of government, by 
making speeches. At public events display speeches would be at the heart of 
the proceedings and in the courts representation was not allowed, any citizen 
who wished to pursue or was pursued through the courts would need to speak 
to both accuse and defend. 
61 Interestingly, when Aristotle defines the three types of rhetoric, they correspond to this 
passage. They deal with just/unjust, expedient/inexpedient and praiselblame (good and 
evil). It may be that it was because he saw rhetoric as not purely artificial but as 
corresponding to something instinctive about man that Aristotle regarded it as a separate 
form of study. 
62 Trittle (1997) and Garner (1987) provide a good introduction to the fourth century in 
Athens. Aristotle's own constitution of Athens is a primary source for information on the 
political institutions. 
63 Rhetoric had been studied before - see Grimaldi (1996) and Poulakis (1996) for an 
examination of the relationship between Aristotle's work and the prior study of rhetoric. 
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Aristotle, though aware of the inevitability of the place of emotions in this 
structure, was also aware of their dangers particularly when the issue is not 
personal advancement but justice where he would prefer an impartial judge. 
He seems to feel that the open political space is somehow an inappropriate 
place to discuss such matters: 
The arousing of prejudice, pity, anger and similar emotions has nothing 
to do with essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man 
who is judging the case. (Rhet 1354a15) 
Aristotle's dissatisfaction with some aspects of rhetoric in practice led to a 
conflict within his work Aristotle did not simply want to pass on practical 
skills and attempts in the Rhetoric to give the first philosophical and detailed 
explanation for why this phenomena worked, why language used in a certain 
way could persuade an audience of an idea when expressed in another way 
the speaker would be less assured of success. This led to him giving two 
separate definitions of rhetoric. The first is theoretical and links rhetoric to 
logic and reasoning: 
It is clear, then, that the technical study of rhetoric is concerned with the 
modes of persuasion. Now persuasion is a sort of demonstration (since 
we are most fully persuaded when we consider a thing to have been 
demonstrated)~ the orator's demonstration is an enthymeme, and this is, 
in general, the most effective of the modes of persuasion~ the 
enthymeme is a sort of deduction (the consideration of deductions of all 
kinds, without distinction, is the business of dialectic, either of dialectic 
as a whole or of one of its branches). (Rhet 1355a5) 
The second which is practical includes not only argument but also emotion 
and character: 
Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are 
three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the 
speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of 
mind~ the third of proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the 
speech itself. (Rhet 1357b3) 
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These two definitions are not fully reconcilable.64 It could be argued that they 
are designed to fulfil separate functions. The first is a justificatory argument 
designed to dignify the study of rhetoric. The second is a practical description 
of how rhetoric works. Aristotle does not acknowledge this point but in his 
study having introduced the object he proceed to concentrate almost solely on 
the second description and the way in which an individual can learn these 
methods of persuasion: 
These are, then, these three means of effecting persuasion. The man 
who is to be in command of them must, it is clear, be able to reason 
logically, to understand human characters and excellences, and to 
understand the emotions - that is, to know what they are, their nature, 
their causes and the way in which they are excited. It thus appears that 
rhetoric is an offshoot of dialectic and also of ethical studies.(Rhet 
1358a22) 
And although these methods which are particularly emotional may seem to be 
beneath logical analysis Aristotle takes these aspects seriously and seeks to 
understand them. 
It is with this that this thesis is particularly concerned, the way Aristotle seeks 
not to dismiss but to understand the role of emotions and character and in in 
doing so generates a complex picture of the interaction between an 
individual's identity, the character portrayed and the way in which rhetoric 
not only reflects but helps to shape society. The next section of this chapter 
will look at this and why the context had such an influence on the role of 
speech, particularly in the courts. Aristotle did not though give up on his idea 
of rhetoric as logical and rational and the final section of this study considers 
how he tried to relate rhetoric to his wider work on dialectic reasoning and 
what this reveals about the limitations of logic but also its usefulness. 
64 There is much debate amongst Aristotelian scholars on this point and any work on 
Aristotle's Rhetoric will consider this apparent conflict 
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2. Ethics, emotions and character 
This consideration of the role of ethics, emotions and character in rhetoric 
once again brings to light the way in which identity is created and understood 
by the wider society. This section looks first at the institutional context before 
considering Aristotle's explorations of ethics and character formation and 
how this relates not only to the ability of an individual to persuade but also to 
what a society will be prepared to consider persuasive. 
2.1 Institutional context 
Aristotle wrote the Ars rhetorica within a context where speech was central to 
political life. The political system was built upon the ability of every citizen65 
to present their views in the Assembly. This system not only provided benefits 
but by a system of lots made it, at least in theory, possible that every citizen 
would be called upon to administer the city-state.66 An individual Athenian 
citizen, who would have felt responsible for the maintenance of the 
constitution, had access to both great power and authority but to achieve this 
had to persuade other citizens to support him. The central political problem 
then was how to persuade other citizens. This was of special relevance when 
it is considered that there were few limits to this persuasion, particularly in 
the courts as can be seen in Aristotle's description of the use of laws in this 
context: 
First, then, let us take laws and see how they are to be used in 
persuasion and dissuasion, in accusation and defence. If the written law 
tells against our case, clearly we must appeal to the universal law and to 
equity as being more just. If however the written law supports our case, 
we must urge ... that not to use the laws is as bad as to have no laws at 
all .... So far as the laws are concerned, the above discussion is probably 
65 There were other groups within the city and Sealey (1987, 5-30) describes the relationships 
between the three main categories of citizen, slave and foreign resident. 
66 Yunis (1996, 6) and Sinclair (1988, 106-135) describe the sheer numbers that were needed 
to keep the system going. 
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sufficient. (Rhet 1375b25)67 
From our point of view, what is interesting is what is missing from this 
discussion. In considering the role of law in persuasion, Aristotle does not 
consider how to find law, how to interpret it or how to apply it. We know 
more about the Athenian legal system than any other Greek system but the 
Athenians produced no textbooks and no works of jurisprudence comparable 
to those produced later by the Romans. If there was logic and a system to their 
law it remained "implicit and unconscious for them.,,68 As Todd puts it: 
Law is one of the very few areas of social practice in which the ancient 
Greeks have had no significant influence on subsequent societies. 
(1993,3) 
Fourth century Athens did have a complex legal structure but this very 
complexity limited the development of jurisprudence. Athens created legal 
procedures and institutions but within this law was linked to individuals and 
politics. 
This applied both to the creation and application of its laws. If a citizen 
sought to change a law or introduce a new law they would have to approach 
the Assembly who could make or change laws by a simple vote. They were 
then published by being inscribed on stone pillars. These were dotted around 
the city and despite an attempt to compile the laws in 403/2, it remained 
difficult to work out whether a law inscribed on a pillar was still valid. Every 
proposed change in the law did have to go through a committee who would 
scrutinise it and consider how it would affect the current law. They would 
67 This technique is used in a surviving speech by Lysias. "It is the laws which urge the victims 
in cases such as this to exact this penalty. I urge you to show agreement with them. If 
not, you will provide so much security for seducers as to encourage thieves too to claim 
that they are seducers ... Everyone will know that the law on seducers can be ignored, 
that is your vote they need to fear for this is the supreme authority in the city. (Carey 
1997,32) 
68 For a good overall introduction to Athenian law see Garner (1987). MacDowell's The Law 
in Classical Athens (1978) remains the standard text on this area. Todd (1993) is very 
thorough and possibly a better introduction for the lawyer. For speeches from actual trials 
placed in their legal context see Carey (1997). 
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instruct the assembly to repeal simultaneously any laws that it conflicted with. 
This, though, did not prevent conflicting laws standing. The committee was 
not made up of experts and relied on the individual who had proposed the law 
to fmd all the other laws that were affected. If a law proposed by an 
individual was later found to conflict with an existing law that individual 
could be brought to court. As it was difficult to know the state of the law, this 
could be a useful political ploy against a rival. 69 An individual citizen wishing 
to change law would have been involved not only in a need to persuade others 
of its use but in a complex calculation about the likelihood of a challenge. 
Most of the "legal" decisions of the assembly, though, were not laws but 
decrees. This distinction was a fundamental one and was strengthened by 
reforms in 403/2 BeE. Decrees did not need to go through the same 
procedures as laws. They were not intended to be fundamental or unchanging 
and were designed to be temporary. They were passed by simple majority 
vote. They could not contradict laws.70 Again, it was up to the proposer to 
ensure that decrees did not contradict with the laws and he could be tried if he 
failed to do so. The system thus made the individual responsible for not only 
persuading others that a change in the law was needed but for ensuring that 
"his" law did not conflict with others. Both laws and decrees were linked to 
individuals, most laws would have been presented in order to further 
individual or group interests and Athenians could contract out of almost all of 
the laws. As citizens they would have been neither able to contract in or out 
of the institutions. This was a status conferred at birth and which would have 
been at the core of the individual's own sense of self. The community was 
generated by physical proximity and close relationships and reinforced by the 
need for these citizens to talk to each other. 71 
69 Todd (1993, 55-58) describes in some detail how difficult it was for the average Athenian to 
find laws. 
70 This does not mean that Athenians saw substantive law as part of a unified system. Laws 
could not conflict with each other and decrees with laws but this was a pragmatic matter. 
Sealey (1994,25-58) is clear that laws were seen as individual and discrete. 
71 Strauss (1986) points to the importance of personal relations in Athens. Political groupings 
were not formal but based on loser connections of kin, trade and friendship. It was 
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Individual citizens were also responsible for the application of law in courts. 
A surviving speech by Demosthenes includes a line which refers to the oaths 
that jurors had to take and shows that they could not refuse to come to a 
decision: "Nay, more, in cases which are not covered by the laws, you have 
sworn that you will decide as in your judgement is most just." (1936, 477) 
Laws were subordinate to the views of the citizens. Todd suggests that statute 
law was evidential rather than binding: 
The function of a modem judge, whether in civil- or in common-law 
jurisdictions, is to apply legal rules to a concrete case~ an Athenian trial 
is instead a dispute an agon (Gernet) or krisis (Paoli), which it is the 
court's function to resolve: statute law in Athens does not supply the 
rules according to which the dikastai must proceed, but rather the limits 
within which they must resolve the dispute. (1993, 59) 
Juries then were generally expected to make their decisions based on their 
individual views of what was or was not just in the circumstances. They were 
neither trained legal experts nor were they expected to justify their decisions. 
They were chosen by lot from a pool of men who had sworn an oath at the 
start of the year. Jurors were paid every time that they attended the courts. 
There were practical reasons for this, service was not compulsory on this 
group, members of which would simply turn up as they chose to and a large 
number were needed every day as Athenian juries were very large. The size of 
a jury would vary according to the case, 500 for public and 2-400 in private 
cases depending on the amount of money involved. 
The procedures in court were relatively simple. The parties to the dispute 
would speak in tum before the jury and could present laws or witnesses to 
back up their case. The jury would make their decision by a simple majority 
vote, taken by ballot, at the end. This is also how they would decide on 
considered acceptable to use politics to advance your own self-interest. 
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punishment. They could not put forward suggestions or impose a punishment 
other than that which had been asked for by the parties.72 There would have 
been little time to do so - trials were very short in Athens. The longest public 
cases would take a day. Where private cases were being tried, the court would 
deal with an average of four a day.73 A magistrate would sit and be 
responsible for procedure but would have had no judicial role. 
There was no scope in this system for Athenian courts to develop case law or 
systems of reasoning to fill the gap created by the uncertainty of statute law. 
Given the size of the jury it was not possible to be sure why a jury had come 
to the decision. Earlier cases might be used by orators as examples of public 
standards but these would be merely illustrative and the court would certainly 
not feel bound by them. In contrast to the talmudic structure the Athenian 
legal system had no legal memory, every decision was treated in isolation, 
laws were part of the context of that decision but had no greater influence 
than other factors. 
This meant that law both in its creation and application remained linked to 
individuals and circumstances. There was no sense of a hierarchy of laws. 
Instead there were procedures by which a citizen could face fellow citizens 
and appeal to a sense of justice in the courts or political expediency in the 
Assembly. 
This system was not without critics. Aristotle did not approve of the 
flexibility of Athenian law. He prefers the decision of the lawmaker to that of 
the judge/jury and advocates that laws should be written to leave as little as 
possible to judgement: 
Now, it is of great moment that well-drawn laws should themselves 
define all the points they possibly can and leave as few as may be to the 
72 This is what would happen in straightforward cases. But there were other more complex 
procedures and, although the decision of the jury was supposed to be final and there was 
no formal appeal structure, cases could be reopened. (Todd 1993, 144-146) 
73 Several courts could sit on one day. 
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decision of the judges; and this for several reasons. First, to find one 
man, or a few men, who are sensible persons and capable of legislating 
and administering justice is easier than to find a large number. Next, 
laws are made after long consideration, whereas decisions in the courts 
are given at short notice, which makes it hard for those who try the case 
to satisfy the claims of justice and expediency. The weightiest reason of 
all is that the decision of the lawgiver is not particular but prospective 
and general, whereas members of the assembly and the jury find it their 
duty to decide on definite cases brought before them. They will often 
have allowed themselves to be so much influenced by feelings of 
friendship or hatred or self-interest that they lose any clear pleasure or 
pain. In general, then, the judge should, we say, be allowed to decide as 
few things as possible. (Rhet 1354a31) 
This can be linked in part to Aristotle's snobbery.74 He had very little respect 
for the poorer citizens who formed the majority of the juries. In PolitiCS, he 
argues that for democracies to be successful they should ensure that the rich 
as well as the poor undertake jury service. This, he feels, would ensure a 
better representation of the public. The balance between rich and poor that he 
envisages would be a mean, in his sense of the word, but not an average. 
Indeed, Athens probably got juries of average citizens as many more citizens 
were in the lower classes. Aristotle almost seems to be suggesting that there is 
a need for these groups to be represented as interest groups. 75 
Aristotle's unease is not simply linked to his snobbery. He does not see self-
interest as equally problematic in all forms of rhetoric, he ranks deliberative 
74 Bullen (1997) looks at this and similar criticisms that Aristotle makes in Politics. Overall, 
Aristotle believes that all citizens should be involved in some aspects of government but 
there are specific areas where specialist skills are needed that all citizens will not have. 
Waldron (1995) starts from the other end of this argument, and asks what Aristotle 
means when he talks about many being better at making decisions than one. He too 
concludes that Aristotle meant this only in a limited sense and that, often, Aristotle would 
prefer decisions to be made by one skilled individual. 
75 In Politics, he also states a preference for arbitration. The arbiter is more trustworthy 
because he is in the middle of the two parties. 
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or political rhetoric above legal because self-interest is clearer and not hidden: 
The reason for this is that in political oratory there is less inducement to 
talk about non-essentials. Political oratory is less given to unscrupulous 
practices than forensic, but treats of wider issues. In a political debate 
the man who is forming a judgement is making a decision about his 
own vital interests. (Rhet 1354b26) 
The audience for a political debate is involved in the decision and needs to 
take responsibility for it This would equally apply to the other main use of 
deliberative rhetoric, in private counsel. The decision has implications for the 
person making the decision. The jury though has a distance they are bound 
only by their oath to be impartial. It is perhaps this distance, the fact that the 
jury will not have to incorporate their decision into their own lives that makes 
them more vulnerable to manipulation. This does not though mean that 
emotion and character should be excluded. Indeed as decision-making is 
involved they are inherent to the process: 76 
But since rhetoric exists to affect the giving of decisions - the hearers 
decide between one political speaker and another, and a legal verdict is 
a decision - the orator must not only try to make the argument of his 
speech demonstrative and worthy of belief; he must also make his own 
character look right and put his hearers who are to decide, into the right 
frame of mind. Particularly in deliberative oratory, but also in lawsuits, 
it adds much to an orator's influence that his own character should look 
right and that he should be thought to entertain the right feelings 
towards his hearers; and also that the hearers themselves should be in 
the right frame of mind. (Rhet 1377b20) 
He summarises: 
There are three things which inspire confidence in the orator's own 
character - the three, namely that induce us to believe a thing apart 
76 Demos (1961) points out that Aristotle never fully separated the cognitive from the 
emotional in the way that later philosophers did. Smith (1997) feels that Aristotle limits 
reason by making it part of and a perfecter of natural instinct, it cannot, therefore, go 
beyond our natural capacity. 
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from any proof of it: good sense, excellence and good will. (Rhet 
1378a5) 
This is not simply about prejudice because ethics and character are closely 
linked. 
2.2 The role of ethics 
For Aristotle excellence is the goal of every individual. He does though 
describe it differently from the point of view of the one seeking to achieve 
excellence and the one seeking to portray it to an audience. In Rhetoric: 
If excellence is a facu1ty of beneficence, the highest kinds of it must be 
those which are most useful to others, and for this reason men honour 
most the just and the courageous, since courage is useful to others in 
war, justice both in war and in peace. (Rhet 1366a4) 
This contrast with Ethics, where he describes only one highest good or 
excellence, which is purely wanted for its own sake, eudaimonia or 
happiness. There are other goods, which are wanted at least partially for their 
own sake as well as for happiness: 77 
... honour, pleasure, reason, and every excellence we choose indeed for 
themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose 
each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness. (NE 
1097b1-3) 
It appears that communicating the way that the behaviour of an individual 
affects others is more useful than trying to persuade them by abstract 
reasoning that it is the best way for them to behave. In Rhetoric, Aristotle is 
concerned not with the real nature of good and happiness but how to use the 
77 The relationship between these partial ends and the highest end is a complex one. At first, 
Aristotle suggests that the highest end for man is the active life lived rationally, but later 
affirms that it is the contemplative life. The link between the active and contemplative life 
is never made clear and this makes the relationship of ends a matter of debate amongst 
Aristotelian scholars. See Ackrill (1980) and Nagel (1980), Cooper (1977), Kraut (1989) 
and Tuozzo (1995), for a full overview of this debate. 
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commonly held opinions about them to influence the decision-making of a 
large audience. 
But despite this there is an also an aspirational aspect to his work on rhetoric. 
Though useful, Aristotle wants to raise the standard of rhetoric by ensuring 
that his pupils will approach their audience with the right facts and a full 
knowledge of the subject matter and of the reason that they use. Equally he 
tries to ensure that his pupils will be good decision-makers. This mean not 
only that they need to reason well but perhaps even more fundamentally that 
they need the correct character and emotional responses before they can even 
begin to reason well. This is because of Aristotle's view of ethical knowledge 
cannot be understood outwith the context. Martha Nussbaum (1986) argues 
that Aristotle even feels that our ethical knowledge creates the context: 
What he is saying is that our most basic beliefs and experiences 
concerning what is worthwhile constrain what we discover about the 
world and about ourselves.... certain things are so deep that either to 
question or to defend them requires us to suspend too much, leaves us 
no place to stand. (1986,321) 
This is why the audience needs to be put into the right frame of mind it is only 
if they are in the correct emotional state that they will be capable of 
understanding the situation and coming to the right decision. This may 
explain his preference for political decision-making where the decision-maker 
will automatically be emotionally committed to the result because it will 
impact directly on his life. It also helps to explain Aristotle's concern with his 
own audience. 
2.2.1 Creation of individual ethics 
In his work on ethics, Aristotle is very specific about to whom he is prepared 
to speak: 
Hence anyone who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is 
noble and just and, generally, about the subjects of political science 
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must have been brought up in good habits. (NE 1095b3-6) 
To understand ethics, the individual already needs to be living by the 
standards that Aristotle is describing. The process of becoming ethical or 
achieving an excellent character, they are the same for Aristotle, starts long 
before virtues are understood in childhood with education. As a child the 
individual is encouraged by praise and blame to follow the correct behaviour. 
This aims to teach the child not only how to act but also what are the right 
feelings and emotions to have in different situations. As the child acts, he 
starts to form his basic character. If he follows good acts and learns how to 
enjoy them then he will develop a good character. 
It makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind 
or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or 
rather all the difference. (NE 1103b24-25) 
The moral state of the adult is thus dependent on the child's and is logically 
prior to the intellectual state which is developed later. 78 The moral state forms 
the ability of the individual to understand behaviour: 
For each state of character has its own ideas of the noble and the 
pleasant, and perhaps the good man differs from others most by seeing 
the truth in each class of things, being as it were the norm and measure 
of them. (NE 1113a31-35) 
In adulthood the process becomes more complex. As the man gains more 
experience and as his ability to reason improves so will his ability to 
understand the ends that his childhood training and habits have provided him 
with. This, in turn, will affect the way he sees and understands those ends. At 
this stage, the interaction between the two aspects becomes increasingly 
blurred. Aristotle wants to give these men of good habits better reason, to give 
78 Meyer (1993) has explored the issues that this raises for moral responsibility. She concludes 
that even when an individual can be regarded as not responsible for their character 
because that was founded at a time when they had limited power they can still be 
responsible for their actions because of Aristotle's descriptions of causality and 
voluntariness. Her study, though, does show that Aristotle's description of character 
formation does raise problems for individual responsibility. 
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them a better aim so that they may achieve excellence.79 This consists of 
providing them with the reasoning to help them understand their already good 
habits. The profound circularity of the concept shows Aristotle's ethics are 
founded in a trust of the individual, the individual who has been brought up 
well and in the world he inhabits. This is why it is a good man that is 
Aristotle's model, not a rational principle. 
This is relevant for rhetoric, where Aristotle seems to be at his most a-moral, 
particularly when it comes to the deliberate manipulation of emotional 
responses as it would give the man who had an excellent character a built-in 
advantage when it came to debate. The man of excellence would reveal his 
character through the language and structures he used in argument. He would 
also have an advantage when it came to assessing arguments. Excellence 
provides the ability to perceive the important aspects of a situation. It would 
provide the man who had this talent with great subtlety in his perception of 
the character of others. Thus, the excellence of his character and his skill in 
decision-making and perception would provide the ability to excel in rhetoric 
(in theory). Moral excellence would be reflected in persuasive talents. This 
in-built bias in favour of the virtuous acts as a riposte to those who argue that 
rhetoric is essentially neutral. Athens was a close-knit community, so people 
would be able to observe the behaviour and words of others, particularly those 
who sought political influence over a long period of time. Aristotle's linking 
of ethics to rhetoric is ultimately not designed to simply insist on the role of 
virtue but is a useful reminder of the oft-ignored impact of emotion and 
character on reasoning. 
Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the 
speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good 
men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally 
79 NE 1142a9. Aristotle also has a political objective. By showing how important the context is 
to the acquisition and the living of a good life he hopes to show the importance of both 
state education and legislation. (NE X:9) Collins (1997) has studied Politics and argues 
that it also has primarily an educative and political role. It seeks to encourage the student 
to adopt a positive attitude towards aristocratic government whilst showing them the best 
way to work within current political structures. 
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whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is 
impossible and opinions are divided. This kind of persuasion, like the 
others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people 
think of his character before he begins to speak. It is not true, as some 
writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness 
revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; 
on the contrary his character may almost be called the most effective 
means of persuasion he possesses. (Rhet 1356a5-13) 
This is of course dependant on social circumstances - what has been praised 
or blamed - Aristotle does assume that there are moral absolutes but his work 
can also be understood as containing a complex view of the way in which 
society creates not only the ethical context but the ethics of the individual. 
This is because he argues that there is a close link between speech and social 
ethics. 
2.2.2 Social ethics 
The relationship between speech and social ethics is most obvious in display 
or epideictic rhetoric where the orator praises or blames individuals or actions 
and Aristotle suggests this performs a similar role to praise or blame aimed at 
a child: 
To praise a man is in one respect akin to urging a course of action .... 
Since we know what action or character is required, then, in order to 
express these facts as suggestions for action, we have to change and 
reverse our form of words. Thus the statement 'A man should be proud 
not of what he owes to himself, if put like this, amounts to a 
suggestion; to make it into a praise we must put it thus, 'Since he is 
proud not of what he owes to anyone, think what you would urge people 
to do; and when you want to urge' the doing of anything, think what you 
would praise a man for having done. (Rhet 1367b36) 
Praise is the predominant form of epideictic rhetoric and it is this form of 
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rhetoric that Perelman argues helps to form the values of a society. Ryan 
(1984), in a study of Rhetoric, comes to a similar conclusion and argues that 
the language used to affect changes in convictions could affect the desires 
both of the person speaking and of the listener, and therefore, their characters. 
As Ryan puts it: 
That Aristotle was concerned primarily with deliberative rhetoric, that 
he showed great care in distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable 
kinds of rhetorical argumentation, and that he regarded it as imperative 
that the speaker have in mind a coherent, and genuine, system of values 
- all these indicate, I believe that he saw rhetoric as a method, not 
primarily for persuasion leading to action, but for conviction leading to 
a new, changed, or reinforced attitude, which in tum would result in 
action. And it was this latter view of rhetoric, and of rhetorical 
argumentation, that could very well have led Aristotle to expend on it 
the efforts he did. He saw it, I believe, as a means of shaping the ethos 
of a society. Speakers, using the art of rhetoric, would over a period of 
time have a great impact on the ethos or character of society. In no way 
was it Aristotle's view that the ethos was completely determined by 
speakers, but rather that it was developed by an interplay between 
speakers and hearers, hearers on the one hand would be influenced by 
the speakers, and on the other hand themselves be such that they "are 
sufficiently disposed towards what is true, and most of the time they 
attain the truth."(1984, 190-191) 
This is why Aristotle devoted time to rhetoric not only as a significant social 
structure but also and even more so as a way of affecting ethics. Therefore 
rhetoric is more than simply persuasion and is involved in the very shaping of 
society. This makes it very powerful and Aristotle is aware of the dangers: 
And if it is objected that one who uses such power of speech unjustly 
might do great harm, that is a charge which may be made in common 
against all good things except excellence, and above all against the 
things that are most useful, as strength, health, wealth, generalship. A 
man can confer the greatest of benefits by a right use of these, and 
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inflict the greatest of injuries by using them wrongly. (Rhet 1355a20) 
This is partly because of the field within which rhetoric is used. The example 
that Aristotle gives of a man who possesses excellence is of a man who is 
well known for his rhetoric: Pericles. This is because there is a close link 
between moral excellence or practical wisdom and skill in politics and 
legislation, though they are not identical: 
Political wisdom and practical wisdom are the same state of mind, but 
to be them is not the same. Of the wisdom concerned with the city, the 
practical wisdom which plays a controlling part is legislative wisdom, 
while that which is related to this as particulars to their universal is 
known by the general name of 'political wisdom'; this has to do with 
action and deliberation, for a decree is a thing to be carried out in the 
form of an individual act. (NE 1141 b24-28) 
Pericles could use his rhetorical skill well but those who followed him did 
not: 
So long as Pericles was leader of the people, things went tolerably well 
with the state; but when he was dead there was a great change for the 
worse. Then for the first time did the people choose a leader who was of 
no reputation among men of good standing, whereas up to this time 
such men had always been found as leaders of the democracy ..... After 
the death of Pericles, Nicis, who subsequently fell in Sicily, appeared as 
leader of the aristocracy, and Cleon son of Cleaenetus of the people. 
The latter seems, more than anyone else, to have been the cause of the 
corruption of the democracy by his wild undertakings; and he was the 
first to use unseemly shouting and coarse abuse on the Bema, and to 
harangue the people with his cloak girt up short about him, whereas all 
his predecessors had spoken decently and in order. .... After Cleophon 
the popular leadership was occupied successively by the men who chose 
to talk the biggest and pander the most to the tastes in the majority, with 
their eyes fixed only on the interests of the moment. (Const. 27) 
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Leaders by their speech are capable of raising or lowering the ethics of 
society. Although he believes that the power of rhetoric is tempered by the 
general preference for the good and the true. 
Rhetoric is useful because things that are true and things that are just 
have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites, so that if the 
decisions of judges are not what they ought to be, the defeat must be 
due to the speakers themselves, and they must be blamed 
accordingly.(Rhet 1355a20) 
He is though concerned about the quality of the Athenian audience who may 
not have been educated into the correct habits and, notably the critique of 
Pericles he records is of the way he impacted on the audience: 
Pericles was the first to institute pay for service in the law-courts, as a 
bid for popular favour to counterbalance the wealth of Cimon. ... Some 
critics accuse him of thereby causing deterioration in the character of 
the juries, since it was always the common people who put themselves 
forward for selection as jurors, rather than the men of better position. 
(Const.27) 
This perhaps suggests that even men who have practical wisdom should use 
these highly flexible arguments of rhetoric with care.80 Even those who 
possess excellent decision-making which cannot be used to harm, can be 
harmful when it comes to persuasion, or perhaps Aristotle is simply being 
inconsistent and recognising that Pericles could make wrong decisions. There 
is a certain amount of snobbery in this critique. Aristotle does seem to favour 
those leaders who had distinction of birth as well as talent and is critical of 
those who actively sought the approval of the majority. Clearly although 
society creates the ethical context this does not mean that individuals are 
always bound by its standards, it can be judged by what it choose to praise 
and blame. 
80 "In the practical art of rhetoric, one senses that the aim is not to know what phronesis is, but 
rather to exercise this virtue in circumstances that challenge its optimal use." (Farrell 
1995, 195) Garver (1994,45) argues that in Rhetoric Aristotle is trying to encourage the 
use of rhetoric as a civic art. 
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3. Logic and persuasion 
The last section dealt with the relationship between rhetoric, ethics and 
character. So far none of this has dealt with the actual words and structures of 
reasoning used. Aristotle's work deals with this in two ways. First he makes 
the theoretical statement that there is a close connection between logic and 
persuasion. Secondly, he shows his students how to generate speeches which 
will be persuasive. This reveals that there is a close link between the reasons 
shown and the character that is made visible. 
3.1 Rhetoric as the counterpart of dialectic. 
At the beginning of Rhetoric Aristotle argues that there is a close link 
between his theories of reasoning and his theory of persuasion. This is 
significant because it is in the areas of logic and reasoning that Aristotle 
believed that he had made the most contribution. 
Aristotle generally built on the work of others and was quite happy to admit to 
thiS.81 When it came to logic, though, he believed that he had created a whole 
new field of study: 
Of the present inquiry, on the other hand, it was not the case that part of 
the work had been thoroughly done before, while part had not. Nothing 
existed at all. (SE. 183b3Sl2 
The field of study that he had created, he did not call it logic, was the 
systematic study of reasoning. He divided it into two spheres - demonstration 
and dialectic. Demonstration produces proofs and deals with scientific 
reasoning. Dialectic deals with areas where there are no proofs, where the 
issues are probable. Demonstration is ideally suited to theoretical knowledge 
81 "Moreover on the subject of rhetoric there exists much that has been said long ago .... " (SE. 
185al0) 
82 This quote refers specifically to Aristotle's theory of deduction. 
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but dialectic is better used in the other two fonns where our knowledge is less 
certain and more contextual. In Rhetoric Aristotle states "Rhetoric is the 
counterpart of dialectic" (NE 1354al). 83 
He describes why this is so in some detail. He argues that rhetoric belongs to 
the same part of the mind (Rhet 1355a15).84 It deals with similar subjects to 
dialectic, both dialectic and rhetoric deal with generalities, with such things 
as come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no 
definite science. "Accordingly all men make use, more or less, of both~ for to 
a certain extent all men attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them, 
to defend themselves and to attack others." (NE 1354a4 )85 
Dialectic and rhetoric then are tools, skills which can be used in a variety of 
context, they are not separate objects of study in the sense that medicine is-
they are fonns of reasoning and in this area they are very similar because 
rhetoric follows the structures of reasoning used in dialectic: 
With regard to the persuasion achieved by proof or apparent proof: just 
as is dialectic there is induction on the one hand and deduction or 
apparent deduction on the other, so it is in rhetoric. The example is an 
induction, the enthymeme is a deduction, and the apparent enthymeme 
is an apparent deduction: for I call rhetorical deduction an enthymeme 
and rhetorical induction an example. (Rhet 1356bl) 
There are though significant differences between the two fonns of reasoning 
and this is linked to the relationships within which the reasoning is taking 
place. Robin Smith (1995) believes that Aristotle's description of dialectic 
83 Brunshwig (1996) deals with the implications of Aristotle's use of the word "counterpart" 
or antistrophe. He argues that there is a development in Aristotle's word and that he may 
originally have meant a historical counterpart but that this altered and became a 
theoretical one. He also suggests that antistrophe implies an analogical or comparative 
relationship. 
84 Aristotle does not specifY which part but it is probably the calculative part. The parts of the 
mind are described in more detail in the section on epideictic rhetoric. 
85 In Ethics (NE 1 094b 11) Aristotle seems to imply that the subject dictates how it can be 
known. "Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject matter 
admits of for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions .... " 
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reflects that its roots lie in a rule-based contest where there were very strict 
limitations on what could be debated and how. This had since broadened and 
Smith believes that by the time of Aristotle dialectic could be described as 
argument directed at another person which proceeds by asking questions. 
Aristotle seemed to want to limit dialectic to something closer to its original 
source. Dialectic, then, is argument within a restricted debate, indeed 
something almost like Plato's view of what rhetoric should be, for Aristotle 
though rhetoric is only like dialectic. The difference lies in the context within 
which rhetoric is used. Equally this idea of asking questions and debate would 
be unsuitable for rhetoric where a large audience was faced. This is at the 
core of the difference. Strict logic appears to be only suitable within a certain 
relationship where one individual can face another and where education and 
rules limit what is accepted as reasonable. 
In the rhetorical context there is a very different relationship. Rhetorical 
debate is defined as those things which people debate about: "we deliberate 
upon without arts or systems to guide us, in the hearing of persons who cannot 
take in at a glance a complicated argument." (Rhet 1355a23) Aristotle feels 
that there is something about the audience in particular that makes full 
dialectic reasoning impossible: 
It is possible to form deductions and draw conclusions from the results 
of previous deductions; or, on the other hand, from premises which 
have not been thus proved, and at the same time are not reputable and 
so call for proof Reasonings of the former kind will necessarily be hard 
to follow owing to their length, for we assume an audience of untrained 
thinkers; those of the latter kind will fail to be persuasive, because they 
are based on premises that are not generally admitted of reputable. 
(Rhet 1357a8) 
Rhetoric involves a larger, more political grouping and the orator must use 
whatever means are available. The orator cannot rely on rules or education to 
limit the attitudes of the audience, assumptions can be made about prejudices 
but not about their capacity to deal with complex arguments. The form of 
argument relates not to the conclusion that one wishes to reach but to the 
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person one is wishing to convince. This point is repeated more explicitly at 
the end of Topics: 
You should display your training in inductive reasoning against a young 
man, in deductive against an expert You should try, moreover, to 
secure from those skilled in deduction their premises, from an inductive 
reasoner their parallel cases; for this is the thing in which they are 
respectively trained. In general, too, from your exercises in 
argumentation you should try to carry away either a deduction on some 
subject or a solution or a proposition or an objection, or whether some 
one put his point which made it the one or the other. For that is what 
gives one ability, and the object of training is to acquire ability, 
especially in regard to propositions and objections. For it is the skilled 
propounder and objectioner who is, speaking generally, a dialectician. 
Do not argue with every one, nor practise upon the man in the street; for 
there are some people with whom any argument is bound to degenerate. 
(Top. 164all) 
This is a very pragmatic view of dialectic and one that emphasises the danger 
of being open to arguments. In dialectic though there is an option to choose to 
debate or not, in situations in which rhetoric is used, there is often no 
choice.86 
3.2 The structures of rhetoric. 
Aristotle does not simply describe the process of rhetoric but teaches by 
showing examples and structures. The Rhetoric is a manual that can be used 
for generating arguments. This again parallels the structure of dialectic 
reasomng. 
86 Cohen (1995, 87) describes law in Athens as a tool of the traditional feud. 
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In books 2-8 of Topics, Aristotle gives his students the material necessary to 
put together good arguments. These are the topoi or locations from which the 
book gets its name. Aristotle provides lists of rules that show the student what 
type of premise or proposition would give the desired conclusion. Smith 
pictures the student using these in the following way: 
Overall, the dialectical method of the topics reqUIres the joint 
application of the "locations" and the inventories of opinion. To find 
my argument, I first look up a location appropriate to my desired 
conclusion and use it to discover premises that would be useful, then I 
consult the relevant inventory of opinions to see if those premises are 
found there. If they are, I have my argument: all that remains is to cast it 
into the form of questions and present them to my opponent. (1995,61) 
The amount of time that Aristotle gives to detailing the form of premises 
encourages the view that Topics is predominantly a training manual. As well 
as showing what premises to use, he also describes what form of argument 
would best support them: 
Induction is more convincing and clear: it is more readily learnt by the 
use of the senses, and is applicable generally to the mass of men; but 
deduction is more forcible and more effective against contradictious 
people. (Top. 105a16.) 
In Rhetoric, Aristotle also takes the student of rhetoric through the process 
that an orator should undergo to produce a complete speech. 
For example, Aristotle defines the field of deliberative rhetoric by listing the 
things which men deliberate about most often. He then shows what an orator 
needs to know to have the right amount of information: 
These, then, are the most important kinds of information that the 
deliberative speaker must possess. Let us now go back and state the 
premises from which he will have to argue in favour of adopting or 
rejecting measures regarding these and other matters. (Rhet 1360a36) 
These lists are topics, or commonplaces, the basic material that the orator 
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needs to start fonnulating his speech. 
Having established the premises, the orator needs to know how to put them 
together into persuasive arguments, how to use fonns of argument practically. 
Like dialectic, rhetoric uses both deduction and induction. These two 
structures of reasoning shared by rhetoric and dialectic,87 deal with how 
premises support the conclusion of an argument but do so in different ways: 
Now a deduction is an argument in which, certain things being laid 
down, something other than these necessarily comes about through 
them. (Top. lO0a25) 
... induction is a passage from particulars to universals, e.g. the 
argument that supposing the skilled pilot is the most effective, and 
likewise the skilled charioteer, then in general the skilled man is the 
best at his particular task. (Top. 105all) 
Deduction is concerned with what inferences can be drawn from premises. 
Induction builds up an argument from related premises. Aristotle did not 
spend a great deal of time on induction and deduction is certainly the more 
important fonn. As it is concerned with inference and the rules that limit what 
deductions can be made it is, in contemporary tenninology, the study of valid 
arguments. Aristotle describes the enthymeme, rhetorical deduction, as 
similar to dialectical deduction but simpler: 
The enthymeme must consist of few propositions, fewer than those 
which make up a primary deduction. (Rhet 1357a16) 
This seems to imply that the enthymeme is a lesser fonn of a dialectic 
deduction. This view can be supported by Aristotle's definition of the maxim, 
which is an even more compact fonn. The maxim consists almost totally of 
conclusions. The maxim is important not as a logical fonn of reasoning but 
because it is useful to the speaker: 
One great advantage of maxims to a speaker is due to the want of 
87 Also shared by demonstrative reasoning. (Aristotle 1984e, 39; Prior An. 24a10) 
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intelligence in his hearers, who love to hear him succeed in expressing 
as a universal truth the opinions which they hold themselves about 
particular cases. (Rhet 1395b 1) 
In the section on the practical use of the enthymeme and on the rhetorical 
proofs in general, Aristotle first lists material from which proofs can be 
constructed: 
Another commonplace is got by considering some modification of the 
key-word, and arguing that what can or cannot be said of the one, can or 
cannot be said of the other. ... Another is based on correlative ideas .... 
Another is the afortiori. (Rhet 1397a20) 
He follows these with examples of how this material can be structured into 
arguments. In this section of Rhetoric, the enthymeme becomes the name for 
a list of persuasive techniques that are presented ready for use. These 
techniques are regarded as the most persuasive. This is why they are 
enthymemes but they have very different forms and it cannot be that they are 
logically the same. Aristotle even lists false enthymemes, methods of 
reasoning that appear to be enthymematic but are not. The "rules" of reason 
do underlie this, the enthymeme is still the most persuasive form because of 
its relationship to the dialectic deduction, but this section shows how flexible 
this relationship can be. Aristotle even goes as far as to use induction as an 
enthymeme: 
Another line is based on induction. (Rhet 1398a31) 
Ryan (1984) argues that topoi are patterns and that in Rhetoric and, by 
implication, in Topics, Aristotle is setting out a list of patterns that can be 
imitated. In his discussion of deduction and induction, Aristotle tries to bring 
some system to these patterns to work out why some are more persuasive than 
others are but his aim remains practical and this is why the topics and the 
logic do not always agree. 
This means that logical validity cannot be the difference between the 
enthymeme and the dialectic deduction. Bumyeat (1994) believes that the 
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enthymeme is not a form of argument at all but refers to ideas and that 
Aristotle is arguing that it is the ideas that are conveyed that are the argument 
and not the form. The form, then, would simply be used to express the ideas 
in the most persuasive manner. The enthymeme then is simply the word used 
for ideas from which it is possible to deduce or create persuasive arguments. 
It should be remembered that the material that Aristotle is working with 
already exists. Aristotle gives both forms of reasoning a theoretical base but, 
in both Topics and Rhetoric, there are inconsistencies between the theory and 
the practice. As with the enthymeme, the list of deductions in Topics is not 
logically consistent. DUring (1968) sees these lists as examples of actual use 
and in this area the question of logical validity is not a central issue. 
Again, it seems that it is the context that is behind the difference. Dialectic is 
limited in both the premises that can be used, in what debates it can be used 
and with whom. This may be because it was originally used in the context of 
a rule-bound debate. Rhetoric is bound by its need to teach students to be 
successful in forms of public speaking that already existed. It seems that it 
may be the context of use and possibly the standard of the debate that lies 
behind the difference between rhetoric and dialectic. 
Another difference between dialectic and rhetoric can be seen in the way in 
which the rhetorical equivalent of induction is a much more important form 
than its more reputable and logical equivalent. Example, is presented in two 
forms, narrated and invented. These also are distinguished not according to 
the logic of their form but the materials that they use for example. The 
narrated examples consist of facts that are true. The invented examples 
consist of facts that have been made up. Further there are two sorts of these 
invented examples, the illustrative parable and the fable. The difference 
between the two is predominantly practical and affects when they should be 
used: 
Fables are suitable for addresses to popular assemblies and they have 
one advantage - they are comparatively easy to invent, whereas it is 
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hard to find parallels among actual past events. You will in fact frame 
them just as you frame illustrative parallels: all you require is the power 
of thinking out your analogy, a power developed by intellectual training. 
But while it is easier to supply parallels by inventing fables, it is more 
valuable for the political speaker to supply them by quoting what has 
actually happened, since in most respects the future will be like what 
the past has been like. (Rhet 1394al) 
In rhetoric the end, persuading a large audience, appears to dictate the means 
and this favours practical examples which work like induction and which are 
close to experience even more so than the enthymeme which starts from ideas 
and seeks to show that they apply. The dominance of the particular which has 
already been seen earlier appears again. Eugene Garver has argued strongly 
that the key to showing character is not logic but examples and that this 
explains the tendency to prefer these to logical structures: 
The great appeal of narrative and examples is that they are obviously 
and immediately ethical, where enthymemes are not. Enthymemes can 
be the manifestation of a pure rationality that has nothing ethical about 
it. The goal of rhetorical arguments is to make discourse ethical, and so 
a purely logical argument can create suspicion, mistrust, and 
unsuccessful persuasion. Hence the appeal of narrative. One's choice of 
examples cannot help making discourse ethical by revealing character. 
Narratives are never ethically neutraL Examples cannot help but make 
their reasoning ethical and so examples are nearer to the goal of making 
discourse ethical than enthymemes. (Garver 1999, 120) 
Garver makes it clear that Aristotle's goal is not to replace argument with 
narrative but to make reasoning ethical, logic on its own can "create 
suspicions that one is being merely clever, not practically wise". This seems 
to be at odds with Aristotle's practical focus but makes more sense when his 
view of the role of rhetoric in society and its link to ethics is understood. This 
does not mean that Aristotle rejects logic but simply that he accepts that logic 
is perhaps less robust and possibly needs a more rarified and protected 
atmosphere to survive. Examples are a shorthand linked to community mores. 
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The aim of this chapter has been to generate a more complex understanding 
of the role of persuasion in judicial decision-making. This section highlights 
certain aspects of this and introduces some of the arguments that will be 
developed in the next chapter which deals with common law reasoning. It is 
in two parts, the first claims that in seeking to understand these different 
forms in their own terms, i.e. the way in which structures and systems led to a 
system in which an individual could and would seek to be persuasive, that 
what has been revealed is the way in which both the individual and the system 
become dependant on each other. The system could not survive without 
individuals but also gives the individual a sense of identity and access to 
authority. The second part suggests that the distance between the system and 
the person who wishes to participate in the system is one that needs to be 
carefully measured. 
1. Identity and authority 
In both systems a process was described whereby the individual's own sense 
of identity and the character that was revealed to a wider society was created 
through an interplay between their particularity and the communal structures 
which they sought in enter in order to be seen by others and by themselves. 
Relationships, indeed, were the key to both structures whether the traditional 
talmudic form which passed on not only knowledge but responsibility and 
authority through strictly regulated relationships or the political system of 
Athens which linked all citizens together by making them all individually 
responsible for pursuing their own interests but limited how they could do so 
by making them seek to persuade others in order to achieve this. 
It is by entering into and accepting these relationships that a community 
within which an individual can seek to be persuasive is created. Before an 
individual can seek to persuade he needs to assert his identity as a member of 
the community with the right to be heard. This parallels the talmudic saying 
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that in order to understand the law one needs to do before one hears the 
reasons, in order to be persuasive one needs to be seen before one can be 
heard. In both studies individuals needed to be visible before they could 
persuade others that their arguments deserved either support or obedience. 
Their acceptance of certain standards allows them to be recognised and be 
seen as people who have authority to make decisions and legal interpretations, 
or the right to be heard. This making visible is closely linked to the way in 
which identity and even the character of the individual is formed and 
describes the ways in which an individual can become acceptable, a part of 
the community. 
This visibility comes at a price for the individual, by showing that he is 
acceptable he needs to acquire a set of socially acceptable character traits and 
identity, to submit to the standards of judgment within the system. 
Individuals do gain from this system, they gain status from their sense of 
identity, they gain a place in the world and become visible to themselves and 
they gain power. 88 
Authority, or auctoritas, has its origins in Roman political experience. It 
comes from the verb augere, meaning "to augment" or "to add to." 
Politically it meant that those who had authority had it by virtue of the 
fact that they augmented or breathed fresh life into the original 
accomplishment of those who founded the city of Rome. Above all 
other considerable achievements of Rome was the unrepeatable 
enormity of the original acts that lay the foundations for the city's body 
politic. These deeds gave authority to the living as long as these citizens 
safeguarded and renewed the spirit of that original foundation. The 
shining beauty of this beginning was passed down through tradition, and 
it was sacred or religious in the sense that it was with the city's 
founding that that gods were given a home. It was the sacred and 
88 Curtis further argues that our own individual experiences do not allow for self illumination 
which requires that they be seen in the light of a common sense. 
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stabilizing cornerstone of the body politic. (Curtis 1999, 105) 
The goal of judgment is authority and specifically, the right to be seen as a 
judge.89 The question of how much choice an individual whose sense of 
identity is related to this submission can have is not a simple one and is one 
that will be answered differently in different cultures and times. Indeed, it 
could be answered differently for the same individual participating in 
different systems within a wider culture. In describing the competing 
methodologies of dialectic and rhetoric Aristotle could be describing different 
roles or characters that an individual would use to express their identity at 
different times. The Talmud seeks to influence the identity of each individual 
in such detail because there are competing understandings open to the 
individual in the other communities within which he lives and precisely 
because its authority is limited. This would suggest that the more authoritative 
the system the less concerned it would have to be with influencing the nature 
of the individual. State sponsored systems could survive with fewer of its 
citizens identifying with the law and with a judiciary who would see their 
identity as judge as less all-encompassing than a religious duty. In the next 
chapter on the common law it will be seen that the individual who 
participates as a judge is very aware of their role in the system and one of the 
reasons they seek to be persuasive and to use arguments which support the 
foundations of the common law is to protect it as well as to formulate their 
own identity and to explore how that identity or sense of role should be 
formed. This awareness is both a support to and a danger to the system. It is 
the need to prevent individuals moving too far away from the system and 
therefore judging it with other standards rather than participating in the 
system that explains why a sense ofthe correct distance is all-important 
2. Distance and participation 
In chapter 1 it was seen that Steiner has described two poles as the dominant 
89 In terms of chapter 1 this could be seen as being dignified by being general. 
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approach to texts, critics or readers. In seeking to be persuasive neither a 
talmudic scholar nor an Athenian orator sits comfortably in either of these 
categories as they do not seek to distance themselves from the subject as a 
critic would, to do so would be to undermine its authority and use a form of 
judgment which comes from without rather than within. Instead, they seek to 
show that they participate in it, whether it be society or the text by persuasion. 
V S Naipaul has argued that the novel, a form which contains narrative and 
character, is only appropriate for certain societies where people have enough 
freedom to generate narratives and can only be written by an author who can 
see the detail of the society but has not seen enough of the world to 
understand the larger political and other factors which inform those and 
which by providing an understanding of the broader context undermine his 
ability to see the details.90 This distance would undermine hislher emotional 
understanding and this is the key not only to good story telling but successful 
persuaSIOn. 
Some distance though is needed III order to judge. The danger of over 
identification is paralysis: 
The problem with which Arendt wrestles is that we need compassion in 
order to have solidarity with the "oppressed and exploited," and yet this 
compassion is politically pernicious if it becomes the foundation of 
politics - and takes the form of pity. Arendt says that compassion is 
politically irrelevant because it destroys the distance between persons. 
In the intensity of identification with another's suffering, the 
compassionate person loses the capacity for argumentative speech, for 
talk about shared interests, for precisely those activities that arouse our 
urge to appear and that humanize the world. The compassionate cannot 
stand the suffering of others, and hence if they are moved to act, to go 
public, they eschew persuasion and negotiation in favour of darkness. 
(Curtis 1999, 90) 
90 In a recent lecture given to the Edinburgh Book Festival (August 2001, unpublished) 
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A judge who is too distant introduces alternative fOTIns of judgment and may 
fail to be persuasive91 but one who is too close cannot judge. The next chapter 
considers the ways in which judges in the common law have tried to both 
respond to society and to ensure that law remains a separate criteria of 
judgment in order to support their role as judges. 
91 This criticism could be made against the legal theorists in chapter 2 - indeed it is their 
distance and their emotional commitment to philosophy and to individual goals which 
make it hard for them to see these aspects of decision-making. 
Chapter 4 
Judicial decision-making in the common law 
This chapter considers the role of persuasion in judicial decision-making in 
common law systems. The common law is an example of a system where 
individuals make judgments where they have limited authority and therefore 
have to provide persuasive reasons. This chapter specifically looks at six 
decisions of the highest court in the two jurisdictions considered, the House 
of Lords. 
Although law lords have the highest authority of any judge in the system this 
is limited by a number of factors, their position as un-elected decision-makers 
in a democracy, the collegiate nature of the judiciary which requires judges to 
consider the views of others, the danger of being overruled or distinguished 
and positively the desire to create a precedent. Persuasive strategies are used 
by the judges in response to these limitations and both seek to reinforce and 
protect the individual decision and to legitimate the judicial role. The 
audience they are trying to persuade therefore is a multiple one consisting of 
their peers, future judges, the parties in the case and wider society. Following 
the analysis in the last chapter this chapter will look at the ways they ground 
authority and it does so through the law of negligence and, in particular, six 
cases which deal with the issues of pure economic loss. 
Negligence is both central to and a border line issue for delict. It is easy to 
argue that an individual should be held liable when they commit an act with 
the intention that it cause harm. In this the relationship is clearly established 
by the actions. Indeed such an act will usually be criminal, although civil 
redress in the form of compensation may be sought. Negligence raises the 
question of how far we should be responsible for the unintended 
consequences of our actions. This raises issues of who we are responsible for 
and what relationships the law is prepared to recognise. This area of law thus 
deals very closely with the relationship between law and society and many of 
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the decisions considered refer to an underlying attitude towards the judicial 
role within society. 
The chapter starts by showing how the doctrine of precedent both provides a 
foundation for judicial authority and a restriction by defining what judges 
need to take into account, the material they need to use to generate persuasive 
argument. Distinguishing techniques show the flexibility of this doctrine and, 
in showing what judges can choose not to take into account, demonstrates 
more precisely what sort of arguments are likely to be persuasive. 
At the core of the chapter is the exploration of the law of negligence. This is 
in two sections. The first section looks at the development of the law of 
negligence in Scotland and in England. This shows how a sense of the 
relationship between law and society develops through the case law and leads 
to the creation of different persuasive strategies or methodologies. 
The second section looks at two methodologies in some detail, principled and 
case-based reasoning. This study reveals that underlying these two strategies 
are conflicting attitudes towards the judicial role and that rather than 
undermining this conflict helps to create commitment. Throughout this 
exploration of negligence, a large field, six cases are used as the main object 
of study. The first Donoghue v Stevenson1 is the modem foundation of the 
law in this area. The other five2 all relate to pure economic loss an area which 
is at the boundaries of negligence and this is why methodological debate has 
been to the fore in these cases. In concentrating on these cases they are being 
used as examples of the implications of this debate and this thesis at no time 
sets out an analysis of the current state of the law of negligence. 
1 1932 SC (HL) 32, 1932 SLT 317. 
2 Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978J AC 728, [1977J 2 All ER 429; Caparo 
Industries pIc v Dickman [1990J 2 AC 605, [1990J 1 All ER 568; Hedley Byrne & Co 
Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964J AC 465, [1963J 2 All ER 575; Junior Books Ltd v 
Veitchi Co Ltd 1982 SC (HL) 24, 1982 SLT 492; and Murphy v Brentwood District 
Council [1991J 1 AC 398, [1990J 2 All ER 908. 
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Precedent and distinguishing techniques 
1. Precedent 
The doctrine of precedent consists of inbuilt limitations in the system that 
dictate what judges take into account, the examples that they must use. The 
rules are strict. Judges are only bound by decisions of higher courts in their 
court structure and only by cases that are directly in point but in these 
circumstances they are completely bound.3 Cases which are not completely 
binding are also influential, decisions made at the same level or even in other 
jurisdictions can also be highly persuasive and often need to be taken into 
account. Precedent gives judicial decisions authority by providing that they 
can use previous case law to show that they are coming to decisions not 
because of personal bias but because they are bound by external constraints. It 
also encourages the judges to generate decisions which in turn can become 
authoritative and binding on judges in the future. In doing so it ensures that 
judges are not only readers and appliers of decisions but authors and in using 
previous decisions they set out the way in which they wish their own 
reasoning to be dealt with. The doctrine itself impacts on this as it dictates not 
simply that previous case law must be taken into account but what in that case 
law should be considered. 
According to the system of precedent, judges are not bound by all aspects of 
previous decisions. What is generally considered to be binding in any decision 
is the ratio decidendi. This is the "statement of law applied to the legal 
problems raised by the facts as found upon which the decision is based." 
(Walker and Ward 1998, 61) It is distinguished from obiter dicta, other 
judicial pronouncements on principles of law which, although potentially 
3 The Court of Appeal in England considers itself bound by its own decisions as well as by the 
decisions of the House of Lords. Until 1966, the highest court was also bound by its own 
prior decisions. In 1966 Lord Gardiner, then the Lord Chancellor, issued a practice 
statement which declared that judges in the House of Lords were no longer bound by 
prior decisions of the House. This power is used rarely as one of the aims of the system 
of precedent is to ensure consistency. 
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interesting and useful for later cases, are not ratio because they are not linked 
to the material facts and do not found the decision. The aspect of the decision 
which precedent defines as most persuasive is the part that relates law to the 
specific details of the problem placed before the judges. This encourages the 
judges to stay close to the details of the case. 
There are though limitations to this as a decision which sticks too close to the 
individual facts is not persuasive and will not found a precedent. This can be 
seen in the case of Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd v Haynes4 the House of 
Lords found that a judge in the lower courts had misunderstood the concept. 
The judge had held that he was bound by the decisions of a higher court as to 
what was reasonable in specific circumstances. As the higher court had 
passed judgement on a case that was almost indistinguishable on the facts, he 
felt that he was bound by it and decided accordingly. The House of Lords held 
that he had failed to distinguish between judgements of law and judgements 
on the facts: 
The question whether on the facts in that particular case there was or 
was not a failure to take reasonable care was a question for the jury .... 
The jury's decision did not become part of our law citable as a 
precedent .... Now that negligence cases are mostly tried without juries, 
the distinction between the functions of judge and jury is blurred. A 
judge naturally gives reasons for the conclusion formerly arrived at by a 
jury without reasons. It may sometimes be difficult to draw the line, but 
if the reasons given by a judge for arriving at the conclusion previously 
reached by a jury are to be treated as "law" and citable the precedent 
system will die from a surfeit of authorities. 5 
Although the distinction being made is that between facts and law the Lords 
are not referring to an external standard but to the different roles of judge and 
jury. The judge will give reasons for decisions which a jury would not but 
4 [1959] AC (HL) 743, [1959] 2 All ER 38 
5 [1959] AC (HL) 743 at p 757-758 
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because he is doing so in his role as a "jury" then these reasons, in effect, can 
have no precedential value, the judge is not acting qua judge and is not 
persuasive. Indeed, these reasons, though the judge clearly feels the need to 
give some, are regarded as unimportant. 
The definition of the judicial role in the sense of defining what is or is not 
persuasive does not belong to the individual judge making a decision. The 
ratio decidendi of a case, and the role and place of that case in the system, is 
decided not by the judges in that case but by later judges who decide to use 
that decision: 
It is for the court which is later called on to consider the precedent to 
decide whether the precedent is "in point" or "distinguishable" and 
whether binding or persuasive, and what the ratio decidendi of the 
precedent is. (Marshall 1995, 117) 
A judge therefore is seeking to persuade not the immediate audience but 
hislher current and future colleagues that hislher decision is persuasive and 
does so by using the authority of previous generations. Slhe is persuasive 
when others agree that what has been produced is a workable ratio - a 
decision which has the character of law and that s/he is doing so in hislher 
role as judge. This clearly has echoes of discussion of understanding and 
judgment in chapter one and this will be considered in more detail in the 
following chapter. It should be noted that there is one further limitation on the 
judge making a decision, slhe is expected not to use the cases that slhe 
chooses but those that are presented before him/her during argument. Indeed, 
if a case is used that the judge disagrees with slhe must either reluctantly 
admit that slhe is bound or distinguish that case. This limits the personal 
involvement of the judge and is one of the limitations that stops him/her from 
pursuing a personal view of the law. Judicial decision-making takes place in 
the context of other decisions and of the presentation of reasons chosen by 
others. This does not mean that there is no space for a personal involvement, 
distinguishing techniques can allow judges to use previous cases flexibly. 
Malloch VA 2002 Judicial decision-making in the common law 176 
2. Distinguishing techniques 
Distinguishing techniques allow judges to avoid some of the rigours of 
precedent while at the same time reinforcing its role as a dominant legal 
practice by focusing the attention of the judges on certain aspects of the 
decision. There are no rules that limit what techniques can be used but judges 
need to persuade others that their decision to distinguish is correct, otherwise 
their decision will be vulnerable to appeal and, in using techniques which 
they feel will be persuasive and undermine the authority of the case they wish 
to avoid following, they reveal what it is in previous decisions that is 
authoritative and stay close to the central tenets of precedent. 
In distinguishing a case they can avoid attacking the reasoning in the previous 
case and thus setting up their authority against that of another judge directll 
by instead setting limits both on the case that is before them and on the 
previous cases they wish to avoid. They can concentrate on either the facts or 
the law of the previous case. On the use of facts to distinguish cases, consider 
Lord Keith's analysis of Hedley Byrne in Junior Books: 
That case was concerned with a negligent statement made in response 
to an inquiry about the financial standing of a particular company, in 
reliance on the accuracy of which the plaintiffs had acted to their 
detriment. So the case is not in point here except in so far as it 
established that reasonable anticipation of physical injury to person or 
property is not a sine qua non for the existence of a duty of care. 7 
It should be noted that what is important is not the specific facts but the ways 
they are legally understand and the way they have been categorised and 
classified. In Caparo, Lord Bridge shows how this same technique can be 
used to distinguish several cases at once by generalising the factual 
6 This is particularly true where they are seeking to distinguish a case where they would 
otherwise be bound. 
71982 SC (HL) 244 at p 267. 
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circumstances and then excluding the instant case from the category that has 
just been defined: 
The salient features of all these cases is that the defendant giving advice 
or information was fully aware of the nature of the transaction which 
the plaintiff had in contemplation, knew that the advice or information 
would be communicated to him directly or indirectly and knew that it 
was very likely that the plaintiff would rely on that advice or 
information in deciding whether or not to engage in the transaction in 
contemplation .... The situation is entirely different where a statement is 
put into more or less general circulation and may forseeably be relied on 
by strangers to the maker of the statement for anyone of a variety of 
different purposes which the maker of the statement has no reason to 
anticipate. 8 
The most common technique though does not concentrate on facts but instead 
attacks the other element necessary for precedent, a ratio based on those 
facts. This technique uses the reasoning of the judges to undermine the 
authority of the case by looking at one decision in detail or, in cases where 
more than one decision has been issued, comparing decisions within one case. 
Where only one of the decisions is considered, it can be distinguished on the 
grounds that it has been disapproved later, that it misunderstood earlier 
authority or that it dealt with a narrow field of law and it does not apply. 9 
When more than one decision is gIVen any differences can be used to 
undermine the authority of a case. A classic example of this is Lord 
Macmillan's analysis of the joint appeal of Mullen v Barr & Co and 
8 [1990] AC 605 at p 620-621 
9 All of these techniques were used to demolish Lord Wilberforce's decision in Anns in the 
latter case of Caparo. This is a slightly unusual case in that this is one of the rare 
occasions when the judiciary directly take on the reasoning of a previous judge and it is 
notable that even here they used these distinguishing techniques. See the way Lord Keith 
of Kinkel deals with his use of American cases, [1991] 1 AC 399 at pp 469-470; and the 
way his decision is clearly defined into the field of pure economic loss and out of the field 
of physical loss (also Lord Keith at pp 464-468). 
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McGowan v Barr & COlO in Donoghue: 
The Lord Justice-Clerk held that negligence had not been proved, and 
therefore did not pronounce upon the question of relevancy. Lord 
Ormidale held that there was no relevant case against the defenders but 
would have been prepared, if necessary, to hold that in any case 
negligence had not been established by the evidence. Lord Hunter held 
that the case was relevant and that negligence had been proved. Lord 
Anderson held that the pursuer had no case in law against the defenders, 
but that, if this view was erroneous, negligence had not been proved. 11 
By showing the differences between the judges, Lord Macmillan undermines 
the decision as a whole. If he had wished to follow the case he would simply 
have chosen the decision he agreed most with and only mentioned that one. 
Lord Buckmaster, who supported Lord Anderson's view, does exactly this in 
the same case: 
In Mullen v Barr & Co., a case indistinguishable from the present 
excepting upon the ground that a mouse is not a snail, and necessarily 
adopted by the Second Division in their judgement, Lord Anderson 
says. ... In agreeing, as I do with the judgement of Lord Anderson, I 
desire to add that I find it hard to dissent form the emphatic nature of 
the language with which his judgement is clothed. 12 
A similar technique is used to show that the decisions in a case do not support 
the proposition for which they have been cited: 
Leaving this on one side, however, it is not easy to cull from the 
speeches in the Hedley Byrne case any clear attempt to define or 
classify the circumstances which give rise to the relationship of 
proximity on which the action depends ... 13 
In this statement, which comes from Lord Oliver's decision in Caparo, the 
objection being made refers to an apparent lack of clarity. This is at the core 
of most of these techniques, the decision is either too clear and too narrow, or 
10 1929 SC 461, 1929 SLT 71. These are known as the "mouse cases". 
11 1932 SC (HL) 31 at p 62 
12 supra at p 42 
13 [1990] 1 All ER 568 at p 588 
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too vague and unclear and therefore can not be used. In this these techniques 
reinforce the doctrine of precedent by ensuring that it is those who fulfil the 
requirements of this practice that will see their reasoning being reused. Indeed 
the practice of distinguishing, the way judges relate to previous legal material 
is where the content of the doctrine of precedent can really be seen. The next 
section deals with the way judges use legal material and justify their decision 
through two dominant methodologies, case-based and principled reasoning 
and their allied persuasive strategies. First the background to the development 
of these methodologies is set out in an historical study of the law of 
negligence. 
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Negligence is a vast area and this chapter concentrates on only six cases. In 
all of them, though methodology was an explicit matter of debate in the 
judicial decisions and this is why they are of interest. This section sets out the 
background to these cases and places them in their broader legal context. The 
six cases considered come from not one but two jurisdictions, Scotland and 
England. I5 These systems originally developed separately and the Act of 
Union of 1707 had guaranteed the independence of the Scottish legal system 
which has remained a separate jurisdiction. In 1711, though it was firmly 
established that the House of Lords could overrule the Court of Session, 
previously Scotland's supreme court in civil matters. I6 This brought English 
and Scots law into direct contact and in Donoghue v Stevenson which is the 
first of the six the law was said to be the same in both jurisdictions. Since 
then the laws have developed togetherI ? and the other five cases dealing with 
pure economic loss come from both systems. Their separate evolution is 
though interesting as it shows the ways in which two different legal systems 
developed different strategies for dealing with the same perceived gap in the 
law. Pre-Donoghue the concern was whether or how to recognise certain 
relationships as legal and post-Donoghue the focus shifted to how to control 
the principle contained therein. 
14 This section considers persuasion from the viewpoint of the judge. See Perelman's 
description of French law in chapter 2 for a parallel analysis of how attitudes towards the 
judiciary impacted on the way in which the role of the judge and the decision were 
regarded. 
15 Technically England and Wales. 
16 In the case of Greenshields v Magistrates oj Edinburgh. (1710 - 11) Rob. 12 
17 There have been calls, particularly by academics, for Scots law to again be allowed to 
develop separately in this area. (eg Brodie 1997; Thomson 1996 and Cooper 1991). 
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1. Negligence pre-Donoghue18 
1.1 Delict 
1.1.1 The role of reason 
Viscount Stair's Institutions19 is the foundation of the law of delict and is the 
first authoritative statement of the ways in which an action and its results can 
be legally recognised.20 Stair's description of delict, one of the obediential 
obligations sees it as based on the need to repair for an injury lost and 
ultimately authorised by divine authority:21 
Obediential obligations are either by the will of God immediately or by 
the mediation of some fact of ours; such are obligations of delinquence, 
whereby we become bound to reparation and satisfaction to the party 
injured, and are liable by punishment to God, which may be exacted by 
those who have his warrant for the effect. (Stair 1988, 100) 
At the time, Stair made this statement, Scots law accepted a number of 
sources, including civillaw.22 Stair, though, saw not posited law but reason as 
18 Although this chapter does not deal with the development of precedent. The development of 
this doctrine which was not fixed until the nineteenth century shows another way in 
which the judiciary can be seen creating an understanding of the nature oflaw and its role 
in society through the development oflegal doctrine. (Maher and Smith, 1988). 
19 The Institutions of the Law of Scotland. (1981) Originally published in 1681, Stair's 
Institutions was revised in 1693 by Viscount Stair. This second edition was reissued in 
1981, edited by D.M.Walker. It is this edition that is quoted in this essay. 
20 In Scots law, a small number of writers have been given 'institutional' status by the courts. 
This means that in the absence of other authority their statements carry the weight oflaw. 
21 In setting out the law of delict, Stair's primary source was the Roman Lex Aquiliae, but he 
chose to ignore it when it clashed with the dictates of reason: "Obligations by the 
Romans are distinguished in four kinds: in obligations ex contractu, vel quasi ex 
contractu, ex maleficio, vel quasi ex maleficio. Which distinction insinuates no reason of 
the cause or rise of these distinct obligations, as is requisite in a good distinct division; 
and therefore; they may be more appositely divided, according to the principle or original 
from whence they flow, as in obligations obediential, and by engagement, or natural and 
conventional." (1981, 100) 
22 Stair himself was a student of both civil law and philosophy. Stair had taken a general arts 
degree at Glasgow, he also taught and is believed to have been a teacher of philosophy 
with a particular interest in logic. He then followed a long Scottish tradition and studied 
civil law abroad in the Netherlands in Leiden during an enforced period of exile. 
Philosophy was at the heart of education in Scottish universities of the time and McIntyre 
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the ultimate foundation of law: 
Law is the dictate of reason, determining every rational being to that 
which is congruous and convenient for the nature and condition thereof 
(1981, 73-73) 
Stair's acceptance of the role of reason in law then is strongly linked to a 
sense that there is a natural law which can be accessed by reason and which 
can provide an alternative authoritative source to civil law (posited by secular 
authorities) or custom (practice and the roots of precedent). 
In this specific area, obligations of delinquence are created by individuals 
who by their actions become bound to one another. This is a distinct method 
of entering relationships apart from citizenship, statute, or contract and is 
primarily what sets this part of the common law apart. In this area of law it is 
the judges who assess that there is a need for legal intervention. Stair argues 
that the obligations are the logical result of the injunction to love your 
neighbour as yourself but the role of the civil authorities in this area is a 
limited one which suggests that for Stair law had a specific and limited role 
which did not extend to imposing moral obligations. Specifically, only God 
can punish the wrongdoer. Civil authorities do though have the power to 
regulate the individual's responsibility to repair for evil done. This is a 
general obligation and is not limited to specific nominate delicts.23 As an 
obligation, a restriction in behaviour, it is limited to the negative injunction to 
repair any evil done to a neighbour. This obligation rests on two distinct 
concepts who is a neighbour and what is evil, underlying any definition of 
both will be a set of assumptions about how and where law should intervene 
(1988, 209-259) considers the central place of philosophy in Scottish thinking and 
contrasts Stair who founded law on reason with Blackstone who saw past practice as the 
primary source oflaw. 
23 There were some specific medieval remedies, including assythment and spuilzie, which had 
survived and which Stair mentions. These remedies had links to criminal law and have 
since either been abolished or are considered obsolete. (Thomson 1999, 1-7; Norrie 
1996a, 127; Smith 1962, 648-649) 
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to impose moral obligations which may have wider compass. Therefore in 
this area of law those making decisions about its application are required to 
not only a view about how law and society relate but how law should reflect 
the morality underlie Stair's description of what persuasive. 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, institutional writers were more 
academic and less theological and the civilian Lex Aquiliae became more 
influentiae4 (perhaps reflecting the difference between Reformation and 
Enlightenment Scotland). There is thus a shift in the sense of what sources are 
acceptable and though reason remains the method authority is sought not in 
religion which was being questioned but in easily verifiable authorities. The 
root of law though remains a wrong and this is not only a deliberate act but 
includes a negligent one as Erskine put it: 
Wrong may arise not only from positive acts of trespass or injury, but 
from blameable omission or neglect of duty. (1989, 664i5 
As wrong was the source, the judiciary who now take over from the 
institutional writers in developing this area of law now sought to develop the 
law by using culpa, a roman law principle, as a way of trying to set out the 
sorts of relationships the law was prepared to recognise on the actions of the 
individuals alone. 26 
1.1.2 Culpa 
The development of negligence in the courts in the nineteenth century can be 
linked to specific societal changes, the industrial revolution and growing 
urbanisation. This brought people into closer proximity and in more 
dangerous circumstances. The attitudes and experience of the judiciary were 
24 Bell, (1899, 250) follows the Lex Aquiliae's four-fold categorisation of obligations rather 
than Stair's schema. 
25 From his Institute first published in 1773. Bell makes a similar point in his work. (1899, 257) 
26 The importance of precedent was established by the nineteenth century and is the 
background to this discussion. 
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also important. In one of the earliest cases, Innes v Magistrates of 
Edinburgh,27 it was held that a person who fell into a pit in the lanes of the 
city was entitled to damages even though considerable precautions had been 
taken to prevent such an accident. At the time, Edinburgh, home of the law 
courts, was full of man-made holes as a result of building work. This may 
have made the judges more prone to decide for the victim. 
A major influence on the development of the law at this time was John Inglis. 
Inglis dominated the Court of Session in the later half of the nineteenth 
century, first as Lord Justice-Clerk and latterly as Lord President.28 Elliot 
(1954) argues that he was central in authoritatively establishing culpa or 
wroni9 as the key to liability. In Campbell v Kennedy/o when he was Lord 
Justice-Clerk, Inglis stated: 
... I go further, and hold that no action for reparation of damage so 
caused can be relevant, unless negligence or culpa of some description 
is averred.31 
Inglis was supported by the rest of the second division in this but there was 
some debate about its implications. The other judges were prepared to accept 
that culpa could be inferred from the facts. Inglis maintained that it was so 
central to the definition of delict that it needed to be specifically mentioned in 
the averments. This required those who sought legal redress not to specify 
facts which the judges could then decide amounted to a situation they could 
recognise but to state from the start the specific legal principle under which 
the pursuer sought reparation. 
The difference of opinion in Campbell about the centrality of culpa supports 
27 (1798) Mor 13967. This case was founded largely on Lex Aquiliae rather than negligence. 
28 John Inglis was Lord Justice-Clerk 1858-1867 and Lord President from 1867 till his death in 
1891. He was much admired by his contemporaries. A laudatory biography was written 
shortly after his death by James Crabb Watt (1893). 
29 At its broadest culpa simply means wrong. It is also used to refer to unintentional wrongs 
alone and in this sense is often contrasted with dolus, intentional wrong. It is the 
narrower sense that came to the fore during the nineteenth century and led to the 
exploration of negligence by the courts. 
30 (1864) 3M 121 
31 (1864) 3M at p 126 
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MacCormick's (1974) assertion that there is a need to be careful when 
assessing the importance of culpa as a principle in the nineteenth century. He 
sees no signs of a fixed principle in the early cases. Instead, Culpa was used 
whenever there was a difficult case that dealt with unintended acts because of 
a preference for Roman legal terms and its meaning varied. The principle of 
culpa, the need for wrong to be established before there could be liability for 
injury, evolved alongside the use of the word.32 As MacCormick puts it: 
Not only do the courts in the process of setting the rule to be applied in 
these situations bring into relief the element of fault, expressed in terms 
of culpa, but these situations appear to have provided the medium for 
the creation of the principle. It was in areas where the basis of liability 
was doubtful that the pressure for the emergence and utilisation of a 
principle was strongest. (1974,28-29) 
This suggests that where the judiciary were unsure about whether they could 
provide a remedy that they sought support and authority for judgments. In 
effect, they were seeking to find legally persuasive reasons to justify their 
application of law in the absence of any pre-existing legally recognised 
relationship. This may explain Inglis' desire for the party who sought to 
establish a relationship to first make it clear what legal reason the court 
should apply. There was a sense that law should respond and that culpa used 
to justify and rationalise judicial attempts to make that response. It was 
therefore a useful category which allowed the judiciary to both develop the 
law while making that development seem part of a rational structure rather 
than a mater of policy. This reinforced the authority of their decisions by 
providing for a legal standard by which their decisions could be judged. It 
also allowed them to develop a sense of how this new society should be dealt 
with and provided the basis for a persuasive strategy that could be used to 
explore the relationship between individuals and the law. 
32 The first reported case to deal with negligence was Caddell v Black. 1804 MOL 13905, 
(1812) 5 Paton 567 (HL). This case cited both Stair and the Lex Aquiliae as sources of 
the law. There is an earlier unreported case of Gardner v Ferguson (1795) cited in 
McKendrick v Sinclair 1972 SC (HL) 25 at p 66., 1972 SLT 110 at p 120. 
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By the end of the nineteenth century negligence or unintentional wrong was 
well established as the core of delict. The source for delictual obligation was 
culpa an act, negligent or intentional, by which an individual became liable 
for wrongful damage which resulted. Culpa then is an act capable of setting 
up a relationship of responsibility between people. The problem facing Scots 
law was how to limit this very broad principle and thus what relationships the 
law was prepared to recognise. Two main routes were used, remoteness of 
damage and duty of care. The remoteness of damage route was used in Allan 
v Barcla/3 and is described by Lord Kinloch:34 
The grand rule on the subject of damages, is that none can be claimed 
except such as naturally and directly arise out of the wrong done~ and 
such, therefore as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the view 
of the wrongdoer. 35 
In contrast, Lord Kinnear in Black v Fife Coal Ltd36 felt the duty of care 
principle was more appropriate as it makes the issue one of law as opposed to 
one offact: 
... it involves a matter of law, because it means that no ground of 
liability in respect of negligence has been established against the 
respondents. But negligence is not a ground of liability, unless the 
person whose conduct is impeached is under a duty of taking care~ and 
whether there is such a duty in particular circumstances and how far it 
goes are questions of law. 37 
The difference between these two approaches is significant, although there 
may be little difference in practice. The first, a consequentialist approach, 
encourages a concentration on the individual facts of each case by 
highlighting the physical results of the act. The second, is grounded not in the 
consequences but in a relationship governed by law and thus encourages a 
33 (1864) 2M 873 
34 Lord Kinloch sat as Lord Ordinary in this case. This quote comes from a note to the judges 
sitting in the appeal 
35 (1864) 2M 873 at p 874 
36 1912 SC (:m..) 33 
37 1912 SC (:m..) 33 at p 40 
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concentration on how law creates and identifies relationships. This is a more 
general approach encouraging abstraction though it is still rooted in an ethical 
understanding of responsibility for others. The approach chosen would dictate 
what examples and analogies could be used to justify individual decisions, 
whether pragmatic examples of the likely physical results of actions or more 
general examples of responsibility and duty. These examples, following 
Aristotle, would reflect and create the judicial view of the character of law 
and therefore their view ofthe role oflaw in society. 
Donoghue v Stevenson definitively answered this question by coming down in 
favour of duty of care and, in doing so, ended the formative period of delict. 
The impact of this case will be considered after the section on tort. This is 
because Donoghue did not only seek to answer questions for delict but also 
for tort. It could do so because Scots law had become heavily influenced by 
English law in this area and particularly by Winterbottom v Wright. 38 
Winterbottom was decided on the English doctrine of privity of contract and 
the judges explicitly refused to create a general liability. Indeed, the House of 
Lords opposed the idea of general liability for injury caused by wrongful 
actions. They felt that liability should only be created by consent - by 
contract. This reflects English law which had a very different development 
based on a sense of law as part of the royal prerogative and which was 
reluctant to see any relationship recognised in law without the prior consent 
of the parties. 
38 1842 10 M&W 109. This decision was followed in the "mouse cases" Mullen v Barr & Co. 
and McGowan v Barr & Co (1929 SC 461, 1929 SLT 71). The facts in these cases were 
virtually identical to those in Donoghue but the judges all gave different reasons for their 
decisions showing that this was felt to be a difficult area. It is possible for all judges in a 
case to produce a written decision but this is rare and usually occurs in controversial 
cases, and indeed, in cases which are regarded as of some importance and likely to 
become sources of precedent. This allows later benches more flexibility in deciding how 
to use the case and which reasons will be acceptable. 
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1.2 Tort 
1.2.1 Access to law 
In England, the roots of tort lie in the middle ages when an action for trespass 
was introduced into the King's COurtS.39 Trespass simply meant wrong and the 
action was designed to deal with breaches of the King's peace. Over time this 
'criminal' action extended to cover areas of civil wrong.40 An action of 
trespass, for example, would be used to recover damages from a workman 
who had negligently damaged an object in his care. (Milsom 1981,290) This 
reflected what must have been a sense that the courts should intervene but 
these non-criminal cases were distorted by the need to bring them into the 
original formula, which stated there had been a crime against the monarch 
and that force had been used. In 13 70 a new procedure was introduced. This 
made it possible to go to trial on the case, the facts simply stated, rather than 
having to claim a breach of the peace. The dominant focus of law was 
therefore access and how individuals could gain access to a space where the 
law seen as lying in the hands of the sovereign would be available to them. 
There were now two actions, trespass and case. The creation of case did not 
lead to trespass losing all its civil aspects. Instead, it split the civil aspects into 
two, with people being free to choose whether to proceed by trespass or case 
to attract the court's attention either by alerting it to relevant facts or by 
bringing it under the King's jurisdiction by claiming his peace had been 
breached. The two actions followed separate procedures until 1504 when the 
procedures were made the same but even after this the writs remained 
distinct. 
It is not possible to understand English law without appreciating the central 
39 The sources for the history in this section are; Hepple (1984), Winfield (1926;1934) and 
Milsom (1981) 
40 Markesinis (1977) argues that tort and delict owe their similarities to the fact that, at an 
early stage, they both had mixed criminal and civil elements. 
Malloch VA 2002 Judicial decision-making in the common law 189 
importance, until this century, of writs. A case could be brought before a 
court that on its facts was good in law but that failed because the wrong writ 
had been used. Separate writs could have different procedures and law even 
when pursued through the same court. In tort the existence of two writs, even 
though procedurally identical after 1504, caused considerable difficulty. 
Especially as over time trespass lost most of its criminal connotations. This 
meant that there was considerable overlap between the writs but, if the wrong 
writ was used - e.g. trespass where case was more appropriate - the action 
would fail. 
By the seventeenth century the situation had become very confused and it was 
not clear why one situation should be tried as case and one as trespass. In 
Scott v Shepherrfl the judiciary tried to establish a logical difference to help 
to resolve some of the confusion. It held that trespass covered direct injury 
and case covered indirect injury. This meant that wrongs were organised by 
injury rather than fault and led to tort being dominated by questions of fact 
rather than law. This reflects the way in which case had been created and 
contrasts with the Scottish development where Inglis sought to bring the facts 
under a recognisable legal principle and led English judges to create a series 
of nominate torts which detailed specific circumstances in which the higher 
courts had held that there was a relationship where there could be liability. 
These areas were limited and were generally restricted to people who had 
specific jobs, innkeepers for example, the nature of which meant that people 
relied on them to care for them or their property. (Winfield 1926, 185-186) 
The judiciary were only prepared to recognise pre-existing relationships. 
Negligence was part of this structure but it had a limited place. It was not a 
nominate tort but a way of establishing wrong within the structure of 
nominate torts. Its role did become more important after it became clear that 
the difference between direct and indirect injury was not always an easy one 
to establish and there was another attempt to remedy the situation in Williams 
41 (1773) 2 Bl R 892 
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v Hollands. 42 In that decision it was held that actions that, under the Scott v 
Shepherd rule, should proceed by way of a writ of trespass could proceed 
under case with no penalty. This did not abolish the difference but meant that 
it had no importance and this allowed legal focus from the distinction 
between trespass and case to the torts themselves.43 Milsom (1981) argues 
that negligence evolved as the central question was no longer about the nature 
of the injury, focus turned to the wrong and in response to this lawyers used 
moral language, like negligence or deceit, as a way of legitimating their 
arguments. After a number of cases used negligence as a foundation for 
liability, it became a standard way for establishing wrong but only in cases 
where the law held that one of the parties had a special duty to the other. 
Relationships came first and acts second and relationships were still a matter 
of choice or clearly pre-existed by virtue of the social roles of the individuals. 
1.2.2 Privity of contract 
The doctrine of privity of contract prevented any development beyond this 
point. The main justification for this doctrine was the unlimited liability or 
floodgate argument which was expressed in its most pristine form in 
Winterbottom v Wright: 
The only safe rule is to confine the right to those who enter into the 
contract: if we go one step beyond that, there is no reason why we 
should not go fifty.44 
The issue in Winterbottom was whether coach hirers could be held liable to a 
driver who was injured in an accident caused by latent defects in one of their 
coaches. The application of the floodgates argument can be seen in Lord 
Arbinger's decision where he justifies the dismissal of the case by arguing: 
There is no privity of contract between these parties; and if the plaintiff 
can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing along the road, 
42 2. LJCP (NS) 10 Bing 112 
43 See Pritchard's (1964) article for a fuller discussion of the reason for and an explanation of 
the importance of this rule. 
44 1842 10 M&W 109 at p 115 
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who was injured by the upsetting of the coach, might bring a similar 
action. Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the 
parties who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous 
consequences to which I can see no limit, would ensue.45 
There is a strong feeling in this argument that law needs to be controlled. The 
legal sphere is one that is both powerful and dangerous and that could 
overwhelm other relationships so that it needs to be carefully fenced in.46 In 
this view of law the role of the judge is to limit the potentially dangerous 
consequences. Another justification put forward for privity of contract was 
that the harm should be left where it falls. The classic exposition of this 
comes from Bramwell, B. in Holmes and Wife v Mather:47 
For the convenience of mankind in carrying on the affairs of life, 
people, as they go along the roads must expect or put up with such 
mischief as reasonable care on the part of others cannot avoid. 
Again this reflects a sense that people should be left alone to regulate their 
own affairs. There is a strong individualistic feel to such arguments that gives 
law a very pragmatic character. As society changed, though, there was a 
growing sense that in certain circumstances it was inequitable for the victim 
to be left to carry the harm. Forty years after Winterbottom, Lord Esher, then 
Brett, M.R, reveals how much when he made a concerted attempt to 
undermine the doctrine of privity of contract in Heaven v Pender. 48 
The facts in Heaven were not contested. A painter had been injured when 
staging put up by the owner of a dry dock gave way. The painter was 
employed not by the owner of the dry dock but by the owner of the boat he 
was painting. The issue was whether the owner of the dry dock could be liable 
if the staging had been put up negligently. Lord Esher felt that privity of 
contract should not stand in the way of the injured party receiving damages. 
45 supra at p 125 
46 This is a reverse of the argument in the Talmud that a fence needs to be placed around the 
Torah in order to protect it but there is the same sense that law needs and requires 
limitations in order to be effective. 
47 (1875) LR 10 Ex 261 at p 267 
48 (1883) 11 QBD 503 
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He argued that there could be duty outside contract: 
It should be observed that the existence of a contract between two 
persons does not prevent the existence of the suggested duty between 
them also being raised by law independently of the contract.49 
He even went so far as to suggest a general principle that could cover the 
area: 
The proposition will stand thus: whenever one person supplies goods, or 
machinery, or the like, for the purpose of their being used by another 
person under such circumstances that every one of ordinary sense 
would, if he thought, recognise at once that unless he used ordinary care 
and skill with regard to the condition of the thing supplied or the mode 
of supplying it, there will be no danger of injury to the person or 
property of him for whose use the thing is supplied, and who is to use it 
as duty arises to use ordinary care and care as to the condition or matter 
of supplying such a thing. And for a neglect of such an ordinary care or 
skill whereby injury happens a legal liability arises to be enforced by an 
action for negligence. 50 
Esher was attempting to introduce a new way to define relationships based on 
actions and close contact rather than by consent. This reveals a greater 
awareness of the complexities of social relationships than was seen in the 
earlier English cases. Lord Esher's proposals went too far for the other judges 
sitting on the case.51 Although they supported his conclusion, they stated that 
they did not support his principle and it was this view that was followed in 
later cases. 52 
Esher had failed to persuade his fellow judges to adopt a principle that would 
allow the law to recognise certain relationships. This did though happen in 
49 (1883) 11 QBD 503 at p 507 
50 supra at p 507 
51 Their timidity was criticised by Lord Johnston in the Scottish case of Kemp & Dougall v 
Damgavil Coal Co. Ltd 1909 SC 1314, 1909 2 SLT 181 
52 There was another small breach in the case of Le Lievre v Gould [1883] 1 QB 491: "If one 
man is near to another or is near to the property of another, a duty lies upon him not to 
do that which may cause a physical injury to the other, or may injure his property" p 497 
per Lord Esher. 
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Donoghue. 
2. Donoghue v Stevenson 
Donoghue v Stevenson is one of the most persuasive of all legal decisions and 
has been adopted by numerous jurisdiction. The facts of the case were simple. 
On the 26th of August 1928, Mrs May Donoghue entered a teashop in Paisley 
with a friend. Her friend bought Mrs Donoghue an ice cream and a fizzy 
drink. 53 It was later claimed that having drunk some of the fizzy drink, Mrs 
Donoghue discovered a decomposing snail in the bottle. It was alleged that, as 
a result, she suffered both shock and illness. 54 The bottle was opaque and 
there was no way that the retailer could have examined it before the sale. Mrs 
Donoghue decided to claim against the manufacturer and employed W.G. 
Leechman & Co. to take the case. 55 
Today, this would be a straightforward situation covered by consumer 
legislation but at the time it was not clear that the law could provide a 
remedy. Mrs Donoghue had no contract with either the retailer or the 
manufacturer and it was a moot point whether in such a circumstance there 
could be a claim under delict. 
The House of Lords did decide in favour of Mrs Donoghue and, rather than go 
to proof, Stevenson settled out of court. The decision was not unanimous. The 
House was divided three to two, but despite the narrowness of the result the 
53 There is some confusion as to what the drink was. The case reports that it was ginger beer, 
but "ginger" in the West Coast of Scotland is a term used to cover any bottled fizzy drink 
and it could have been misinterpreted. (Thomson 1999, 58) 
54 The facts were never proved 
55 There was a sense of the wider legal profession although this solicitor had been unsuccessful 
in two virtually identical cases here was extremely successful but there was strong feeling 
a change was due. Even Stevenson's senior counsel felt the law was against them - "I 
personally thought that the H.L. would decide as they did in fact decide, but that we had 
a very strong case on the facts. If the case had gone to proof I think it would have been 
fought and possibly won on the issue whether there was a snail in the bottle and I may 
have told MacKinnon this." (McBryde 1991, 51) 
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case has become incredibly influential and possible one of most persuasive. 
The influence of Donoghue comes not from the bare facts of the decision but 
the methodology of the decision-making and the reasons given. It has become 
precedent and regarded as both useful and authoritative in Scotland. Indeed in 
both jurisdictions it has become the foundation of the law in this area. One of 
the reasons is not just its simple ratio but that judges have been able to adapt 
and use it in a number of different ways. The core decisions in the care are 
those of Lord Macmillan, a Scottish judge and Lord Aitken, an English judge. 
Their decisions reflect these different backgrounds and their views of the 
relationship between law and society. They also reflect the relationship 
between the two judges and the two jurisdictions.56 
2.1 Judicial relationships. 
Lord Macmillan had initially intended to decide the case usmg mainly 
Scottish cases and authority and only deal with English law because it had 
been cited before him. As he puts it, in an earlier draft of his decision: 
The question accordingly for your Lordships' determination is whether 
by the law of Scotland the appellant has on her averments any right of 
action against the respondent. I say advisedly, by the law of Scotland, 
for close as may be the approximation in modem times between the 
Scots law of delict and the English law of torts, and instructive as 
English precedents may be of way of illustration in Scottish cases, the 
question before the House is one of Scots law. Historically there are 
distinctions, both in origin and in principle, in this branch of law 
between the two systems. These distinctions may not be material for the 
present purpose, but they should be borne in mind. Thus the law of 
Scotland has never recognised the English distinction between 
56 It also brings to mind the point made in section on precedent that the first step to 
establishing a precedent is to show that the other judges who sat with you found your 
arguments persuasive. 
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misfeasance and non-feasance, which has had considerable influence on 
the development of the English law of negligence; nor again has the law 
of Scotland been hampered by procedural difficulties due to the rigidity 
of the English system of forms of action, which, though decently 
interred by the Judicature Act, in Maitland's words "still rule us from 
their graves." I hope, however, to show in the sequel that, 
notwithstanding these historical divergencies, the law of Scotland and 
the law of England, in their relation to practical problem of everyday 
life which this appeal presents, are not really at variance in principle. 
Both parties indeed at your Lordships' bar appeared to assume that this 
was so, but while the appellant maintained that her claim was not 
contrary to English doctrine or English decisions when rightly 
interpreted the respondent contended that according to English law the 
appellant's claim was inadmissible. It will therefore be necessary to 
consider hereafter whether the respondent's submission on the law of 
England is well-founded. But this is a Scottish case and I think it both 
appropriate and logical that to consider in the first case whether the 
appellant had stated a relevant case according to Scots law, for if she 
has not it is unnecessary to examine the English authorities. (Rodger 
1992,249) 
Yet despite this robust defence of Scots law, Lord Macmillan's final decision 
minimised any difference and decided on English law: 
At your Lordship's bar counsel for both parties to the present appeal, 
accepting, as I do also, the view that there is no distinction between the 
law of Scotland and the law of England in the legal principles 
applicable to the case, confined their arguments to the English 
authorities. The appellant endeavoured to establish that, according to 
the law of England, the pleadings disclose a good cause of action; the 
respondent endeavoured to show that, on the English decisions, the 
appellant had stated no admissible case. I propose therefore to address 
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myself at once to an examination of the relevant precedents. 57 
Lord Macmillan never explained why he changed his mind about what 
material was primarily persuasive in this case The earlier version of the 
decision was only found recently amongst his papers. Rodger (1992), who 
published the earlier decision, suggests a number of reasons for this change. 
These include the fact that none of the Scots authorities that Lord Macmillan 
used in his earlier decision had been put before the court by the parties 
involved58 but Rodger also feels that Lord Atkin may have had something to 
do with Lord Macmillan's change of mind. 
It is certainly likely that Lord Atkin would have been discussing Lord 
Macmillan's decision in detail with him. He appears to have been preparing 
for such a case for some time and was very clear about what he wanted it to 
achieve. Lord Atkin was a reformer. He was unhappy with certain aspects of 
English law and sought to change them for the better. In two lectures to the 
Society of Public Teachers of Law, made prior to the Donoghue decision, he 
argued that English law needed to become more scientific, by this he meant 
more principled: 
There is a general tendency to demand that law should consist of broad 
principles, that narrow distinctions should be eliminated. There are 
certainly still a number of such distinctions which it is difficult to 
justify or to apply. (Atkin 1925, 13) 59 
Lord Atkin was seeking to eliminate such narrow distinctions and to develop 
principles to replace them. He specifically criticised tort and singled it out as 
an area of law in need of reform. (1925, 13) Lord Atkin chose the Donoghue 
case to introduce a principled approach to this part of law: 
It is remarkable how difficult it is to find in the English authorities 
statements of general application defining the relations between parties 
57 1932 SC (HL) 31 at p 63 
58 This reflects a sense of the judge as a dispute solver and not primarily as the source of the 
law. 
59 In the same article, Atkin suggests that in areas of law where principles were settled they 
could only be reformed by legislation. (1925, 15) 
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that give rise to the duty. The Courts are concerned with the particular 
relations which come before them in actual litigation, and it is sufficient 
to say whether the duty exists in those circumstance. The result is that 
the Courts have been engaged upon an elaborate classification of duties 
as they exist in respect of property, whether real or personal, with 
further divisions as to ownership, occupation, or control, and 
distinctions based on the particular relations of the one side or the other, 
whether manufacturer, salesman, or landlord, customer, tenant, 
stranger, and so on. In this way it can be ascertained at any time 
whether the law recognises a duty, but only where the case can be 
referred to some particular species which has been examined and 
classified. And yet the duty which is common to all the cases where 
liability is established must logically be based upon some element 
common to the cases where it is found to exist.60 
Clearly, Lord Atkin wanted to have an impact beyond the present case and 
one that would reflect his view of law as it should be - based on logic and 
principle. If there were some doubt as to whether the decision applied equally 
in England as in Scotland, this would have undermined that impact. This may 
have encouraged him to persuade Lord Macmillan to use only English law in 
his decision. 
Whether Lord Macmillan was persuaded by Lord Atkin's reforming zeal, or 
was affected by other factors, can not be known for certain. It is certain that 
his use of English authorities did not affect the reasoning he employed in the 
decision: 
Essentially what Lord Macmillan did when he prepared the May version 
was to take the generalised reasoning that he had originally used for 
Scots law and apply it to the law of both systems. In other words he 
used the same basic material but said that he was speaking of both 
systems rather than simply of Scots law. (Rodger 1992,242) 
Although Lords Macmillan and Atkin were both using what they described as 
60 1932 SC (HL) 31 at p 44 
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a principled approach, they had very different attitudes towards it and this 
revealed in reasons used to justify and legitimate their use of that approach. 
2.2 Principled reasoning. 
Lord Macmillan saw this as a traditional way of approaching such questions 
and found it unproblematic. Lord Atkin was seeking to have a radical effect 
on the way the law evolved. This difference can be seen in the way each judge 
introduced his use of principle-based reasoning. Lord Atkin, quoted earlier, 
starts by appealing to logic and reason. This appeals to a sense of law as an 
atemporal hierarchy which can always supply the answer. He then seeks a 
foundation in commonly accepted morality: 
The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must 
not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question, Who is my 
neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to 
avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be 
likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law, is my neighbour? 
The answer seems to be - persons who are so closely and directly 
affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in 
contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the 
acts or omissions which are called into question. 61 
It is notable that this is the same principle that Stair used when seeking to find 
a foundation for delict. It grounds this area of law in social morality and in the 
structures of society. Aristotle argues that the maxim or proverb has a 
particular power and it is likely this is because of its instant emotional 
comprehensibility rather than any inherent logic. Lord Macmillan does not 
61 supra at p 44. This section is remarkably like one from one of the lectures to the Society of 
Public Teachers of Law: "It is quite true that law and morality do not cover identical 
fields. No doubt morality extends beyond the more limited range in which you can lay 
down the definite prohibitions of law; but apart from that, the British law has always 
necessarily ingrained in it moral teaching in this sense: that it lays down standards of 
honesty and plain dealing between man and man ..... He is not to injure his neighbour by 
acts of negligence; and that certainly covers a very large field of the law. I doubt whether 
the whole law of tort could not be comprised in the golden maxim to do unto your 
neighbour as you would that he should do unto you." (1932, 30) 
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feel the same need to justify his use of principle though, he does point to its 
flexibility and the way it can be used to link law and societies' view of what 
is appropriate: 
In the daily contacts of social and business life, human beings are 
thrown into, or place themselves in, an infinite variety of relations with 
their fellows; and the law can refer only to the standards of the 
reasonable man in order to determine whether any particular relation 
gives rise to a duty to take care as between those who stand in that 
relation to each other. The grounds of action may be as various and 
manifold as human errancy; and the conception of legal responsibility 
may develop in adaptation to altering social conditions and standards. 
The criterion of judgement must adjust and adapt itself to the changing 
circumstances of life. The categories of negligence are never closed. 
The cardinal principle of liability is that the party complained of should 
owe to the party complaining a duty to take care, and that the party 
complaining should be able to prove that he has suffered damage in 
consequence of a breach of that duty. Where there is room for diversity 
of view, it is in determining what circumstances will establish such a 
relationship between the parties as to give rise, on the one side, to a duty 
to take care, and, on the other side, to a right to have care taken. 62 
In using a reasonable man as the standard Macmillan is asserting that a person 
should be the model rather than founding law in any more abstract principle. 
It also reflects the close link Macmillan feels should exist between the law as 
applied by the judiciary and the way in which society is evolving. The role of 
the judge is to assess whether society ready to be legally regulated or not and 
then to absorb that within legal system by applying legal categories to the 
relationships. 
By coming down in favour of the duty of care, both judges are setting the 
scene for legal rather than pragmatic argument. That is argument about 
62 1932 SC (HL) 31 at p 70 
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principle and relationships rather than cause and effect. In doing so Donoghue 
solved the question of how to limit the culpa principle by coming down in 
favour of duty of care and relationships similar to the way England had. In 
tort, duty of care became the founding principle in negligence cases. This then 
became the principle around which new legitimate arguments could be 
explored. This has led to an explosion of cases, five of which, all dealing with 
pure economic loss are considered here. 
3. Pure economic loss 
Despite the shift to a relationship-based principle, negligence has tended to 
ground itself in physical links between people and to restrict loss to physical 
consequences: 
The duty of care only extends to physical injuries to the pursuer or 
damage to the pursuer's property caused by the defective product. The 
damage must be done to property other than the defective product itself. 
For example, if a defective vacuum cleaner explodes and burns the 
pursuer or burns the pursuer's carpet, there is Donoghue v Stevenson 
liability. But if the defective vacuum simply does not work or it 
explodes and does not injure the pursuer or does not damage any other 
property of the pursuer there is no Donoghue v Stevenson liability. 
Why? In these circumstance, the pursuer has suffered only pure 
economic loss, ie the cost of repairing the vacuum cleaner or the 
difference in value between a defective or non-defective cleaner. The 
courts have consistently refused to allow the pursuer to recover 
compensation in delict for such losses. Instead, the pursuer must resort 
to the law of contract to obtain compensation .... (Thomson 1999,95) 
There has been a reluctance to go beyond the physical results of actions which 
could be easily absorbed into legal terms and the judiciary have required an 
extra justification to do so. As Thomson points out: 
Although reasonable foreseeability of pure economIC loss is not 
sufficient for the imposition of a duty of care, the courts have, in certain 
situations, been prepared to hold that a duty of care does exist. 
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However, there must be factors in addition to reasonable foreseeability 
of pure economic loss, which demonstrates that there is a sufficient 
degree of proximity between the parties for a duty of care to be inferred. 
(1999, 79)63 
This is why pure economic loss is an interesting area. It is not enough that the 
reasonable forseeable results of my actions might lead to such loss. In 
considering proximity judges have continually to consider what relationships 
deserve legal recognition. 
One of the first significant cases was Hedley Byrne v Heller. 64 The question 
in Hedley Byrne was whether negligent misrepresentation could give rise to 
liability. In this case an agency had placed orders with a company for a third 
party. The agency was liable for the orders and asked their bankers to check 
the company. The bank wrongly and negligently gave good references and 
when the company failed the agency was liable to the principal. The agency 
sued their bankers for the loss which was described as purely economic. 
One of the main authorities against the agency was the English case of Derry 
v Peak 65 which asserted that negligent statements could not give rise to 
liability but Derry v Peak had been limited by Nocton v Ashburton.66 As Lord 
Reid in Hedley Byrne said: 
It must now be taken that Derry v Peak did not establish any universal 
rule that in the absence of contract an innocent but negligent 
misrepresentation cannot give rise to an action .... it was shown in this 
House in Nocton v Lord Ashburton that this is too much widely stated. 
We cannot, therefore, now accept as accurate the numerous statements 
to that effect in cases between 1859 and 1914, and we must now 
63 Thomson (1999,69-109) sees duty of care as a 'threshold device'. A way of allowing judges 
to limit liability by using policy considerations. This view, and others, of duty of care is 
discussed byK Norrie (1996b 157-169) 
64 [1964] AC 465, [1964] 2 All ER 575, HL. 
65 (1889) 14 App Cass 337. 
66 [1914] AC 932 
Malloch V.A. 2002 Judicial decision-making in the common law 202 
determine the extent of the exceptions to that rule.67 
The situation in Hedley Byrne was declared to be such an exception. The 
House held that there was a special relationship between the parties. This 
relationship was sufficient to find that they were in proximity and that, 
therefore, the agents were reasonable in relying on the bankers statement and 
that the bankers had a duty of care not to make those statements negligently. 
In doing so the judges made use of Donoghue, Lord Devlin chose not to 
follow the facts of the decision but to use its methodology: 
... for a general conception cannot be applied to pieces of paper in the 
same way as to manufacturers .... The real value of Donoghue v 
Stevenson to the argument in this case is that it shows how the law can 
be developed to solve particular problems.68 
Lord Pearce's reasoning is similar but he prefers Lord Macmillan's contextual 
reasoning and is clearer about the need for judges to consider how law relates 
to society in deciding which relationships to recognise: 
How wide the sphere of the duty of care in negligence is to be drawn 
depends ultimately upon the courts' assessment of the demands of 
society for protection from the carelessness of others. Economic 
protection has lagged behind protection in physical matters where there 
is injury to person and property. It may be that the size and width of the 
range of possible claims has acted as a deterrent to the extension of 
economic protection.69 
According to this view the role of the judge is to assess whether society would 
regard it as unfair if the law did not recognise certain relationships. It is not 
clear how the judge would assess the social view. Anns made this point more 
explicit. 
In Anns, the local authority defending the case had approved the design for 
67 [1964] AC 465 at p 484 
68 supra at p 525 
69 supra at pp 536-537 
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the foundations of a building. These later proved defective. The House of 
Lords decided that the local authority was liable to the owners of the house 
even though there had been no other damage to any other object or to a 
person. The most frequently cited and criticised passage from the decision 
focuses on the reasoning used. It was delivered by Lord Wilberforce: 
Through the trilogy of cases in this House - Donoghue v Stevenson 
[1932] A. C. 562, Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. 
[1964] AC 465, and Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. v. Home Office [1970] AC 
1004, the position has now been reached that in order to establish that a 
duty of care arises in particular situation, it is not necessary to bring the 
facts of that situation within those of previous situations in which a duty 
of care has been held to exist. Rather the questions has to be 
approached in two stages. First one has to ask whether, as between the 
alleged wrongdoer and the person who has suffered damage there is a 
sufficient relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the 
reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part may be 
likely to cause damage to the latter - in which case a prima facie duty of 
care arises. Secondly, if the first question is answered affirmatively, it is 
necessary to consider whether there are any considerations which ought 
to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of 
person to whom it is owed or the damages to which a breach of duty of 
it may arise.70 
This was to prove a remarkably unpersuasive statement. In particular Lord 
Wilberforce was attacked for confusing the limiting principle which should 
have been proximity by restricting this to reasonable foreseeability and 
expanding the political role of the judiciary. Little that he actually said though 
could be criticised if compared for example to Lord Macmillan in Donoghue, 
where Macmillan links duty of care to reasonable foreseeability and refers to 
the need for law to be socially aware. This though was in cases of physical 
injury where proximity and reasonable foreseeability would logically have 
been very close. In cases of economic loss there was less obvious justification 
70 [1978] AC 728 at p 752 
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for law to intervene and perhaps, therefore, an underlying need to be more 
cautious about proximity.7l In Hedley Byrne the judge was to be responsible 
for assessing whether society was ready for this relationship to be classified as 
legal but Anns went further, the relationship was already recognised by the 
physical act and then the judge would consider whether it was fair to 
recognise it. This may seem a pedantic difference but it means that the legal 
classification becomes automatic and judges are left concentrating on policy 
and this they can no longer hide behind a discussion of legal classifications.72 
The discomfort this generated can be seen in Murphy which overruled this 
decision but before this there is one more case to consider Junior Books. 
In Junior Books, the pursuer was a company which owned a new factory. The 
company was seeking reparation for a floor that had been laid badly. The 
floor had been laid by a nominated sub-contractor. Thus, although the pursuer 
knew who was laying the floor, there was no direct contract between the 
company and the defendants. There were no averments that the floor was 
dangerous. The loss was, therefore, economic. The cost to the company was 
the cost of repair or replacement. The court held that the sub-contractors were 
liable to the pursuer. On the facts, this appears uncontroversial. It was 
reasonably foreseeable that if the sub-contractor's laid the floor badly that the 
pursuers would be disadvantaged. In the absence of any damage to other 
property or immediate danger the special relationship test comes into play and 
the relationship can be easily established by the link of contracts.73 Indeed it 
is clearly stated that proximity was accepted and not in issue. This meant that 
the judges were left to consider whether the damages were such as to be 
covered. This would seem to be fairly uncontroversial, this, though, was not 
how the decision was regarded. Instead, critics focused on the perceived 
71 Peter Cane (2000) argues that negligence is not rooted in the intention of the actor (as in 
criminal mens rea) but rather judges have focused on the victim and this has led to the 
discussion of whether it would be inequitable to compensate and then how to justify. 
72 Howarth (1995) sees a similar problem in The Wagon Mound No 1. (Overseas Tankships v 
Morts Dock and Engineering Co. Ltd. [1961] AC 388, [1961] 1 All ER 404.) In that 
case, Howarth argues the remoteness and directness test was lost raising the spectre of 
infinite liability and that this was the source for the reaction against principled reasoning. 
73 This follows Thomson's (1999) analysis. 
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dangers of extending liability to goods which though badly manufactured do 
not present a danger to property or person. The dangers were that if no such 
boundary existed that there would be no way to logically stop legal liability 
spreading into more and more areas. The obvious fear behind this being that 
law itself would therefore be brought into disrepute. 
Part of the problem came from Lord Wilberforce's two stage tests in Anns, 
which was explicitly referred to as persuasive in Junior Books and although 
Junior Books can be seen in a different light this led to it being viewed as 
infected with the same perceived fault. Reasonable foreseeability is easily 
passed in this case. As proximity and reasonably foreseeability had become 
combined, proximity was not considered.74 Instead, the limiting factor was 
what the judiciary often define as policy - the view of the community.75 Two 
of the judges saw no reason for restricting the duty of care. Lord Brandon did 
and in his decision lays the ground for the reaction against Anns and Junior 
Books. Lord Brandon follows Lord Wilberforce's two stage test closely but he 
does so in order to undermine it by showing that its methodology takes the 
law into dangerous areas. Notably, he was very clear about the policy 
considerations that informed his choice to dissent: 
To that second question I would answer that there are two important 
considerations which ought to limit the scope of the duty of care which 
it is common ground was owed by the defenders to the pursuers on the 
assumed facts of the present case. 
The first consideration is that, in Donoghue v Stevenson itself and in all 
the numerous cases in which the principle of that decision has been 
applied to different but analogous factual situations, it has always been 
either stated expressly, or taken for granted, that an essential ingredient 
in the cause of action relied on was the existence of danger, or the threat 
74 This seems to be a reversal of the initial process and establishes duty through proximity. The 
limitation is reasonable foreseeability of the damage. 
75 Such reasoning will be discussed in more detail below. 
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of danger, of physical damage to persons or their property, excluding for 
this purpose the very piece of property from the defective condition of 
which such danger, or threat of danger, arises. To dispense with that 
essential ingredient in a cause of action of the kind concerned in the 
present case would, in my view, involve a radical departure from long-
established authority. 
The second consideration is that there is no sound policy reason for 
substituting the wider scope of the duty of care put forward for the 
pursuers for the more restricted scope of such duty put forward by the 
76 pursuers .... 
The first consideration is not strictly a policy reason but rather a desire to 
restrict law and is based on a clear view of the role of the judge. There is a 
strong underlying desire to limit what could be perceived as judicial law 
making. In concentrating on authority rather than principle law will only 
evolve in steps rather than grand leaps and the policy consideration, although 
dealt with, is largely rejected. In concentrating on authority and analogy Lord 
Brandon is seeking to remind judges that their power is limited, that they need 
to justify their reasons and that the way judges should justify their reasons is 
by appeal to precedent. This restricts what an individual judge can do but 
embeds new decisions in a tradition. This has the advantage of hiding the way 
in which judges inevitably consider the relationship between law and society 
in such areas in questions of classification and categorisation. Although the 
result is similar this differs from early English attitudes to law as it is no 
longer a question of access to a space where judge's dispense a delegated 
authority but an awareness that the judiciary might not be the best place to 
openly define the legal meaning of relationships in the face of a political 
alternative. This contrasts sharply with Lord Atkin's desire to organise the 
law around scientific principles which sees the law as an area which creates 
meaning which should be clear and easy to see. 
76 1982 SC (HL) 244 at pp 281-282. 
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In the decade following Junior Books. Lord Brandon was to be at the head of 
the judicial shift which led to case-based reasoning becoming dominant. 
There are probably a number of social reasons for this shift. Internally, there 
was a lack of a clear justification of these relationships and the judiciary 
sought to justify any change in the law by embedding it in tradition rather 
than being seen to be involved in social engineering of any kind. From a 
broader view the market-centred 1980s favoured a caveat emptor approach 
rather than a protectionist one. The fear of American-style litigation may also 
have been a factor but the generational change in the judiciary may also have 
been significant. 77 New judges may well have instinctively sought a different 
path from their predecessors in order to stamp their own personalities on the 
law. Two cases show this new approach, Caparo v Dickman78 and Murphy v 
Brentwood District Council. 79 
In Caparo the criticism of previous decisions was on two fronts. The first, put 
forward by Lords Bridge, Oliver and Jauncey, dealt with the identification of 
foreseeability with proximity. All three judges agreed that these should be 
kept separate: 
The relationship of proximity '" is not one which is created solely by 
the foreseeability of harm resulting from carelessness in the statement, 
but is one in which some further ingredient importing proximity is 
present. 80 
Interestingly, the test in Caparo has been understood in two ways reflecting 
the difference between the two methodologies. Some commentators 
describing Caparo as introducing a three-stage test which expanded the first 
part of Lord Wilberforce's two-stage test so that foreseeability and proximity 
become separate tests that both needed to be passed before liability could be 
77 There may also have been a reflection of changed attitudes towards reason and scientific 
principles since Donoghue. 
78 [1990] 2 AC 605, [1990] 1 All ER 568 
79 [1991] 1 AC 398, [1990] 2 All ER 908 
80 [1990] 2 AC 605 at p 655 per Lord Jauncey 
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established.81 This reestablishes a principled form of reasoning. But the other 
criticism in the decision was of the principled approach itself and this is how 
most people have viewed Caparo. Lords Bridge, Roskill and Oliver all argued 
that there had been a move within recent cases back to such an approach and 
that this was a necessary corrective: 
My noble and learned friends have traced the evolution of the decisions 
from Anns v Merton London Borough [1977] 2 All ER 492, [1978] AC 
728 until and including the most recent decisions of your Lordships' 
House in Smith v Eric S Bush (afirm), Harris v Wyre Forest DC [1989] 
2 All ER 514, [1989] 2 WLR 790. I agree with your Lordship that it has 
now to be accepted that there is no simple formula or touchstone to 
which recourse can be had in order to provide in every case a ready 
answer to the questions whether, given certain facts, the law will or will 
not impose liability for negligence or, in cases where such liability can 
be shown to exist, determine the extent of such liability. Phrases such as 
'foreseeability', 'proximity', 'neighbourhood', 'just and reasonable', 
'fairness', 'voluntary acceptance of risk' or 'voluntary assumption of 
responsibility' will be found used from time to time in the different 
cases. But, as your Lordships have said, such phrases are not precise 
definitions. At best they are but labels or phrases descriptive of the very 
different factual situations which can exist in particular cases and which 
must be carefully examined in each cases before it can be pragmatically 
determined whether a duty of care exists and, if so, what is the scope 
and extent of that duty. If this conclusion involves a return to the 
traditional categorisation of cases as pointing to the existence and scope 
of any duty of care, as my noble and learned friend Lord Bridge, 
suggests, I think this is infinitely preferable to recourse to somewhat 
wide generalisations which leave their practical application matters of 
difficulty and uncertainty.82 
81 This has been particularly true of the Scottish courts (See Brodie 1997 for a full analysis of 
this position). 
82 [1990] 2 AC 605 at P 628 per Lord Roskill. 
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The return to a desire to control law is clearly present in this passage and 
brings to mind the talmudic idea of the need for a fence around law to protect 
it. It could be arguable that the judges are aware that this works both ways, 
society needs to be protected from a law escaping its bounds and intruding in 
all relationships but equally if law and particularly judge made law is seen to 
be too radical it risks undermining the institution itself. 
After Caparo it was clear that Anns was under a sustained attack and eight 
years after Junior Books and several cases in which Anns was debated, 
distinguished and criticised,83 Anns was overruled in Murphy v Brentwood 
District Council. 84 If Anns was the highpoint of expansion, then Murphy was 
the highpoint of the reaction. The main criticism of Anns had been of its 
reasoning. It was felt that it had laid down too broad a principle and that it led 
to dangerous results. Murphy espoused a different approach: 
As regards the ingredients necessary to establish such a duty in novel 
situations. I consider that an incremental approach on the lines indicated 
by Brennan J in the Sutherland Shire Council case is to be preferred to 
the two-stage test. 85 
Brennan's view of reasoning had been referred to positively in a number of 
cases in which Anns had been criticised and distinguished.86 Its use in Murphy 
gave it even more support. Brennan did not set out his approach in detail. It is 
as much a critique of the use of policy in decision-making as a distinctive 
method: 
It is preferable in my view, that the law should develop novel categories 
83 See Governors of the Peabody Donation Fund v Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co Ltd [1984] 3 
All ER 529, 1985 AC 210. Leigh & Sillavan Ltd v Aliahnon Shipping Co Ltd [1986] 2 
All ER 145, [1986] AC 785. Curran v Northern Ireland Co-ownership Housing 
Association (Stewart, third party) [1987] 2 All ER 13, [1987] AC 718. Yuen Kun-yeu v 
A-G of Hong Kong [1987] 2 All ER 705, [1988] AC 175. Hill v Chief Constable of West 
Yorkshire. [1988] 2 All ER238, [1989] AC 53. 
84 [1991] 1 AC 398, [1990] 2 All ER 908 
85 [1991] 1 AC 398 at p 461 
86 See Caparo Industries pic v Dichnan [1990] AC 605 at p 618 per Lord Bridge, Curran v 
Northern Ireland Co-ownership Housing Association (Stewart, third party) [1987] AC 
718 at p 726 per Lord Bridge, Yuen Kun-yeu v A-G of Hong Kong [1988] AC 175 at p 
191 per Lord Keith. 
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of negligence incrementally and by analogy with established categories, 
rather than by a massive extension of a prima facie duty of care 
restrained only by indefmable "considerations which ought to be 
negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of 
person to whom it is owed". 87 
Brennan is allying his views strongly to a core legal value, the need to provide 
certainty. It is this that allows people to use law in their daily affairs. He is 
arguing that principled reasoning does not provide for such certainty. In some 
ways he almost seeks a return to the pre-Donoghue law. Legal reasoning is 
based on examples with pre-established factual categories and certainly does 
not seek to understand the broader social relationships behind the categories 
but to restrict the speed with which law can respond. It portrays a more 
cautious role for the judiciary. 
4. Conclusion 
In looking at negligence, the unintended consequences of actions, the 
judiciary have, over centuries, tried to adapt to changing attitudes towards law 
and changes within society generally. This task is not though unproblematic. 
Judges not only have to consider changing attitudes but how they can justify 
their recognition of those attitudes. In particular, in deciding how far pure 
economic loss should be recognised legally, the judiciary have been led to 
consider their own role and the way they should relationships in society. Two 
dominant methodologies have emerged, principled and case-based reasoning. 
These reflect historical differences in the two jurisdictions which interact in 
this area but also different views about where the limitations, the boundaries 
of law should be drawn. These reflect attitudes towards the judicial role and 
the next section shows how looking at these two methodologies and the 
persuasive strategies involved within them helps to reveal the emotional and 
personal commitment of the judiciary to the law. 
87 The Counsel of the Shire of Sutherland v Heyman & another. (1985) 157 CLR 424 at p 481 
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Principled and case-based reasoning 
The last section showed how the law evolved and how in the five pure 
economic loss cases being considered these two methodologies were used to 
justify judicial reasoning. Although the phrase principled reasoning suggests 
that previous case law is ignored the doctrine of precedent ensures that the 
judiciary must take into account previous decisions and the distinction 
between the two is more subtle and relates to how previous decisions should 
be used. The choice made between these methodologies deals with how the 
judiciary relate to the material which they must take into account and the 
examples they use and, therefore, following Aristotle, the character they 
portray. 
1. Judicial definitions. 
In Donoghue, Lord Atkin describes how principled reasoning is based on a 
belief that there must be some logic to the law: 
And yet the duty which is common to all the cases where liability is 
established must logically be based upon some element common to the 
cases where it is found to exist. 88 
The advantage of finding this logical element is that it can then be applied to 
future cases, as Lord Fraser puts it in Junior Books: 
If and when such other cases arise they will have to be decided by 
appealing sound principles to their particular facts. 89 
Principled reasoners seek to find a principle in previous case law that can be 
reused. In Hedley Byrne Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest follows this procedure, 
first looking at previous authorities, then setting out a general principle and 
finally stating: 
881932 SC (HL) 31 at p 44 
89 1982 SC (HL) 244 at p 265 
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I do not propose to examine the facts of particular situations or the facts 
of recently decided cases in the light of this analysis but I proceed to 
apply it to the facts of the case now under review. 90 
According to these statements, principled reasoning is dependant on finding a 
ratio that has been applied in a number of situations and therefore can found a 
general authoritative principle. Once this principle has been established future 
judges can use this rather than examining previous decisions. This can be 
seen in the case of Donoghue which is seen as founding a general principle 
and earlier cases are rarely considered. Lord Devlin describes this as almost 
an organic and natural process: 
What Lord Atkin did was to use his general conception to open up a 
category of cases giving rise to a special duty. It was already clear that 
the law recognised the existence of such a duty in the category of 
articles that were dangerous in themselves. What Donoghue v. 
Stevenson did may be described either as the widening of an old 
category or as the creation of a new and similar one. The general 
conception can be used to produce other categories in the same way. An 
existing category grows as instances of its application multiply until the 
time comes when its cell divides.91 
It should be noted that these categorisations are general rather than universal 
and do not stray far from the requirements of precedent. They provide a 
structure within which arguments can be placed and examined to see if they 
fit. In this view of legal development the role of the judge is to set out these 
logical categories and to decide when a new one has or should be created. The 
judge is responsible for developing a rational and logical structure.92 
Case-based reasomng IS often portrayed as being in direct conflict to 
principled reasoning and in many judicial pronouncements which have 
90 [1964] AC 465 at p 503. 
91 [1964] AC 465 at pp 524-525. 
92 This supports MacConnick's view set out in chapter 2 that such structures support the rule 
oflaw and are therefore ethical. 
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supported this style of reasoning, approval has been given to the words of 
Brennan in The Council of the Shire of Sutherland v Heyman & another: 
It is preferable, in my view, that the law should develop novel 
categories of negligence incrementally and by analogy with established 
categories, rather than a massive extension of a prima facie duty of care 
restrained only be indefinable «considerations which ought to negative, 
or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of person to 
whom it is owed. ,,93 
Brennan is describing a form of reasoning that, like principled reasoning, 
starts with previous cases and at first sight seems very similar. This can be 
explained by the dominance of the doctrine of precedent which ensures that 
categories and classifications remain at the core of what is persuasive.94 The 
difference lies in the way that these categories and classifications are created. 
This can be seen in a section from Lord Bridge's judgement in Caparo, where 
he describes how he will put the analogical method into practice: 
Consistently with the traditional approach it is to these authorities and 
to subsequent decisions directly relevant to this relatively narrow comer 
of the field that we should look to determine the essential 
characteristics of a situation giving rise, independently of any 
contractual or fiduciary relationship, to a duty of care owed by one party 
to another to ensure that the accuracy of any statement which the one 
party makes and on which the other party may forseeably rely to his 
economic detriment. 95 
From this it would appear that the main difference between the forms of 
reasoning is that judges perform the task of finding a generalisation in every 
case in case-based reasoning and do not need to do so in principled. Case-
based reasoners use the cases cited before them to find examples that are used 
93 (1985) 157 CLR424 at p 481 
94 If a case is too narrow then it will be distinguished on its facts if too broad it will not found a 
precedent being seen as obiter and distinguished accordingly. 
95 [1990] 2 AC 605 at p 619 
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to find "characteristics" that are essential and apply these direct to the case. 
They do not seek to state this generalisation in such a way that it can found a 
new category. This structure is founded not on the sense of law of a structure 
but of law as authority. Previous cases show not some logical principle being 
developed but the application of authority. This is a form of commentary and 
reflects a sense of law as traditional rather than logical. 
The implications of choosing between these two forms can be seen in 
Donoghue where there was a direct conflict between judges on this point, 
Lord Buckmaster preferred a case-based approach, although he admitted the 
limited presence of principle: 
The law applicable is the common law, and, although its principles are 
capable of application to meet new conditions not contemplated when 
the law was laid down, these principles cannot be changed nor can 
additions be made to them because any particular meritorious case 
seems outside their ambit. Now, the common law must be sought in law 
books by writers of authority, and in judgements of the judges entrusted 
with its administration. The law books give no assistance, because the 
work of living authors, however deservedly eminent, cannot be used as 
authority, although the opinions they express may demand attention and 
the ancient books do not assist. I tum, therefore, to the decided cases to 
see if they can be construed so as to support the appellant's case.96 
This is a more rigid version of case-based reasoning than would generally be 
accepted today but it does show the link between this and tradition and 
authority. In making this statement it is also clear that he has a very strong 
view of his own role which is to apply authority. 
The following extracts all come from Lord Buckmaster's speech in Donoghue 
and show how he deals with earlier cases: 
One of the earliest is the case of Langbridge v. Levy. It is a case often 
96 1932 SC (HL) 31 at p 35 
Malloch VA 2002 Judicial decision-making in the common law 215 
quoted and variously explained. ... [Facts of case summarised.] .... 
How far it is from the present case can be seen from the judgement of 
Parke, B., who, in delivering the judgement of the Court, used these 
words (at p 531 of 2. M & W.): " We should pause before we made a 
precedent by our decision which would be an authority for an action 
against the vendors, even of such instruments and articles as are 
dangerous in themselves, at the suit of any person whomsoever into 
those hands they might happen to pass, and should be injured thereby." 
The case of Winterbottom v Wright is, on the other hand, an authority 
that is closely applicable. Owing to negligence in the construction of a 
carriage it broke down, and a stranger to the manufacture and sale 
sought to recover damages for injuries which he alleged were due to 
negligence in the work, and it was held that he had no cause of action 
wither in tort or arising out of contract. This case seems to me to show 
that the manufacturer of any article is not liable to a third party injured 
by negligent construction, for there can be nothing in the construction of 
a coach to lace it in a special category. It may be noted, also, that in this 
case Alderson, B., said (at p 115) : - "The only safe rule is to confine the 
right to recover to those who enter into the contract ; if we go one step 
beyond that, there is no reason why we should not go fifty.,,97 
In these extracts, Lord Buckmaster is following a standard pattern. The facts 
are described and distinguished and the reasoning backed up with a statement 
of the judge from the prior case which shows the possible consequences of 
the decision. It is not surprising that a judge who sees his role as following 
authority should take such a syllogistic approach which from the study of 
MacCormick reveals an ethical commitment to the rule of law. 
Lord Macmillan's decision is more complex. He starts by setting out the facts 
of the case before him and its procedural history. There then follows two very 
different sections. The first which he refers to as "preliminary observations", 
97 supra at p 35 
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could also be split into two subsidiary parts. The first deals with the "mouse 
cases" and uses passages from the individual judgments of the judges to 
undermine its authority, to make it appear a decision that is problematic. He 
also uses the reliance on English authority in those cases to justify his 
concentration on English rather than Scottish authorities. This section is 
clearly dealing with arguments that he feels could undermine the authority of 
his decisions and he is preparing a rebuttal. The second part consists of a 
general consideration of the relationship between privity of contract and 
negligence, few cases are quoted and it almost feels like a textbook or 
academic discussion in that it is "reasonable" - looking for general reasons for 
distinctions. This suggests that he believes such arguments are not only 
persuasive in a legal context but that it is important for a judge and a decision 
to appear to be reasonable in this sense. The second section of the decision is 
where the case law is contained. Lord Macmillan starts by setting out his 
approach: 
... I tum to the series of English cases which is said to compose the 
consistent body of authority on which we are asked to nonsuit the 
appellant. It will be found that in most of them the facts were very 
different from the facts of the present case, and did not give rise to the 
special relationship, and consequent duty, which, in my opinion is the 
starting point here.,,98 
Lord Macmillan then considers a senes of cases, these are approached 
chronologically and in most he follows Lord Buckmaster's pattern of a 
description of facts and then principles. This shows the dominance not only of 
precedent but of a rule of law ethic that lies within the concept of precedent. 99 
It is not surprising that in a system where precedent ensures that authority is 
grounded in previous cases that judges who also see reason as an important 
factor still use this syllogistic structure. Even here though there are 
differences, he concentrates more than Buckmaster on what the judges said in 
98 supra at p 65 
99 As judges tend to use the form rather than the strict deductive logic of the syllogism this 
could be seen as the use of enthymemes (see chapter 3 above). 
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those decisions rather than the facts for example in considering Heaven v 
Pender concentrates on the dicta of Brett MR. Having established none of 
these apply, he returns to general principles which he sets out in some detail 
before applying them to the circumstances of the case. 
It is in this latter section that one would expect to find the main distinctions 
between Lord Macmillan's and Lord Buckmaster's, yet in applying the 
principle he does use a practical example, not of a previous case but of a 
hypothetical situation of a baker to show the reasonableness of his decision: 
Suppose that a baker, through carelessness, allows a large quantity of 
arsenic to be mixed with a batch of his bread, with the result that those 
who subsequently eat it are poisoned, could he be heard to say that he 
owed no duty to the consumers of his bread to take care that it was free 
from poison, and that, as he did not know that any poison had got into 
it, his only liability was for breach of warranty under his contract of sale 
to those who actually bought the poisoned bread from him?lOo 
Indeed Lord Macmillan appeals to the reasonableness of the consequences of 
his decision and the irrationality of the alternative as a central justification. 
I am happy to think that in their relation to the practical problem of 
every day life which this appeal presents, the legal systems of the two 
countries are in no way at variance, and that the principles of both alike 
are sufficiently consonant with justice and common sense to admit of 
the claim which the appellant seeks to establish. lOi 
This parallels Lord Buckmasters approval of the "floodgate doctrine", both 
judges are then looking at the facts of previous cases and seeking to apply and 
justify their decision making primarily in terms of consequences which are or 
are not reasonable. There are significant differences in some of their 
100 1932 SC (HL) 31 at p 71. 
101 supra at pp 71-72. 
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approach102 but this does suggest that the source of what they find persuasive 
comes at least in part from how well it justifies the reasonable result. 
If I were asked what is the most potent influence upon a court in 
formulating a statement of legal principle, I would answer that in the 
generality of instances it is the desired result in the particular case 
before the court. (Goff 1984, 183) 
This could be seen to be a cynical statement where judges rationalise their 
opinions but as seen earlier103 such rationalisations are a way in which 
individuals can understand values and socially are a way of encouraging 
others to act appropriately. It shall be argued that the values this 
rationalisation supports are linked to the sense of the judicial role held by 
each individual judge, whether they feel bound by authority or are seeking to 
apply justice - concepts which link well to these two forms of reasoning. The 
sections that follow look at these themes in more detail, the first looks at the 
consequences that concern the judiciary and which cluster around the 
floodgates argument. This relates strongly to a sense of the relationship 
between law and society and the character of law but in the way these 
arguments relate to judicial role also help to foster a sense of individual 
identity. 
2. Law and society 
A central issue in the cases explored here is the difference between economic 
and physical loss, the relationship between this and what judges find 
persuasive can be seen if the decision of Lord Keith in Murphy is contrasted 
with that of Lord Devlin in Hedley Byrne. Lord Keith strongly supported the 
view that these should be treated differently: 
It being recognised that the nature of the loss held to be recoverable in 
Anns was pure economic loss, the next point for examination is whether 
the avoidance of loss of that nature fell within the scope of any duty of 
102 Notably in Lord Macmillan's adoption of a more academic style. 
103 Chapter 3 
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care owed to the plaintiffs by the local authority. On the basis of the law 
as it stood at the time of the decision the answer to that question must 
be in the negative. 104 
because to allow such a right: 
would open an exceedingly wide field of claims, involving the 
introduction of something in the nature of a transmissible warranty of 
quality. 105 
What is interesting in this passages, is what Lord Keith finds persuasive about 
the consequences that he identifies. He is persuaded by the danger of "an 
exceedingly wide field of claims." It is this consequence that is most 
persuasive and suggests that he feels there is a need to protect society from 
the law. 
Compare this rhetoric with Lord Devlin in Hedley Byrne, who feels the 
distinction is unjustifiable: 
The interposition of the physical injury is said to make a difference of 
principle. I can find neither logic nor common sense in this. . .. I am 
bound to say, my Lords, that I think this to be nonsense. It is not the sort 
of nonsense that can arise even in the best system of law out of the need 
to draw nice distinctions between borderline cases. It arises, if it is the 
law, simply out of a refusal to make sense .. The line is not drawn on any 
intelligible principle. 106 
The arguments that persuade Lord Devlin centre around the use of logic and 
principle. He finds the distinction simply "a refusal to make sense." The 
power of logic is enough for him to consider overruling earlier authority. But 
it is not simply logic alone that persuades Lord Devlin: 
As well as being defective in the sense that it would leave a man 
without a remedy where he ought to have one, it would also be 
104 [1991] 1 AC 398 at p468 
105 supra at p 469 
106 [1964] AC 465 at p 517 
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profoundly illogical. 107 
Logic linked to a sense of the unjustness of the decision that would result is 
what persuades Lord Devlin. The desire for law to be logical is thus linked to 
a sense in which this is the way to apply it to society. Lord Keith, on the other 
hand, feels the persuasive force of authority more than Lord Devlin and is 
also persuaded by arguments that stress the potential danger of unlimited 
liability. There is thus a real difference, expressed through their use of 
language, between what these two judges find persuasive. This difference is 
one that is not just related to the facts of the case but reveals more general 
attitudes about legal reasoning. 
The differences between what judges found persuaSIve tended to cluster 
around the issue of unlimited liability or the floodgates argument. This 
argument dominates delict. It is present in all the cases in one form or 
another. It has not always been seen as positive. McManus feels that it has 
had a particularly negative effect on the way the courts have handled the issue 
of 'nervous shock': 
As far as so-called "secondary" victims of nervous shock are concerned, 
the Atkinian foreseeability test has been refined in effect, almost 
beyond recognition, by judges superimposing arbitrary limits to the rule 
in order to whittle down the potential number of claimants. (McManus 
1996, 159) 
The classic statement on unlimited liability, quoted in the last chapter, comes 
from Winterbottom v Wright: 
The only safe rule is to confine the right to those who enter into the 
contract: if we go one step beyond that, there is no reason why we 
should not go fifty. 108 
This fear, that reason would compel judges into making decisions that would 
expand the law to irrational levels if they take that one first step, is the core of 
107 supra at p 516 
108 184210 M&W 109 at p 115 
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the argument. 109 It is so persuasive that it distorted the development of tort 
and delict for decades following this decision. It was the main argument 
against introducing principle into delict and, even after Donoghue did 
introduce principle, it retained its persuasive force. Consider these two 
passages, which are separated in time by nearly sixty years. First Lord 
Buckmaster from 1932: 
If such a duty exists, it seems to me it must cover the construction of 
every article, and I cannot see any reason why it should not apply to the 
construction of a house. If one step, why not fifty? Yet if a house be, as 
it sometimes is, negligently built, and in consequence of that negligence 
the ceiling falls and injuries the occupier or anyone else, no action 
against the builder exists, according to the English law, although I 
believe such a right did exist according to the laws of Babylon. 110 
Now Lord Jauncey from 1990: 
If it were to stand as good law there is no logical reason why it should 
not extend to defective chattels, thereby opening the door to a mass of 
product liability claims which the law has not previously entertained. III 
There are stylistic differences between these two passages. Lord Buckmaster 
is much more assertive. This can be attributed to the passage of time. The 
underlying argument is, though, exactly the same. 
The consistency with which the unlimited liability argument appears suggests 
that it is of great significance to delict. As Lord Fraser in Junior Books puts it: 
.... the concern which has been repeatedly expressed by judges in the 
United Kingdom and elsewhere, that the effect of relaxing strict 
limitations upon the area of liability for delict (tort) would be, in the 
words of Cardozo J., to introduce "liability in an indeterminate amount 
for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." This is the 
floodgates argument, if I may use the expression as a convenient 
109 The fear of infinite regress and its importance in law is described in more detail in chapter 5 
below. 
110 1932 SC (lll.,) 31 at p 43 
111 Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398 at p 498. 
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description, and not in any dismissive or question-begging sense. The 
argument appears to me unattractive, especially if it leads, as I think it 
would be in this case, to drawing an arbitrary an illogical line just 
because a line has to be drawn somewhere. But it has to be considered, 
because it has had a significant influence ... 112 
Lord Fraser is not persuaded by the floodgates argument but he has to 
consider it. 113 This shows how powerful this argument can be and how the 
sense of law as something dangerous which led to the privity of contract rule 
still dominates this are of law. It does not, though, stand alone. There are 
other arguments that reoccur throughout the cases. Some of these tend to be 
used by those who support the unlimited liability argument and others by 
those who reject it. These create two distinct persuasive strategies. 
In particular, those who are persuaded by the unlimited liability argument are 
very open about the use of policy in law and its limitations. Lord Keith in 
Murphy again: 
So far as policy considerations are concerned, it is no doubt the case 
that extending the scope of the tort of negligence may tend to inhibit 
carelessness and improve standards of manufacture and construction. 
On the other hand overkill may present its own dangers. ... There is 
much to be said for the view that in what is essentially a consumer 
protection field, ... the precise extent and limits of the liabilities which 
in the public interest should be imposed on builders and local 
authorities are best left to the legislature. I 14 
The presentation of the judicial role in this passage is repeated by a number of 
judges who are also persuaded by the unlimited liability argument. It is not 
surprising that those who hold this view also tend to support case-based 
reasoning. The incremental development that case-based reasoning claims is 
112 1982 SC (HL) 244 at p 264 
113 It is the nature of dominant arguments that even those who oppose them need to work 
within their structures. See the Neusner quote with which this thesis began p 1 above. 
114 [1991] 1 AC 398 at p 472. 
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attractive to the cautious nature of the decision-making of these judges. They 
are keenly aware of the importance of authority and in seeking to move one 
step at a time they are re-establishing the relationship between law and 
society in every decision. 
If those who are persuaded by unlimited liability are persuaded by other 
related arguments, this is also true of those who are not persuaded by this 
argument. 
In looking at Lord Devlin's decision in Hedley Byrne, two arguments were 
identified as persuasive. One was the "justice" argument. This rests on the 
need to provide remedies where there is felt to have been an injustice. Unlike 
the group of judges identified earlier, who feel the need for a strong argument 
before they will consider expanding the law, Lord Devlin wants a good reason 
for not providing a remedy. The other argument that Lord Devlin appeals to is 
the need for logic in the law. This positive attitude towards logic is in direct 
contrast with those who support the unlimited liability argument and are 
afraid of logic leading to illogical extremes. Principled reasoners make more 
assumptions about law and society. They assume that reason is good and that 
logic and justice can establish the relationship between law and society 
without the need to constantly refer to authority. 
Thus, there is a clear distinction between the way judges approach arguments 
about consequences and policy and this links to the different methodologies 
adopted. The unlimited liability argument is linked to a distrust of principle. 
Those who support principled-reasoning are sceptical of line drawing and 
classification which is closer to case-based reasoning. Thus, there seems to be 
a link between the methodology explicitly chosen and what the judge finds 
persuasive. The principled group is persuaded by logic and reason, by 
arguments about justice. They admire the structure of principles. The case-
based group is afraid of the generality of principles and seek refuge in 
classifications which they feel they can control. The choice made between 
these two methodologies relate to the examples that they feel are persuasive 
Malloch VA 2002 Judicial decision-making in the common law 224 
but also to the language which they use and it is here that the most emotive 
language is used. 115 This suggests that it is to these arguments that the 
judiciary are most committed and these are linked to their views of judicial 
role. 
It is notable that it is in reasons centred around this most emotive of 
arguments and the persuasive strategies that are related to it and that include 
more abstract issues of methodology that the real differences are seen 
between individuals. As shall be seen these emotive arguments remain 
individual and this may be because they reflect a very deep sense of the role 
of law in society that will be closely linked to the judge's view of their own 
judicial role and thus be closely linked to their own identity. 
3. Judicial role 
Arguments related to judicial role can not only be extracted from the 
decisions but are made explicitly. The link between these arguments and the 
relationship between law and society can be seen in Murphy where an attitude 
towards role was the main persuasive argument. Lord Mackay puts it this 
way: 
For this House in its judicial capacity to create a large new area of 
responsibility on local authorities in respect of defective buildings 
would in my opinion not be a proper exercise of judicial power. 116 
Lord Bridge: 
It is pre-eminently for the legislature to decide whether these policy 
reasons should be accepted as sufficient .... 117 
Lord Oliver: 
115 Language such as "just" 1982 SC (HL) 244 at p 271 per Lord Roskill; "absurd" [1964] AC 
465 at p 516 per Lord Devlin; "capricious" [1991] AC 398 at p 457 per Lord Mackay 
and the use of such phrases as Lord Salmon's " the innocents who suffer from it 
[negligence]" [1978] AC 738 at p 767. Negligence itself is of course an emotive term 
with connotations of blame and wrongdoing. 
116 [1991] 1 AC 398 at p 457. 
117 supra at p 482. 
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... I do not, for my part, think that it is right for the courts not simply to 
expand existing principles but to create large new principles in order to 
fulfil a social need in an area of consumer protection which has already 
been perceived by the legislature, but for which, presumably advisedly, 
it has not thought it necessary to provide. II8 
Lord J auncey: 
Parliament is far better equipped than the courts to take policy decisions 
in the field of consumer protection. 1 19 
Though all make variations on the theme, these judges clearly have similar 
views about the judicial role and how that relates to the legislative role. There 
is no clear "opposing" view to this description of the judicial role. 120 Judges 
who do not find the unlimited liability argument persuasive do not talk about 
judicial role. It could be argued that in their preference for arguments 
involving logic and justice that a sense of judicial role could be extracted and 
Lord Devlin is perhaps the prime example of this: 
This is why the distinction is now said to depend on whether financial 
loss is caused through physical injury or whether it is caused directly. 
The interposition of the physical injury is said to make a difference of 
principle. I can find neither logic nor common sense than this .... [Devlin 
gives a practical example which he feels shows this absurdity] I am 
bound to say, my Lords, that I think this to be nonsense. It is not the sort 
of nonsense that can arise even in the best system of law out of the need 
to draw nice distinctions between borderline cases. It arises, if it is the 
law, simply out of a refusal to make sense. The line is not drawn on any 
intelligible principle. I21 
Lord Devlin clearly sees it as a core role of the judge the need to be logical 
and use common sense: "no system of law can be workable if it has not got 
118 supra at p 492. 
119 supra at p 498. 
120 The attitude towards Parliament would be accepted generally by almost all judges. 
121 [1964] AC 465 at p 517. 
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logic at the root of it". 122 Law is a hierarchy and a structure. It is also just and 
it is this aspect of logic that principled reasoners often focus on. Amongst a 
number of case-based reasoners in Murphy Lord Mackay of Clashfem 
manages to find a principled approach to the decision: 
the result of applying these qualifications to different factual 
circumstances is to require distinctions to be made which have no 
justification on any reasonable principle and can only be described as 
capricious. It cannot be right for this House to leave the law in that 
state. 123 
Judges do not though apply persuasive strategies and methodologies rigidly. 
They can be mixed and it is here that it is possible to see how the individual 
retains their commitment to a view of judicial role even when at first sight his 
choice of methodology appears at odds with this. 
A good example of this is Lord Brandon's dissent in Junior Books. 124 He 
explicitly uses principled reasoning. So do the other judges in this case and it 
is clearly the dominant form. Yet, closer analysis of Lord Brandon's decision 
shows that he also finds persuasive arguments that would normally be 
associated with case-based reasoning - he is worried about unlimited liability 
and seeks to follow authority. 
Lord Brandon starts by identifying the principle he will follow. He begins 
with Donoghue but settles on Lord Wilberforce and bases his decision on the 
two-stage principle in Anns: 
My Lords, in support of their contentions the pursuers placed reliance 
on the broad statements relating to liability in negligence contained in 
the speech of Lord Wilberforce in Anns v Merton London borough 
Council (supra) at pp. 751-2. Lord Wilberforce there said: - "Through 
122 supra at p 516. 
123 [1991] AC 398 at p 497. 
124 1982 SC (HL) 244 at pp 278-283 
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the trilogy of cases in this House - Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 
562, Hedley Byrne & Co. td v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465, 
and Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd V Home Office [1970] AC 1004 - the 
position has now been reached that in order to establish that a duty of 
care arises in a particular situation, it is not necessary to bring the facts 
of that situation within those of previous situations in which a duty of 
care has been held to exist. Rather the question has to be approached in 
two stages. First, one has to ask whether, as between the alleged 
wrongdoer and the person who has suffered damage there is a sufficient 
relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable 
contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part may be likely to 
cause damage to the latter - in which case a prima facie duty of care 
arises. Secondly, if the first question is answered affirmatively, it is 
necessary to consider whether there are any considerations which ought 
to negative or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class or 
person to whom it is owed or the damages to which a breach of it may 
give rise ... ,,125 
Lord Brandon answers the first question positively: 
That first question having been answered in the affirmative, however, it 
is necessary, according to the views expressed by Lord Wilberforce ... 
whether there are any considerations which ought, inter alia, to limit the 
scope of duty which exists. 126 
In answering the second question, though, he answers in the negative and it is 
this that he uses to justify his dissent. He starts thus: 
To that second question I would answer that there are two important 
considerations which ought to limit the scope of the duty of care, 127 
These considerations are authority and the danger of unlimited liability. As he 
puts it: 
The first consideration is that in Donoghue v Stevenson itself and in all 
125 supra at p 281. 
126 supra at p 281. 
127 supra at p 28 L 
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the numerous cases to which the principle of that decision has been 
applied ... , it has always been either stated expressly, ... that an 
essential ingredient in a the cause of action relied on was the existence 
of danger.... To dispense with that essential ingredient in a cause of 
action of the kind concerned in the present case would, in my view, 
involve a radical departure from long-established authority. 
The second consideration is that there is no sound policy reason for 
substituting the wider scope of the duty of care put forward for the 
pursuers for the more restricted scope of such duty put forward by the 
defenders ..... 
It is, I think, just worth while to consider the difficulties which would 
arise if the wider scope of the duty of care put forward by the pursuers 
were accepted. . ... 
This illustrates with especial force the inherent difficulty of seeking to 
impose what are really contractual obligations by unprecedented and, as 
I think, wholly undesirable extensions of the existing law of delict. 128 
In Junior Books, where he gives a dissenting decision, he refers to few cases 
and applies Lord Wilberforce two-stage test. 129 By contrast, in Leigh and 
Sillavan Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping Co. Ltd,130 where he gives the leading 
decision, he places facts at the core of his decision and follows a form of 
reasoning much closer to Lord Buckmaster's style in Donoghue. From this, it 
could be argued that, in choice of methodology, Lord Brandon is more aware 
of the importance of the views of others and that the arguments that he finds 
consistently persuasive are the ones that reflect his own view of his role. Lord 
Mackay's decision in Murphy echoes this though it does so in a different way. 
128 supra at p 283. 
129 supra at pp 278-283 
130 [1986] AC 785, [1986] 2 All ER 145, 
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In Murphy he argues for the narrow view of the judicial role which is the most 
common persuasive argument in that case and yet he does so because the law 
is not found in principle in this area, there is no principled justification. 131 
Thus although he accepts the dominance of the legislature he sees the role of 
the judge to apply principles and this is at odds with his fellow judges who 
seek to limit the judge to the application of authority. 
These Law Lords are not being inconsistent. They are responding to a basic 
requirement of legal reasoning, the need to persuade others. The biggest 
influence on the style of reasoning used and the choice of the dominant 
persuasive argument appears to be the attitudes of the other judges deciding 
on the same case. 
At appeal level, judges do not decide alone. At the level of the House of 
Lords, the authority given to their decisions means that they are also deciding 
for future cases. They need to persuade others that their decision-making is 
rational and reasonable. The process of persuasion can be seen in the texts 
and is the result of a longer process that occurs behind the scenes.132 
Between the hearing and the final decision, there is discussion between the 
judges. The details of this are not made public, but traces of it are left in the 
final decision. There is often consensus between judges as to what are the 
important points of the case. The similarity in matters of style, number of 
cases cited, the place of facts, and language used can be striking and notably 
in Lord Brandon's case, choice of methodology which is dependant not only 
on what the individual judge believes is appropriate but on what s/he believes 
will be accepted by the judges around him/her. Lord Diplock has suggested 
that: 
. .. the way in which Courts in fact adapt themselves to the changing 
131 See quote above p 226 
132 See the discussion above of the possible influence on Lord Macmillan's decision in 
Donoghue of discussions with Lord Atkin. 
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pattern of society is influenced less by conscious intention than by the 
training, practice and habits of though of the legal profession as a 
whole. (Paterson 1982,32) 
This relates to the sense of character of law and yet when these judges are 
looked at in more detail their sense of the role of the law is consistent. This 
identity may sit better with one persuasive strategy than another but what 
really persuades these judges individually is their view of the relationship 
between law and society. In containing more than one view the legal system 
allows judges to ally themselves with alternative views of law and society. 
The way the judges relate to such arguments is linked to which form of 
reasoning they prefer. When we look at the unlimited liability argument, we 
can see that attitudes towards it and its persuasive force clearly split the 
decisions into two groups. 
This model can be used to explain how judges come to the same decision but 
for different reasons. Compare these two passages from different decisions in 
Junior Books. Both were for the respondents, first Lord Roski11: 
I think today that the proper control lies not in asking whether the 
proper remedy should lie in contract or instead in delict or tort, not in a 
somewhat capricious judicial determination whether a particular case 
falls on one side of the line or the other, not in somewhat artificial 
distinctions between physical and economic or financial loss when the 
two sometimes go together and sometimes do not - it is sometimes 
overlooked that virtually all damage including physical damage is in 
one sense financial or economic for it is compensated by an award of 
damages - but in the first instance establishing the relevant principles 
and then in deciding whether the particular case falls within or without 
those principles. I33 
and Lord Keith: 
Having thus reached a conclusion in favour of the respondents upon the 
133 1982 SC (HL) 244 at p 276 
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somewhat narrow ground which I have indicated, I do not consider this 
to be an appropriate case for seeking to advance the frontiers of the law 
of negligence upon the lines favoured by your Lordships. There are a 
number of reasons why such an extension would, in my view, be wrong 
in principle .... So to hold would raise very difficult and delicate issues 
of principle having a wide potential application .... To introduce a 
general liability covering such situations would be disruptive of 
commercial practice, .... The policy considerations which would be 
involved in introducing such a state of affairs appear to me to be such as 
a court of law cannot properly assess, and the question whether or not it 
would be in the interests of commerce and the public generally is, in my 
view, much better left to the legislature. 134 
Although Lord Keith and Lord Roskill come to the same conclusion, they are 
persuaded by very different arguments. Lord Roskill is influenced by principle 
and logic. He is wary of making illogical distinctions. Lord Keith is persuaded 
by the unlimited liability argument. He also refers to policy arguments. Thus, 
although Lords Roskill and Keith superficially appear to be on the same side, 
the arguments that they find persuasive puts them in different camps and 
leads them to prefer different methodologies which relate to the relationship 
between law and society. 
This distinction can generate conflict but in doing so generates loyalty. They 
have a view to which they are committed and one of the reasons for this 
commitment may be that this is not a universal view but one that they have to 
argue for. In making them generate reasons the law encourages commitment 
by making the judges choose sides this commitment is deepened and linked to 
the way they see themselves as well as the law. 
3.1 Judges outside the courtroom 
Throughout this study, the focus has been on the decision as legal artefact. 
134 supra at p 269 
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The attitude of the judges has predominantly been taken from the law reports. 
There are though other ways in which the attitudes of the judges could have 
been explored. Alan Paterson in his influential work the Law Lords, 
interviewed a number of senior judges. (Paterson 1982) Some senior Judges 
have written about their attitudes to judging. 135 
Detailed study of these sources are outside the scope of this thesis. However, 
it is worthwhile to note that a brief consideration of them reveals similar 
conclusions to those reached by this study of the decision itself. 
Paterson has concentrated on the affects of judicial role perception and 
highlights the importance of the audience as perceived by the judge. His 
conclusions support the contention made here that judges are most influenced 
by those people they are immediately concerned with persuading, the other 
judges in the court. Paterson does also make the point that the individual 
personalities of the judges will affect how they respond in hard cases and this 
is strongly linked to their sense of role or identity: 
The Law Lords' responses to role conflict, although along lines 
predicted from other fields of research, depend in part on their 
personalities. Thus when justice and certainty conflict, some Law Lords, 
for example Lords Diplock, Pearce, Salmon and Denning, consider that 
they have a tendency to favour flexibility and justice, others, for 
example Lords Cross, Guest, Pearson and Upjohn have admitted to a 
tendency in the opposite direction, while the bulk of the remainder 
endeavour to strike a balance between the two expectations. (1982, 199) 
The law allows space for different personalities to exist and it is likely that 
these personalities and views of law are useful to legitimating the role. They 
encourage strong stances and seek to ensure that judges will not respond to 
135 There is a growing literature in this area. Atkin (1925; 1932), Denning (1979), Goff(1984), 
Devlin (1976; 1978) McLuskey (1987) and Reid (1972) are only a few of the judges who 
have written about the judicial process from a variety of angles. 
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personal bias but to a strong sense of their role. In looking at the material 
produced by judges who have written or lectured on the judicial decision and 
role, it should be remembered that they are still aiming to persuade others that 
their views are correct. They are doing so, though, before a different audience 
and in these situations, their style is generally more personal, they do not need 
to justify their opinions with reference to earlier cases but much of their views 
remain the same. Lord Atkin is a good example of this. As has been shown, 
his earlier speeches to the Society of the Public Teachers of Law, (Atkin 
1925; 1932) echo his decision in Donoghue v Stevenson. Lord Reid also gave 
a lecture to the Society of the Public Teachers of Law, in which he argued 
that in approaching a decision in the common law: 
We should, I think, have regard to common sense, legal principle and 
public policy in that order. We are here to serve the public, the common 
ordinary reasonable man. He has no great faith in theories and he is 
quite right. What he wants and will appreciate is an explanation in 
simple terms which he can understand. (1972, 25) 
Lord Reid is quite fond of the reasonable man. 136 He is mentioned twice in 
quick succession in Hedley Byrne. 137 Indeed, the decision that Lord Reid 
presents in Hedley Byrne fits with his description of how decisions ought to 
be made. He starts with the common sense argument and then considers the 
law: 
A reasonable man, knowing that he was being trusted or that his skill 
and judgement were being relied on, would, I think, have three courses 
open to him ... 
[Lord Reid describes three reasonable responses] 
If that is right, then it must follow that Candler v Crane, Christmas & 
136 The reasonable man has an interesting pedigree. As can be seen above, p 199, Lord 
Macmillan, like Lord Reid finds its use problematic but in a recent decision in the Inner 
House in Scotland it was this subject rather than the floodgates argument which 
generated the most emotional responses. Lord Morrison clearly feeling that Lord 
Prosser's use of this model was a way of introducing subjective moral views which would 
undermine the impartial position of law. (see McLelland v Greater Glasgow Health 
Board 2001 SL T 446 especially pp 453 and 458) 
137 [1964] AC (HL) at p 486-487. 
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Co. was wrongly decided.138 
The decision being decided at this stage, there is no need to tum to the third 
part of policy. 
The statements that judges make outside court either in interview or in public 
statements are consistent with the arguments that they make in court. This 
suggests that they regard at least some of the arguments that they use in court, 
usually the ones relating to the place of law in the world and choice of 
methodology, as persuasive outside the field of the decision. In particular 
what is most persuasive are those arguments which reflect their view of their 
own role, of their identity as ajudge. 
4. Conclusion 
This section has demonstrated the ways in which different methodologies and 
persuasive strategies reveal different attitudes towards the place of law in 
society. The link between these arguments and judicial role and a sense of 
individual identity explains why judges are committed to these values and 
seek to explore them through their decisions. 
In the Talmud contradictory views were allowed the status of truth. This 
allowed those whose views were not accepted as having practical significance 
to feel that they had nevertheless become part of the tradition. It also allowed 
a greater pool of material for later generations to use. In the common law 
contradictory views are also allowed to stand and the judiciary have generated 
contradictory views of the legal process and the relationship between law and 
society. These views are both capable of describing the common law and 
could even be seen as complimentary. Law is both an historical, traditional 
structure and a logical structure and the choice that judges make between 
seeing law as the exercise of justice or authority in society relates to their own 
sense of self and how they feel about the role of law. In doing so, law does 
138 supra at p 486-487. 
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not tear itself apart, both of these views of its place in society can be linked to 
underlying values of consistency and the rule of law to which all judges 
would subscribe but the existence of this conflict means that judges have to 
make a choice and therefore declare a commitment to law. 
Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
The first chapter concluded with a quote from Kimberley Curtis describing 
Arendt's vision of judgment. This saw judgment as paradoxical, an emotional 
experience as a result of which the person was both convinced they were right 
and compelled to tell others but did so in a form which suggested a lack of 
belief - persuasion. This thesis set out to try and unravel the aspects of 
judicial decision-making which leads judges to feel convinced that they are 
right in their application of law but requires them to justify that assertion by 
arguments which legitimate and justify that decision. This chapter concludes 
this study by considering not only the relationship between judgment and 
persuasIon but also that between persuasion and philosophy before 
concluding by arguing that using judgment as a paradigm for all 
understanding is highly problematic. In doing so it seeks not only to return to 
the main themes of the thesis but to understand more fully the ethical choice 
made in undertaking either philosophy or judgment. 
The fust section looks at persuaSIOn as philosophy through Neusner's 
identification of the Talmud as philosophy. This defines philosophy as a pure 
form of persuasion where everything is questionable including the identity of 
the questioner. 
The second section looks at judgment and shows why the role of authority 
means that despite some similarities to philosophy the two remain essentially 
different as the role of judgment is not to question but confirm. 
The final section begins by arguing that this analysis explains more clearly 
why legal theorists have had difficulty expressing the role of the person in 
judgment. It, and this thesis concludes by arguing that, although it may seem a 
logical result of the position set out in this chapter, judgment should not be 
used as a model for understanding. 
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In chapter 2 it was argued that the three theorists presented had difficulty 
understanding the emotional commitment of a judge to hislher role. In part 
this was because they were seeking to produce philosophically acceptable 
arguments and were using the person of the judge to deal with gaps in their 
theoretical structures but it also related to a problem that philosophy in 
general had both with understanding the individual and with its own 
foundations. This problem made it difficult for them to understand judgment 
and, in particular, aspects of judgment such as authority and the role of 
character and identity. This section starts by looking at another attempt to 
understand judgment not only by philosophy but as philosophy. Jacob 
Neusner, whose interpretation of the Talmud was used in chapter 3, sees a 
strong link between the two. It will be argued here that this argument reveals 
less about judgment than it does about philosophy. His argument does though 
allow the form and structure of philosophy to be set out more clearly and 
therefore the problems that undertaking any philosophical analysis entails. 
1. The goal of philosophy 
Jacob Neusner has argued that there is considerable congruity between 
Classical Greek philosophy and the Talmud. (Neusner 1997) His argument is 
based on his identification of the Talmud as predominantly a work of 
philosophy and, in doing so, he expresses a view both about the goal of 
judgment and the nature of philosophy. In describing the Talmud he states: 
This is a book about how in concrete detail great principles of Western 
philosophical thought were brought to concrete realisation, through 
applied reason and practical logic. (Neusner 1997, 1) 
This sees the Talmud as a work about the application of principles. The 
Talmud does deal in detail with the application of laws and is a model 
teaching people how to judge and make persuasive judgments but Neusner is 
not concerned with the details of its debates but rather with the attitudes that 
underlie them. He says of the talmudic scholars: 
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Specifically, they took the static, systematic exchange of proposition 
and counter-proposition, argument and refutation, and turned it into a 
dynamic, sometimes meandering sequence of propositions, lacking the 
neatness of the received, neat exchange of positions and reasons for 
those positions. For what marks the Bavli's mode of dialectics is the 
power of an argument to change course, the possibility of re-framing a 
position altogether in direct response to a powerful counter-argument 
(1997, 15)1 
Philosophy is not being identified with a form of argument or even with the 
application of principles to fact per se. Instead it is an attitude that is 
Neusner's core concern and an attitude that is about accepting the power of 
argument and debate. This can be seen in what Neusner describes as the three 
key ways in which a philosophical argument can be identified: 
1) Every allegation is tested by a counter-proposition.2 
2) The range of possible moves from the original argument are 
explored. 
3) It is set forth in such a way that the reader can understand the thought 
processes of the participants and reconstruct the argument 
These all place the argument rather than the answer to the argument at the 
heart of philosophy. They also define what sort of argument is acceptable and, 
by concentrating on the logical aspects of the argument, describe it as an 
argument which is not about the power of language but the power of ideas 
expressed through language. Indeed, if implemented, these three statements 
would limit the language that would be acceptable in a philosophical debate. 
They are founded on an aim to clarify and to make the steps in the argument 
clear. There is a desire for purity of form here that could be at odds with a 
desire to win the argument and Neusner accepts that despite the highly 
combative nature of the first statement the goal is not to win: 
Specifically, the goal of all argument is to show in discrete detail, the 
1 Bavli is a term used to denote the Babylonian Talmud. 
2 The implications of taking the opposite view will be discussed below. 
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ultimate unity, harmony, proportion and perfection of the law - not of 
the Mishnah as a document but of all the law of the same standing as 
that presented by the Mishnah.(l997, 140) 
On this view of philosophy, an individual argues and seeks to do so in a 
rigorous fashion to establish the harmony, proportion and perfection of the 
object to which he is committed. This suggests that philosophy is interested in 
the aesthetics of argument and persuasive arguments are those which not only 
explain but do so in a specific form. This desire to uncover, to make clear and 
to explain may suggest a deep seated need in human beings to understand and 
to represent that understanding in an aesthetically pleasing manner. 3 
Whatever the source, this commitment to harmony and perfection is one that 
can be seen in legal theorists and supports the view that they are essentially 
producing philosophical arguments. The legal theorists in chapter 2 all 
showed a strong preference for presentations of law which were structural and 
unified. Even Jackson who criticises positivism for its unified structures seeks 
to replace it with his own. Dworkin's mythical Hercules is perhaps the best 
known theoretical embodiment of this desire and one which clearly sees this 
particularly as the goal of the judiciary. (Dworkin 1986) Dworkin accepts that 
this is unobtainable given the constraints on the judiciary but this does not 
mean this is insignificant. The goal is significant not because it is achievable 
but because of the process that it encourages.4 Certainly any practical 
difficulties would not exclude such a philosophical goal from at least 
informing legal argument and it could be argued that those who supported 
principled reasoning certainly seems to have such a goal and to seek to see 
law displaying a character which is logical and rational. This would suggest 
3 This is not an overriding goal and it could be argued humans also show a desire for chaos 
and irrationality. 
4 Madry and Richeimer have criticised Dworkin for having "'mistakenly collapsed the two 
distinct practices, that of the philosopher describing judicial practice and that of the judge 
adjudicating a case". (1998, 228) The view of philosophy presented here supports this 
critique and indeed Hercules embodies the role of a legal theorist that MacCormick 
argues for in his ethical reinterpretation of his own work. 
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judges and philosophers have similar roles and goals. 
Aristotle though felt that even when similar methodologies are used the 
context could be enough to generate two different forms of study and when 
one considers the persuasive strategies of philosophers it is possible to see in 
more detail the character of philosophy and how it relates to the identity of 
philosophers. This actually shows that though the power of a harmonious 
argument may be used by both philosophers and judges it is in their roles and 
context where the differences emerge. 
2. Philosophy as question 
In describing philosophy, Neusner describes a very general approach which 
can apply to any situation where an argument is used and requires an attitude 
rather than a professional practice but this approach can be seen in particular 
strategies used when presenting a philosophical theory. First philosophers 
have to demonstrate there are problems with past theories and with the 
structure of knowledge. This demonstrates that there is a space where they 
can enter. They then seek to generate solutions to show that they have the 
right to define that space, these solutions tend to be structural and involve 
categorisation and classification. The strength of the solution is shown by its 
ability to clarify and solve a whole range of problems. There is no false 
modesty in these goals - the space they define they define completely from the 
foundations up. Indeed there is not only a strong tendency but in their need to 
answer all possible refutations a need to make theories of everything. 
The way in which they seek to answer all possible objections and the way 
they start the process by attacking previous theorists suggests that 
philosophers are not operating in a place where everything is sayable as 
suggested in chapter 1 - rather it is a space where everything is questionable.5 
Aristotle defined the question as the heart of dialectic and he was well aware 
5 Gadamer describes the hermeneutic priority of the question (1994,362). 
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of its combative nature. His caution may be seen as similar to Perelman's, 
entering this space means being open and allowing all of one's arguments to 
be questioned and this should only be done when the other(s) present are in a 
certain relationship of respect. 
This relationship means that as well as being questioned the philosopher is 
aware that slhe will be heard. Other philosophers will listen and attempt to 
understand their solutions. They will be taken seriously. It is the promise not 
only of being able to understand all but of being capable of communicating 
that knowledge and therefore of convincing others that is the lure of 
philosophy. It suggests that a single individual could understand and explain 
everything. It places power in the hands of an individual. Indeed, the 
individual can even dictate the standards by which s/he will be judged. This 
can be seen in Perelman's description of the two audiences which are central 
to philosophy - the audience of all reasonable beings and self-evidence. There 
is a close link between these two, they are both created by the individual who 
seeks to persuade. The individual defines the standards by which s/he will be 
judged. As a result they will be the first aspect of any theory that will be 
questioned. In this way Jackson criticised MacCormick for failing to 
understand the ethical commitment in his description of the syllogism 
although MacCormick had claimed he wished to describe law without such 
ethical commitment. 
Philosophy is founded on the understanding of individual philosophers. They 
generate the solutions and take part in the process of debate and questioning. 
It is they who are always seeking to find better solutions and which keeps it 
looking ever forward, tearing up its foundations as it goes. For all the goal of 
philosophy may be to explain all and to communicate that purely, its 
methodology of constant questioning and its corresponding goal to find the 
arguments which can withstand all questions has led it to become concerned 
with its foundations. In the last century this has led to a focus on a possible 
achilles heel - the inevitable limitations of the individual. In questioning the 
individual philosophy has come to its ultimate foundation and thus reveals 
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itself as pure persuasion - pure debate - but also as incapable of achieving its 
own goals. 
3. Philosophy as persuasion 
Today, the first question a philosopher must ask is "who am IT', s/he needs to 
understand his/her point of view and the prejudices and limitations this 
imposes.6 Jackson grounds truth in an individual and it is demonstrated by the 
individual defining where s/he stands and what sort of character s/he seeks to 
display by a rigorous application of self-reflection and self-awareness. Truth 
here is a process which is displayed not in the harmony and perfection of 
argument in truth but in the honesty of a person. The person who would have 
ultimate integrity would be completely free of the limitations of their point of 
view as they would understand them perfectly but such an individual is as 
mythical as Dworkin's Hercules who could create the perfect structures to 
explain the law. This individual is important though because s/he would 
display the character of someone who has absorbed the central point of 
philosophy who debates with themselves and would express philosophy 
through their sense of identity. S/he would be the paradigm philosopher. 7 
Perelman saw the audience of oneself as similar to philosophy in that it was 
an area where one sought to convince but this argument take this further and 
sees this conviction as the foundation of philosophy. Aristotle argued that 
debate was at its purest when the individual who had to decide would be 
affected by the result and Jackson's academic of integrity would, if the 
6 Gadamer puts it this way: "My real concern was and is philosophic: not what we do or what 
we ought to do, but what happens to us over and above our wanting and doing." (1994 
xxviii) 
7 If a mythical comparison is required this would be a Solomon rather than a Hercules. 
Hercules shows his strength of intellect in creating the perfect constructive interpretation. 
For this structure to be convincing in a world where the individual is now suspect it 
would to be completed by one who, like Solomon could absorb the viewpoint of others 
and found the structure ethically. Solomon is famed for his skill in judgment and 
philosophy has turned to judgment for a solution to this problem. The relationship 
between philosophy and judgment will be considered below. It should be noted that 
Dworkin also accepts that the role of the individual is problematic when he tries to refute 
suggestions that Hercules would be a tyrant (1986,399) 
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process was taken to its limit, implicate his/her own identity in the process of 
questioning. Perhaps the best way to describe the nature of the pure form of 
persuasion that results can be seen with a parable of a similar problem in 
ethics. In Arthur Koestler's book 'Arrival and Departure' (1969), the main 
character, Peter, writes a short story, "The Last Judgement" (179 - 184) 
Meanwhile the trial of the fIrst defendant had begun. He stood facing 
the Court, a lean ascetic man with a stoop. 
'How do you doT asked the Judge in a terrible voice, which echoed 
throughout the dome. 
'Humbly, my Lord,' said the defendant. But his voice was thin, it 
collapsed in the air without resounding and fell with broken wings on 
the marble slab before his feet 
'Bad echo,' roared the Judge. 'However, proceed.' 
'He has sacrificed his fortune to help the poor,' said Counsel for the 
Defence. His face resembled the defendant's, but there was more fat on 
his body and more righteousness in his voice. 
'On what did you dine tonightT roared the Judge. 
'On a glass of milk and a crust of bread, my Lord,' said the defendant 
The prosecutor rose. He too resembled the defendant, but he loked even 
more haggard and his voice was like a lash. 
'A child starved in China while he guzzled his milk and bread,' he 
shouted. 
'Condemned!' roared the Judge; and the audience echoed III awe-
stricken voices: 
'Condemned, condemned. ' 
The next defendant was a jovial, guileless man with a paunch. He 
advanced beaming all over his face, and as he advanced, the opposing 
Counsel changed in appearance; they again both resembled the accused, 
only the Defender looked even more guileless and had a bigger paunch. 
'On what did you dine tonightT roared the Judge. 
'Well, my Lord,' said the defendant, 'we thought we might start on 
some fresh salmon, this being the season, and a bottle of hock, to keep 
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it swimming and cool.' 
<Enough,' roared the Judge. <What has the defence to say?' 
'He has a blessed digestion,' the Defender nodded earnestly, crossing 
his hands on his belly. < And what is the charge, anyway?' 
The Judge turned towards the prosecution; but the Prosecutor's seat was 
empty. 
'Acquitted in the absence of a charge,' he roared; and the audience 
repeated joyously: 
'Acquitted, acquitted.' (Koestler 1969, 180 - 181) 
Koestler's story was written as a direct response to relativism and sought to 
try and explain why some people could still feel bound when there was no 
longer a rational justification for submitting to ethics. It can though serve as a 
model for the problem philosophers face. If they accept that their role is to be 
open to questions and the rigour of others they cannot seek to impose their 
standards on those others. They are walking into an arena where like the "thin 
man" they are pre-judged. Philosophers though seek to present arguments of 
everything in this arena, they construct not only themselves but their 
audience, they are open to all questions and in their structures they even 
suggest what arguments can be used against them, by what standards they 
should be judged. Philosophy is a commitment less to a result than to a 
process. Debate and argument, the ability to rigorously question is placed 
above all else. 
In the last century this has led them to focus on the individual with the result 
that they must also question themselves and, in doing so, risk destroying their 
own discipline or as Emmanuel Levinas has put it in: 
the modem world; noone is identical to himself; nothing gets said for no 
word has its own meaning; all speech is a magical whisper; noone 
listens to what you say; everyone suspects behind your words a not-said, 
a conditioning, an ideology.(Levinas 1990, 152) 
It is a paradox that if everything is questioned noone is listening. In this pure 
form of persuasion where first a philosopher need to persuade himlherself that 
Malloch VA 2002 Conclusion 245 
hislher own identity can withstand questioning but the contextual limitations 
mean that this will be impossible, slhe will always be doomed to fail. Slhe 
will not be able to communicate that conviction and all of the structures she 
wishes others to accept as convincing will be based on an unstable 
foundation. If this pure form of persuasion is always doomed to failure 
because it is rooted in the character of an individual who creates the standards 
by which that character is judged and these standards are always suspect it 
could be argued that philosophy is a futile enterprise. Yet unlike other 
attempts to provide theories of everything such as science or religion, 
philosophy does have an underlying ethical principle that is expressed in the 
way it places the individual human and a human in all hislher limitations at its 
core. Philosophy cannot explain everything because it only ever has one point 
of view but its desire to place this point of view in a public arena where it can 
be dignified as a possible explanation of everything and questioned as if it 
were of supreme importance is a supremely ethical one.8 
There is also the abundant fact that philosophers do the impossible on a daily 
basis and like Steiner's translator the rigorous logic which declares its 
enterprise impossible does not stop the process occurring in fact Steiner was 
though wrong to say that this impossibility has no empirical consequences. 
The goal of philosophy to provide the ultimate unquestionable structure that 
lies beneath its constant process of debate and questioning should not obscure 
the fact that philosophical tools and methodologies, the process of 
clarification, categorisation and classification have been useful not only in 
philosophies exploration of its own foundations but have been used in other 
spheres of knowledge. Further it is this commitment to pure persuasion, to the 
power of argument alone and above all else that give philosophy its character 
and that differentiates it most strongly from judgment which seeks not to 
question but to confirm. 
g Camus's reinterpretation of the myth of Sisyphus which seeS in the King condemned to a task 
which is unachievable parallels this description of philosophy as a task aimed at the 
impossible. Camus concludes by stating: "The struggle itself towards the heights is 
enough to fill a man's heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy." (2000, Ill) 
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In chapter two all three theorists recognised that authority was at the heart of 
judicial decision-making which is perhaps the paradigm of judgment. The 
role of authority in judgment can be contrasted with the role of authority in 
philosophy. Philosophy seeks not to found authority externally but to create 
the pure argument whose authority is held within itself and which can be 
easily communicated to the audience of all reasonable beings. By contrast, 
judgment seeks not only to use authority but can only exist when there is a 
certain amount of authority whether it be social, political or legal to enforce 
that judgment or at least to increase its persuasive power beyond that of the 
pure argument. This is because judgment is vulnerable to the power of 
argument, as although judges have authority they do not have absolute 
authority and this is seen by the way they express their judgments - in the 
giving of reasons: 
... providing a reason invites evaluation of said reason and opens room 
for disagreement and dissent. In contrast, issuing a decree without 
reason means that the decree rests solely upon the authority of the 
issuer; if that authority is recognized, then those addressed by the decree 
have no opportunity (or reason) to question what has been demanded by 
then. (Kraemer 1996, 25). 
To be effective, judgment must at some point stop the questioning. In doing 
so those who judge must seek to find ways to stop the endless circularity of 
questioning that occurs in pure persuasion. There are a number of possibly 
strategies, legal systems for example are almost always founded on the use of 
state power. The Talmud which did not have this option used a combination 
of education and social pressure to reinforce its standards and assumptions to 
embed them in the subconscious where they could be safe. Curtis, using 
Arendt's structures, describes a process where an appeal to commonsense is 
made. Like all attempts at persuasion this could become circular but unlike 
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self-evidence, or the audience of all reasonable beings commonsense IS 
embedded in a real community and this is what stops the infinite regress. 
There are concrete others who can choose to accept or not and this stops the 
questioning. Much of philosophy in practice is a process of judgment with 
accepted social and intellectual practices exemplified by those who undertake 
philosophy as a profession. 
In practice what this means is that judgment is not so much a form of 
persuasion but an attempt to use its power, the process of debate, while 
protecting its foundations from the ability of argument when pure process to 
undermine itself. A judge to be successful cannot question his role qua judge, 
s/he somewhere to stand a point of view that is acceptable not universally but 
at least generally. In recognising that dialectic and rhetoric could use the 
similar tools while being very different Aristotle was making a related point. 
He also pointed out that the rarified arguments in a process where one allows 
an other to question all of one's assumptions can only take place following a 
certain amount of training and an acceptance of a certain relationship. In a 
public arena such arguments would simply not be heard. 9 
There are numerous situations where certain matters are designated as not 
open to question and the first sign of judicial authority is their ability to 
decide what and whom to listen to. The common law contains a variety of 
practices which limit what the judge has to or can hear. S/he is limited to the 
arguments and authorities put forward by the parties to the case. S/he has to 
take into account previous case law. There is a hierarchy of courts that binds 
him or her. These limitations protect the foundations of the judge's authority 
by designating certain matters as beyond question. Just as philosophy's 
ultimate lack of limitations defines its sphere. Judgment is defined by its 
limitations. 
9 This does not mean that they will have no impact. Relativism could be seen as having 
evolved first in philosophical sphere and gradually affecting public speech. It is only 
though when the language has entered this sphere and is part of common sense that such 
issues would be listened to in this context. 
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2. Authority and limitations 
It may seem paradoxical that in seeking to avoid the dangers of persuasion, 
judgment uses argument and language as its primary tools. In the common 
law there is the ultimate power of the judge to use the state to enforce the 
decision and which always defines law as not a matter of choice.1O This 
ultimate sanction is at its clearest in criminal law where society readily 
accepts the legitimacy of such power but is hidden in civil law where 
sanctions are generally financial and need to be pursued by individuals. It 
chooses to hide this power in order to appear above the mechanism which 
justifies the use of this power in a democracy - politics. Harlow, in a recent 
lecture reported in the Independent has argued that if the law were to be seen 
to be political that would undermine it: 
The judicial process is valued for different qualities. It is formal, its 
conclusions are reached through a method of reasoned proof based on 
arguments submitted by the parties to an independent and impartial 
judge. Its objective being primarily the protection of legal interests, it is 
appropriate for access to be limited to those who can show such an 
interest That is, of course, a stereotype. I suggest however, that, if we 
move too far away from the stereotype, we may end by stultifying it If 
we allow the campaigning style of politics to invade the legal process, 
we may end up by undermining the very qualities of certainty, finality 
and independence for which the legal process is esteemed, thereby 
undercutting its legitimacy.(1ndependent 13 June 2001) 
In democracies, law which is imposed by non-elected judges cannot use the 
methods of justification that are used to support the state and therefore the 
state use of power. The legal system is self-conscious in that it is based in 
public acceptance, particularly in a democracy, but seeks to hide this 
10 Cover puts it this way: "On one level judge may appear to be, and may in fact be, offering 
their understanding of the normative world to their intended audience but on another 
level they are engaging a violent mechanism through which a substantial part of their 
audience loses its capacity to think and act anonymously." (1986, 1615). 
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dependence to ensure that it retains a sense of power. Judges therefore need to 
use strategies to provide legitimacy in a different manner. One of the ways 
they do so is to make clear that they are not political. They portray law as 
impartial and consistent, and not subject to the vagaries of public opinion. 
Law is blind not just to protect those who come before the judiciary but to 
protect the judiciary from claims of bias. It is notable that feminist and 
critical theorists seek to undermine law by setting bare the foundations of the 
system in fallible human beings who do not live up to the impartial character 
it. 1 1 They use its own standards, set up to hide its dependence on public 
opinion, against it. I2 
The legal system uses a variety of techniques to establish its legitimacy. This 
thesis has focused on one set of limitations, those which are self-imposed by 
the judiciary in presenting acceptable arguments. This has led to a 
consideration of precedent and the judicial role. 
2.1 Precedent and tradition 
Precedent is purely a matter of practice and yet it is rigidly followed. This is 
understandable in lower courts where it is imposed by the state sponsored 
hierarchy of courts. Yet even in the House of Lords this is a supreme 
obligation. Previous cases may be overruled but the Lords are extremely 
reluctant to do so. This seems to place authority in these previous decisions 
and yet it is the judge making the decision who defines that power and its 
limits by defining the ratio and choosing whether or not to distinguish 
previous cases and even whether to distinguish on the grounds of fact or law. 
This process is expressed though not in the language of choice, instead judges 
use the language of compulsion, they are bound, they cannot see how this, the 
11 Maley suggests that a growing interest in language in law often betrays a radical critique 
(1999,50). 
12 Simpson has pointed out that the common law is essentially customary and based on 
acceptance. (1973, 85-86) He was focusing on those who participate but this is true also 
of its acceptance by the wider society and by the political establishment. 
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facts of the case simply do not apply. They seek the power of a tradition. 
Traditions have power because they can hide the person who is making the 
decision in the instant case. Gadamer, who sees tradition as a paradigm of all 
understanding, has referred to the way in which noone can escape from their 
"historically determined consciousness". Philosophy has seen this as 
problematic - the individual is always open to prejudices and yet judges seek 
this and seek to prejudge. This is not to use prejudicial in its more common 
sense but there is in the way that judges seek to portray, and clearly feel, 
themselves bound by previous cases an attempt to suggest that the case has 
been prejudged that they are applying a tradition that flows through them. In 
this their lack of individual response, the fact that they are determined by a 
tradition makes them less and not more suspect. The complex structure of 
tradition in the Talmud was strongly dedicated to smoothing out individual 
differences and creating structures of reasoning which would embed in the 
subconscious and predetermine certain responses to the material. Precedent is 
the structure through which the common law absorbs this traditional power. 
The practice of distinguishing is essential to this structure and provides for the 
mechanism of change that all traditions require. 13 It ensures that even when 
judges seek to avoid the power of a legal decision they do not seek to go 
beyond the decision. An advocate or barrister who approached the House 
arguing that precedent was simply a fiction and it was up to those individuals 
present to decide the case on the basis of their own sense of what would be a 
just outcome would be unsuccessful. Judges seek not only to make decisions 
but to legitimate and to justify them. They do not with to persuade others 
simply that their decision is correct but that they had no choice but to come to 
that decision. They do not wish the decision to belong to them but to belong 
to the system as this is where it gains its authority.14 
13 Krygier has described the way in which traditions build in change (Krygier 1986) and this is 
reflected in Gadamer's statement that the past and present are constantly mediated - see 
chapter 1. 
14 Levenbrook argues that the examples used in precedent are socially rather than judicially set 
and that the judiciary are constrained by a wider sense of what is significant (Levenbrook 
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Precedent is not without content and this thesis as well as looking at 
precedent looked at the development of case law and judicial argument in the 
law of negligence in Scotland and England. This showed how the methods 
that judges used to develop acceptable arguments in this area of law changed 
and evolved over time. In Scotland the acceptance of reason and philosophy 
as an authoritative source encouraged the use of its tools of categorisation and 
principled reasoning. IS In England where authority was based in sovereignty 
where this encouraged the development of systems where authoritative 
processes such as writs could become all powerful. The recognition of the 
limitations of this led judges to look at argument and reasoning and develop 
case law as an alternative source of authority. In Scotland case law came to 
replace a belief in a common moralityI6 as a source of authority and thus from 
different directions the systems independently evolved a case-based system of 
precedent. Both systems also had to deal with what within that case law was 
authoritative. It would not have been possible for the system to simply be 
founded on the authority of individuals. Each decision made by a judge does 
not question but seeks to establish and re-establish their character and their 
role of identity - judges cannot ask "who am IT. Rather they have to support 
and nurture that character through their decisions. This thesis has argued that 
in looking at the way in which judges explore these arguments in their 
decisions and in what arguments are accepted it is possible to see the way in 
which these foundations of judgment are established and re-established and at 
the core of this is the complex which surrounds the way in which judges 
understand their role. 
2000). 
15 Blackshield (1987) has said of the influence of the Scottish traditions on the House of 
Lords: "This continuing influence is at its greatest precisely at the level of inarticulate 
background assumptions with which we are now concerned; and it is, of course, at this 
level too that Scots Law Lords (always among the most redoubtable in the House) are 
most likely to display the continuing influence of their original training." (1987, 115) 
16 It is interesting to note that Simpson links the development of precedent to a break down of 
custom. (1973, 98) Traditions occur in times when there are difficulties generating 
consensus in matters such as religion which seek the atemporal. This is another way in 
which judgment can be distinguished from philosophy which despite any difficulties still 
seeks this atemporal truth. 
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2.2 Judicial role 
Negligence and pure economic loss are of particular interest in looking at 
judicial role because of the way they deal explicitly with the relationship 
between law and society which the judiciary see themselves as mediating. 
Negligence is an alternative way of recognising relationships in the absence 
of contract and can clearly only be based on a sense that law has a duty to 
enforce such relationships and to enforce some broader sense of the way 
relationships are formed. At times the judiciary are very clear about this, in 
Donoghue Lord Macmillan links the development of the law to social 
attitudes and Atkin goes further in espousing a principled approach on the 
foundations of commonly accepted morality.17 They do so though in the 
context of physical relationships, the bottle passed physically from hand to 
hand. It is likely that any form of "common sense" would support a legal 
recognition of such relationships.I8 It is when there is no longer a clear 
physical link but a strong logical link that the arguments about limitations 
become most keen. In considering pure economic loss they cannot ground the 
decision in the real world. 19 This means that in this area judges are concerned 
that the foundations of their authority will be exposed as ultimately this is 
what the decision will be based on. These concerns will be expressed where it 
is that they feel law is vulnerable. It may seem a simple matter of fact to 
decide whether damages are reasonably forseeable but as has been seen in the 
case of Junior Books this issue raises questions of foundational importance, 
implicitly raising questions such as how far is law prepared to go and how far 
will its foundations take it without them being open to question. It is in 
answering these questions that judges use their most emotional language and 
17 Bankowski shows how the imaginative leap that this involved was later absorbed into the 
tradition where it lost its power to surprise (1991,212) 
18 This has of course not always been true particularly in England. There is something 
anachronistic about the early English cases to modern ears which are based in a society 
with strongly defined roles. The new common sense probably evolved in response to the 
industrial revolution. which undermined this structure. 
19 There is a strong tendency to use the authority of the "real" world in judgment. Whether it 
be in the linking of the ratio to the facts of the case or the wariness about the power of 
pure ideas and logic. 
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show that it is when they feel that their role is in question that judges are most 
committed. The heat of the debate reflects the level of emotional commitment 
and undermines again MacCormick's argument that cognitive commitment 
and emotional or volitional commitment are separable. The emotional 
commitment here arising out of the cognitive commitment and indeed cannot 
be understood without it Similarly the implications of the cognitive 
commitment are seen in the emotional response which in turn deepens the 
cognitive understanding of the process. The intensity of their debate does not 
lie around the emotional or ethical arguments as understood by the wider 
society but around the ways these should be absorbed so that the legal system 
retains its authority and is not undermined by being seen to be too politicaL 
In providing these reasons the core commitment of judges remains to law and 
the distinction between the two methodologies discussed can be seen in terms 
of their response to issues which they feel undermine law's foundations. 
Often they are afraid of the same problems, politics and the power of 
argument When it comes to being seen as political, the fIrst group who 
espouse the principled approach is most concerned of the dangers of being 
seen to have founded a decision not on clear reasonable logic but on a narrow 
legalistic interpretation of facts which can appear to draw the line on a 
subjective whim and even worse on the whim of people with no links to the 
common people. Case-based reasoners are wary of being seen to be going too 
far and being ahead of public opinion, of losing the power of tradition to hide 
the impersonaL They are not afraid that logical arguments will show the 
absurdity of their narrow classifIcations rather they are afraid of the power of 
logic to tend to infInite regress. The key to both points of view is where they 
feel law is established and where the foundations remain secure their sense of 
authority and role is linked to their sense of limitations. This brings to mind a 
defInition of a judge by Levinas: 
The Judge is not just a legal expert of laws~ he obeys the law he 
administers and he is trained in this obedience~ the study of the law is 
itself the essential form of this obedience. (Levinas 1994, 107) 
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The obedience is not simply demonstrated in his/her ability to apply the rules 
and practices but in their emotional commitment to the foundations of their 
authority. 
Malloch V.A. 2002 
Conclusion 
Conclusion 255 
It has been argued that no philosopher or theorist will ever be convincing and 
it has been pointed out that in practice philosophy is a form of judgment that 
often settles for lesser standards in order to resolve the problems of infinite 
regress. This conclusion considers first why theorists, and in particular the 
three studied in chapter 2, have failed to see the importance of emotional 
commitment in understanding judgment and then whether, given the 
limitations on philosophy, judgment should be seen as a model for all 
understanding. 
1. Understanding judgment 
In considering the success or failure of a legal theorist it is first necessary to 
consider the goals of their theory.20 MacCormick seeks to support the rule of 
law with the tools of philosophy. He does so by defining people as essentially 
reasonable and seeing the syllogism as a choice not simply of logic but ethics. 
Perelman seeks to justify reasonable debate to provide it with a foundation. 
He is seeking to support theoretical debate with judicial authority. Jackson is 
the purest theorist, seeking to show how a structure can clarify practical 
problems. Most of the implications of these positions and the way it led the 
three theorists to misinterpret the role of the individual were raised at the end 
of chapter 2 and this section does not seek to revisit that argument but instead 
to deal with how their theories relates to the process of judgment as described 
in this thesis. 
This analysis has actually revealed the importance of much of what was 
highlighted by the theorists in their own work and in particular this 
conclusion owes much to Perelman. Even Jackson who was seen as the least 
persuasive of the three can be seen, particularly in his discussion of closure 
rules, to be aware of the importance of limitations in defining a discourse. 
20 This limits the constant questioning and allows them to be judged by their own standards. 
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Indeed, the works of Jackson and Perelman may well better highlight the 
ways in which the judge defines himlherself according to his audience as this 
thesis has focused more on the use of language. MacCormick's theory could 
also be used to explore the way in which the judiciary use philosophical tools 
to bolster their arguments. The core criticism made against them though 
remains and that is that they failed to deal with the rhetorical and the 
symbolic elements in the judicial decision. Instead, they have sought to see 
beyond these elements into philosophical structures. This does not mean that 
judgment cannot be understood in this way but that in stripping the decisions 
of the identity of the judge they failed to miss a key component of the 
judgment - the commitment of the judge. 
It is in their commitment that the judge reveals the foundations of the system 
and why they too seek to hide certain personal elements and to be general but 
not universal. They absorb their role as a judge into their own personality and 
the system encourages them to do so by offering competing versions of the 
role which allow different personalities to absorb different versions. This 
makes their understanding the role a matter of choice and something which 
they can identify strongly with themselves. This is a trick known to the 
Talmud, a system which appears structural and impersonal but which allows 
individuals a degree of freedom.21 In seeking to describe such a system in 
purely structural terms and not realising the way in which the individual 
relates to the system the theorists inevitably fail to see why the judge absorbs 
a sense of role and even more so why the system needs to keep open the 
possibilities of more than one sense of role or one answer in order to absorb 
different personalities. Indeed, their view of judicial role can be seen to 
express their own commitment and this is why only one view of the judge is 
presented and this the one that best fills the gaps and supports the foundations 
21 Garver applies the talmudic structure to law in arguing that while there may be many 
legitimate arguments in a case, there will be only one just one in the sense of one 
compellable argument and that the gap between the two is an ethical one (1999, 122-
123). Kramer (1991) following Derrida has argued that the paradoxes within law, its 
tendency to set up oppositions set up the sense of a background of objectivity to law and 
in this sense would be essential to its desire to justify its foundations. 
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of their own theory. In this light, McConnick's work is particularly notable as 
he, like the judiciary, wishes to support the legal system, and his description 
of judgment as essentially rational not only supports a rule of law ethic but 
gives strong support to a '"Scottish" style of reasoning. Jackson's commitment 
to integrity is seen in his description of the academic which supports his role 
and explains his distance from a process which is essentially more bounded 
than that of the academic and which seeks to hide and not to reveal personal 
bias. Perelman's judge is the perfect example of a participant in 
argumentation who can respect all views and by using reason as well as 
rationality provide persuasive arguments without resorting to violence. These 
points have been made before but in the light of this understanding of 
judgment another possible reason behind their failures becomes clear - it may 
be that philosophy's desire to provide one single answer and therefore one 
model of the legal system makes it hard for philosophers to provide models 
which show why, within limitations, the system allows individual participants 
the opportunity to have divergent models. 
2. Judgment as understanding 
In chapter 1 it was suggested by Gadamer that judgment was the paradigm of 
all understanding. This was supported by a view of understanding as a process 
of mediation and application of past knowledge. It could be argued that the 
view of philosophy which is not a mediation but a questioning could also be 
seen as a practice akin to judgment in that this has its own limitations and 
certainly, as a profession, philosophers do submit to judgment Yet 
philosophy does still retain within itself the pursuit of the unquestionable 
answer and is more dedicated to its process as pure persuasion than any 
particular paradigm. The goal it is wedded to may be impossible but does this 
mean that we should settle for a bounded view of understanding when it is at 
least possible to see an unbounded one. 
The bounded nature of understanding and its limitations is what gives it 
authority and allows it to be communicated. A fonn of understanding that is 
Malloch V.A 2002 Conclusion 258 
judgment sees knowledge as traditional and rooted in relationships between 
others and texts. The flexibility of such structures has been seen in this thesis 
which considered three different views of judgment in judicial contexts as 
well as different theoretical models which sought to understand them. The 
boundaries allows us to communicate to each other by setting out a series of 
practices and defining relationships but is this inevitable and should we hold 
on to the possibility of an unbounded world even though that raises questions 
of impossibility. 
Yet there is an appeal in the goal of unbounded understanding. Critchley's 
reminder that betrayal is the result of all commentary and is inevitable 
whenever a choice or a decision is made22 shows that the implications of a 
bounded understanding are not all positive and there is something attractive 
about the goal of the reader, a pure desire to completely absorb and 
reunderstand a text rather than imposing one's own situation on the text. 
There is an ethical argument in saving philosophy and not using a judgment 
as a model of all understanding but rather reestablishing its foundation in the 
impossible. 
This is not to say that philosophy as questioning can not be equally 
problematic. Its structure of questioning and the goal of theory to explain 
everything can make it rigorously intellectual and as has been seen it has 
difficulty dealing with emotions, character and identity.23 It is not being 
argued that philosophy is a purer or better goal than judgment but its 
unbounded nature means that restricting our understanding of understanding 
to judgment which is of essence bounded leads to a denial of the core element 
of what has been for millennia a respected form of intellectual practice. It 
may be that the way we understand texts, and each other is too complicated to 
be understood by one single theory and that we need different forms of 
22 See chapter 1 above. 
23It is possible that its current obsession with identity may lead to a form of study which can be 
more responsive to aspects of humanity that are not strictly intellectual. 
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understanding to reflect the different ways individuals and intellectual 
communities try and make sense of the world. This would see philosophy and 
judgment as related in their use of similar tools but as very different forms of 
understanding. Any similarity between them would lie in the fact that they 
were used by people as ways of explaining phenomena rather than in any 
relationship to some meta- or more foundational form of understanding. This 
means that there would be no overall theory of understanding that could 
explain the ways in which people choose to understand but instead the key to 
understanding would be in the decisions of individuals, influenced no doubt 
by their culture and education to adopt and use different forms and the ways 
in which each individual related them to each other. The advantage this 
would have over a meta-theory of understanding is that it would be at the 
service of individuals rather than, as so often appears to be the case in 
theoretical constructs of understanding, at the service of the theory. This 
would place ethics at the core of any such attempt at understanding and would 
inevitably lead to issues of relativism but this thesis has shown that it is 
possible to consider the complexities of the emotional commitment 
individuals have to their methode s) of understanding without having to share 
that commitment 24 It has though to be admitted that the choice the 
philosopher or theorist makes in choosing a method of understanding to use 
themselves that they will inevitably have to make such an ethical 
commitment 
24 This does not mean that the theorists would not be and indeed they would probably have to 
be emotionally committed to the method of understanding that they themselves were 
using. There is an inevitable circularity in this structure. It is also likely that the best way 
to prove one understood a certain methodology of understanding would be as a 
practitioner rather than by using a different methodology. The latter though would have 
the advantage of introducing new perspectives. 
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